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Abstract 
This thesis begins by establishing an understanding how capacity is conceptualised, developed, 
managed, monitored and evaluated in the field of international development. I then use this 
understanding to assess how it might inform program management monitoring & evaluation 
(PMM&E) in international police capacity development operations. I do this through exploring the 
literature surrounding the conceptualisation of capacity development (CD) and its implementation 
as well as considering conventional approaches to program management and monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) before applying the findings of this literature review to the case of police 
capacity development in Solomon Islands. Through this exploration I consider the value of 
complexity theory in understanding such police capacity development environments. I then utilise 
complexity understandings to develop a framework for PMM&E in police CD operations that is 
more able to manage and monitor the complex realities of a CD environment as well as harness the 
manner in which capacity emerges. 
The case study chapters focus on the institutional CD of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
(RSIPF) and the experienced realities of police practitioners. The chapters are broken into two 
separate but related stages of analysis. The initial analysis of this data is concerned with 
understanding if and how the conceptualisation of capacity, CD and PMM&E in the field of 
international development is relevant to the case of police CD in the Solomon Islands and what it 
might be able to tell us about how best to design a framework for program management inclusive of 
M&E (Program Management M&E [PMM&E]) appropriate for police CD operations. The 
emergent themes suggest a dramatically different approach to PMM&E is required to fully account 
for the processes and environment. Given the strong and consistent themes in the data surrounding 
issues to do with the interconnectedness and interdependence of systems and subsystems, the 
importance of individual agency and how different and complex cultural and knowledge systems 
shape, inform and limit such agency, the unequivocal centrality of emergence and the unpredictable 
nature of CD in this case leads me to consider the relevance, and explanatory power, of systems 
thinking and complexity theory.  
The first stage of data analysis suggests a need to return to the literature to explore complexity 
theory in international development. This literature informs stage two of the data analysis. The 
findings of this second stage of analysis demonstrate there are a number of component complexity 
concepts that appear to be highly instructive in understanding the case of police CD. Accordingly 
the concepts are grouped together into themes and the data is reanalysed against these new insights. 
The case study findings present a strong argument for the utility of complexity theory in the 
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PMM&E of police CD as well as a range of practice based lessons to be incorporated into the 
design of a program management framework.  
The dissertation draws on the above findings regarding the relevance of complexity theory and 
other practical lessons for improving practice in CD PMM&E and further unpacks these concepts to 
draw out the practical implications for designing a PMM&E framework in an international police 
CD operation. Based on the demonstrated centrality of complexity theory concepts, I propose a 
framework for PMM&E in international police CD operations incorporating both the theoretical and 
the practical findings generated by the preceding literature reviews and case study analysis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 An Overview   
This thesis is concerned with understanding how capacity is conceptualised, developed, managed, 
monitored and evaluated in the field of international development – exploring how such 
conceptualisations might inform program management monitoring and evaluation (PMM&E) in 
international police capacity development (CD) operations. I do this through reviewing the 
literature surrounding CD approaches as well as considering conventional program management 
and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) before applying the findings of this literature review to the 
case of police CD in Solomon Islands. Through this exploration I consider the value of complexity 
theory in understanding such police CD environments. I then utilise complexity understandings to 
develop a framework for PMM&E in police CD operations that is able to manage and monitor the 
complex realities of a CD environment as well as harness the manner in which capacity emerges. 
Given the relative infancy of the international police CD field at the time of embarking on this 
research project (in 2008) and the pressure on police organisations to demonstrate development 
outcomes in their M&E, my early literature review led me to consider what the field could learn 
from the experiences of CD and M&E within program management in the field of international 
development more broadly. As a consequence this thesis explores the concept of capacity, the 
process of CD, and the debates surrounding approaches to program management and the M&E of 
such CD in the international development field. I find that the concept of CD has shifted from one 
concerning the technical training of individuals and the treatment of recipient organisations as 
‘pieces of techno-rational machinery that needed to be fixed’1 to focusing on organisational 
capacity in terms of soft and complex adaptive systems (referred to as ‘systems’). I find that whilst 
conventional approaches to the PMM&E of CD do offer some practical benefits, these approaches 
are largely at odds with the systems’ conceptualisation of capacity and CD and are therefore 
deficient in their ability to account for the CD process.  
I find that the problems with conventional approaches to PMM&E are partly a result of shortfalls in 
practice and implementation. However, based on the literature review, I argue that a great deal of 
these problems appear to stem from an underlying ontological/epistemological tension and 
inconsistency between how CD is conceptualised, in terms of systems with an emphasis on 
emergence and non-linear pathways, and how it is planned for and measured in PMM&E, in terms 
                                                 
1 H. Baser and P. Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance Study Report,” ECDPM Discussion Paper 59B 
(Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2008), 27. 
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of closed systems, rational and logical approaches dependent on linear ‘cause and effect’ 
understandings of change. Having established the value of conceptualising CD in terms of systems I 
move to consider if conventional approaches to the PMM&E of CD can be modified and improved 
to capture a systems approach to CD. I then draw on the findings of the literature review to develop 
a table of key concepts and principles for operationalisation in the context of police CD in Solomon 
Islands.  
The case study chapters focus on the institutional CD of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
(RSIPF) and the experienced realities of police practitioners. The chapters are broken into two 
separate but related stages of analysis. The initial analysis of this data is concerned with 
understanding if and how the conceptualisation of capacity, CD and PMM&E in the field of 
international development is relevant to the case of police CD in Solomon Islands and what this 
analysis might be able to tell us about how best to design a framework for program management 
inclusive of M&E (i.e., PMM&E) that is appropriate for police CD operations. The case study 
suggests that the experience of CD in the field of international development is indeed relevant to the 
case of police CD in Solomon Islands. However, the emergent themes reveal that a dramatically 
different approach to PMM&E is required to fully account for the processes and environment. 
Given the strong and consistent themes in the data surrounding issues to do with the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of systems and subsystems, the importance of individual 
agency and how different and complex cultural and knowledge systems shape, inform and limit 
such agency, the unequivocal centrality of emergence and the unpredictable nature of CD in this 
case leads me to consider the relevance, and explanatory power, of systems thinking and complexity 
theory.  
Thus the first stage of data analysis suggests a need to return to the literature to explore complexity 
theory in international development. This literature informs stage two of the data analysis. The 
findings of this second stage of analysis demonstrate that there are a number of component 
complexity concepts that appear to be highly instructive in understanding the case of police CD. 
Accordingly the concepts are grouped together into themes and the data is reanalysed against these 
new insights. The case study findings present a strong argument for the utility of complexity theory 
in the PMM&E of police CD, as well as a range of practice based lessons that can be incorporated 
into the design of a program management framework.  
The dissertation draws on the above findings regarding the relevance of complexity theory and 
other practical lessons for improving practice in CD PMM&E, and further unpacks these concepts 
to draw out the practical implications for designing a PMM&E framework in an international police 
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CD operation. Based on the demonstrated centrality of complexity theory concepts, I propose a 
framework for PMM&E in international police CD operations that draws upon both the theoretical 
and the practical findings generated by the preceding literature reviews and case study analysis. 
This framework aims to strategically incorporate a wide range of complex adaptive agents (CAAs) 
in its planning, implementation and M&E (PMM&E cycle) of police CD. It recommends 
mechanisms for taking account of interrelated/interdependent systems and subsystems and puts in 
place enabling conditions for the emergence of sustainable capacity together with a monitoring 
framework which can account for unpredictable non-linear change processes. The proposed 
framework incorporates practical lessons by recommending processes for overcoming commonly 
experienced problems in CD implementation and M&E as well as harnessing the practical benefits 
of current approaches. Importantly it strikes the balance between strategic planning and planning for 
uncertainty, ensuring it takes account of both positive and negative unintended consequences. The 
framework is designed to be flexible, adaptable and iterative in its application to context and scale – 
meaning it can ultimately generate data which takes account of complex realties while still lending 
itself to feeding data back into the more rigid, rational and logic based M&E mechanisms which 
remain a dominant feature in the current CD environment.  
1.2 Research Question 
The research question has been designed to provide a workable boundary around a relatively open 
framework for this enquiry in the interests of exploring the wider issues and allowing at least a 
partially inductive approach within a focused area of interest. The overarching research question is 
as follows: 
How can a program management framework inclusive of M&E (PMM&E), informed 
by the conceptualisation of capacity development in the field of international 
development, be usefully applied to international police capacity development 
operations? 
1.2.1 The research puzzle  
This research project takes a standard qualitative approach and is presented therefore as a research 
puzzle comprised of a series of questions designed to explore the overarching research question. 
Rather than propose a hypothesis for testing, the research question has been broken down into a 
systematic framework of sub-questions in the interests of unpacking the components of this 
research puzzle. The research pathway has been largely contingent on the findings of each of these 
sub-questions and has allowed the data to inform the consequent approach to the subsequent 
questions. The research puzzle is comprised of the following questions: 
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• How is capacity and CD conceptualised in the field of international development? 
• What are the dominant approaches to the PMM&E of CD interventions in the field of 
international development? 
• Are contemporary understandings of capacity and CD relevant to the police CD intervention 
in Solomon Islands? 
• If so, are conventional approaches to PMM&E adequate for capturing, managing and 
monitoring the complexity of police CD environments and processes and do they reflect the 
manner in which capacity emerges?  
• What processes and data need to be captured to better account for the realities of a police 
CD operation? 
• How can PMM&E frameworks be improved to effectively manage and monitor police CD 
operations? 
• Based on the foregoing analysis, what would a PMM&E framework for police CD 
operations look like? 
The exploration of these questions provides a basis for answering the overarching research question 
and allows me to conclude by offering a proposed framework for PMM&E in international police 
CD operations. 
1.2.2 Scope 
The manner in which M&E is conceptualised and operationalised varies enormously between 
donors and programs in international development and it is beyond the scope of this research 
project to consider the full gamut of approaches in this space. It must be acknowledged from the 
outset that monitoring and evaluation is often treated separately in that monitoring tends to be used 
as an ongoing approach to managing performance while evaluation is commonly added to the end 
of the project – routinely enlisting the services of external consultants. The motivation for using 
external consultants and treating evaluation as a discrete inquiry generally at the end of a program 
or program cycle varies. However, it is common for evaluation to be undertaken in this manner in 
the interests of bringing in outside scrutiny. It is generally claimed that such independent analysis 
offers a level of objectivity which cannot otherwise be achieved by program staff and stakeholders 
evaluating themselves. There is a sense that such independence and objectivity can achieve a level 
of external validity which is scientific – and above reproach. The methodologies employed to 
conduct such evaluations are generally characterised by their commitment to objectivity based on 
varying degrees of positivism. However, approaches do vary considerably with methodologies 
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ranging from participatory methods to quasi-experimental approaches such as randomised 
controlled trials.2 
Whilst this type of evaluation (generally impact evaluations) is important and no doubt significantly 
influences the manner in which programs are managed and the consequent effectiveness of such 
programs (both actual and perceived), it is not the focus of this research. This research begins by 
recognising the centrality of M&E and the importance of M&E being embedded in program 
management from the outset. I am primarily interested in how M&E within the program 
management cycle can monitor progress and inform improvements in practice and implementation 
– that is, it is my assumption that M&E information is required during the program cycle if it is to 
be best utilised for improving outcomes and achieving the desired impact. Therefore approaches 
which treat evaluation as a discrete activity remain outside the scope of this research. However, 
whilst my position is based on the understanding that M&E data and analysis is necessary for 
informing the ongoing process of policy and program adaptation throughout the life of an 
intervention, the data generated by M&E embedded in program management nonetheless provides 
an invaluable source of evidence for analysis at the point of impact evaluation.  
1.3 Methodology  
1.3.1 Literature review and primary source documentary analysis  
The second chapter of this thesis explores the concept of CD through providing an overview of the 
CD literature in the field of international development and describing and analysing a range of 
relevant primary source material. In particular, the literature review focuses on research conducted 
by or for the dominant international development institutions that most obviously influence 
Australian CD policy and practice in the interests of ensuring the literature review findings are 
relevant to the case study. The documentary analysis also includes an extensive review of practice 
based policies, guidelines, principles and tool kits in operation through relevant CD agencies to 
understand how the theory of CD is being translated into practice. A comprehensive review of the 
literature and operational documents has led me to focus on the seminal research and 
conceptualisation of CD produced by the European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) and corresponding AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development) policy 
and practice guidelines.  
The third chapter takes a similar approach as the second in conducting a literature review and 
primary source documentary analysis of the field of PMM&E in international development with a 
                                                 
2 M. Palenburg, “Tools and Methods for Evaluating the Efficiency of Development Interventions,” Evaluation Working 
Papers (Bonn: BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011), 17-20. 
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focus on approaches to PMM&E in CD. The chapter begins by exploring the theory and practice of 
conventional approaches to PMM&E and outlines the international consensus by considering 
literature and policy documents of dominant organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
United Kingdom’s (UK) aid agency, the Department for International Development (DFID), 
amongst others. The chapter goes on to critically analyse this approach by considering the practical 
shortfalls as well as the position of practitioners operating within this paradigm. This section draws 
on practitioner opinion and experience by considering relevant conference papers and blogs. The 
chapter concludes by briefly outlining the implications of a systems perspective for PMM&E, as put 
forward by the ECDPM. There is a deliberate emphasis on the literature and primary source 
material that is demonstrably defining and informing policy and practice. I have attempted, in 
describing and presenting this literature and documentary analysis – particularly of primary source 
operational documents, to reproduce the language of such sources through the use of quotations, 
paraphrasing and the provision of illustrative excerpts. An understanding of the discourse of 
dominant PMM&E practice then provides a basis for the critical analysis of its implications.  
Based on the findings of the literature review chapters I identify the key concepts and implications 
for practice. In doing so, I present these concepts in a table for operationalising throughout the case 
study. The concepts are numbered and drawn upon to inform interview questions which are then 
coded against these concepts and addressed in themes. To ensure the case studies explore the 
practical aspects of CD and PMM&E the primary focus of these case studies is the experienced 
realties of police CD practitioners and their corresponding police counterparts.  
The case study section explores the practice and PMM&E of the institutional police CD operation 
in the RSIPF as a component of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In 
the interests of understanding how CD happens in practice and how it is perceived by its key 
implementing stakeholders this case study is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with 
police CD practitioners (advisers) and host organisation police officers (counterparts). The 
interview questions have been designed to ask systematic questions about the approach to CD and 
PMM&E to determine the relevance of the above conceptualisation of capacity, CD and PMM&E 
in a police CD environment and to inform a proposed framework for PMM&E. Ultimately the aim 
of this research is to understand whether or not CD as defined by the ECDPM (and increasingly 
accepted by the institutions important to, and influential in, Australian policy and practice) is 
relevant to police CD, if it reflects the experienced realities of CD in the international police CD 
context and what this means for PMM&E. Accordingly the interview data is coded against the key 
concepts and analysed to determine the relevance of these concepts and the consequent implications 
for PMM&E.  
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The critical themes emerging from these interviews and the consequent data analysis provides an 
impetus for further exploring the concepts of systems thinking and how they relate to complexity 
theory. The second phase of data analysis then systematically compares the component elements of 
complexity theory with the case study data to understand the potential relevance of complexity 
theory concepts to police CD PMM&E. Based on the findings of these two stages of analysis I draw 
out the relevant and practical implications for police CD PMM&E. I do this by summarising the key 
concepts and implications for PMM&E in a matrix which then explicitly links the foregoing 
analysis and findings with a proposed framework for PMM&E that is systematically informed by 
the research findings.  
1.3.2 Reflections on the research project and approach to data analysis 
It is important to acknowledge that my research process has been somewhat more iterative than I 
initially envisaged and, as is a strong theme of this PhD project, my approach to methodology and 
particularly data analysis was far more ‘messy’ than expected. Whilst I certainly embarked on this 
project with the intention of taking a largely inductive approach to the analysis, in hindsight it is 
clear that I was expecting through my primary research to find a number of practical ways in which 
conventional PMM&E could be improved in the context of police CD and that these findings would 
lead me to propose changes within the existing dominant PMM&E paradigm. This is not because I 
was at all wedded to the ideological, epistemological and theoretical assumptions upon which 
conventional approaches to PMM&E are based, but because I felt this was a pragmatic approach as 
the entrenchment of these dominant frameworks seemed inevitable.  
However, contrary to my expectations I did not find that systems thinking only offered an 
interesting critique in which to inform PMM&E adjustments. Rather, based on the experienced 
realities of police practitioners, I found that systems thinking exposed a far more fundamental 
problem at the core of conventional PMM&E. Throughout the interview process and during my 
preliminary data analysis strong themes began to emerge that clearly challenged the assumptions 
which underpinned dominant PMM&E logic. As I explored these tensions the relevance of systems 
thinking became clearer, more potent and ultimately impossible to ignore. I found myself unable to 
make sense of the data within a conventional framework and despite my cursory literature review 
on how complex adaptive systems relate to CD I was unable to fill the gaps. I was compelled to 
return to the literature and further explore systems thinking and complexity theory as it relates to 
international development. In the meantime, during my period of primary research (2009-2011), 
complexity theory was beginning to take hold in this field and consequently there was a newly 
emerging body of knowledge to draw upon and apply to my consequent data analysis. I therefore 
proceeded by unpacking the component concepts of complexity as they were presented in this 
8 
 
literature and systematically applying these concepts to the interview data in an effort to understand 
the explanatory power of complexity theory in a police CD context – with the ultimate aim of 
exploring the consequences for PMM&E. 
1.4 Context: International Police Capacity Development  
The focus of this research project is the PMM&E of institutional or organisational CD of a police 
organisation. Whilst there is a longer history of technical skills transfer and development in the field 
of international policing, the expanded mandate of reforming and capacity developing whole police 
forces is relatively new.3 The first comprehensive approach to reforming, restructuring and capacity 
developing a whole policing organisation is generally understood to be the police CD operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.4 In this case, and in those that followed, the development of 
police capacity, as part of reforming and rebuilding the Rule of Law (RoL) apparatus, was seen as a 
critical intervention designed to establish stability and replace (or restore) institutions destroyed 
and/or compromised by conflict.  
Whilst no doubt an ‘ideal’ type, manifesting in different and complex ways, police CD is generally 
viewed (in the prevailing international donor discourse) as a necessary component of the restoration 
of RoL in post-conflict or fragile state settings. Such establishment of the RoL is understood to be 
the precondition for sustainable peace and development: ‘indeed, there is widespread consensus that 
a semblance of stability and public security is a prerequisite to peacebuilding in other social, 
political and economic domains’.5 The (re)building of police forces in the context of widespread 
conflict or fragile state institutions can often coincide with other governance, bureaucratic and 
administrative CD as part of a wider state-building approach. This state-building approach is 
consistent with RAMSI, the case study explored in this research project, whereby the CD of the 
police force was part of wider whole of government CD strategy.  
As the case study will testify, the relative infancy of this field of international policing means that 
approaches to PMM&E are underdeveloped and program managers and police practitioners have 
found conventional approaches to the M&E of policing to be wanting. Despite some dedicated 
efforts in recent years to develop PMM&E systems for such police CD interventions there is little 
                                                 
3 B. Hughes, C. Hunt and J. Curth-Bibb, Forging New Conventional Wisdom Beyond International Policing: Learning 
from Complex Political Realities (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 19-21. 
4 Ibid., 20. 
5 W. J. Durch and M. L. Englands, ed., Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and the 
Rule of Law, Revised and Updated (Washington, DC: The Henry L Stimson Centre, 2010), cited in ibid., 31.  
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consensus on how to approach this task. The few models that have been implemented in this field 
have been largely inadequate.6   
In considering the approach to PMM&E, it is crucial to note that policing organisations operating in 
an international CD environment are increasingly required to meet the expectations and 
requirements of the international development agenda. The use of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) for police operations is now common practice in the evolving security-development nexus. 
For participating OECD DAC (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee) countries this means there is pressure on police to produce, 
measure and report on development outcomes. Policing organisations are not in the practice of 
looking for development outcomes and meeting these reporting requirements will require a 
reorientation of focus.7 ODA criteria specify that for assistance to be classified as ODA it must be 
‘administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries 
as its main objective’.8 Whilst ‘expenditure on police training is reportable’, ‘the supply of the 
donor’s police services to control civil disobedience’ is not and nor is the interruption of violence or 
‘enforcement aspects of peacekeeping’.9 This means that policing organisations delivering CD need 
to demonstrate the explicit use of resources for such CD as well as demonstrate the links between 
policing and CD outcomes and broader development outcomes.10 These ODA conditions further 
suggest the value of considering the experience of CD PMM&E in the field of international 
development to understand how it might inform approaches in police CD PMM&E. I begin this 
exploration in the following chapter as I unpack the concept of capacity and the implementation of 
CD in the field of international development. 
  
                                                 
6 Ibid., 43-51. 
7 Personal communication with management personnel (International Deployment Group, AFP), 2010. 
8 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Is it ODA?” Factsheet (Paris: OECD, 2008), 1. 
9 OECD, “Is it ODA?”, 2.  
10 Police capacity development operations are subject to the same accountability priorities applicable to development 
agencies. This includes meeting international standards regarding process, reporting and accountability in relation to aid 
effectiveness. International agreements include The Paris Declaration, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), DAC 
Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance, and other DAC guidelines. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
explore these agreements. However, it does help to understand they do in part shape PMM&E approaches to CD in the 
field of international development.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review I – The Concept of Capacity Development 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Concept of Capacity Development 
The following literature review outlines the historical origins of CD. The chapter discusses how CD 
was initially under-theorised and how a heavy emphasis on technical aspects of institutional 
functions has resulted in a lack a critical reflection regarding the inherent assumptions which 
underpin CD interventions. The chapter goes on to explore how international agreements and 
forums in this space have shifted the field from a narrow technical focus to a broader 
conceptualisation of capacity. Based on systems understandings of capacity, CD as a concept is now 
understood to be much more complex. Whilst this critical reflection and more holistic approach are 
welcome, the concept of capacity has become one that is more difficult to operationalise in practice. 
This chapter considers the pivotal work of the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM) in attempting to generate a consensus around the concept of capacity and 
the work they have undertaken in the interests of translating this conceptualisation into one that is 
grounded in practice and is able to inform PMM&E in this field. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
outlining the practical implications for CD processes, and particularly highlights the work of 
AusAID in this area in the interests of applying the broader conceptual understandings to a specific 
example of policy and practice that is relevant to the case studies addressed in this research project.  
It should be noted that much of the literature examined in this chapter may be termed ‘grey 
literature’. This includes the work of think tanks as well as the policy documents of agencies and 
international statements and agreements. In general, the most important work that needs to be 
considered for the purposes of this research project is that which is generated within policy circles 
(and through commissioned and affiliate research units). As Morgan and Lyon acknowledge this is 
‘part of the challenge involved in clarifying the idea of capacity’ due to its origins being largely 
outside academia.11 For this reason an academic body of literature that compares and debates the 
relative merits of different approaches does not exist. Rather there is a plethora of technical 
documents which describe how to go about capacity development with no reflection on the 
underlying assumptions or the implicit theory being operationalised. 
With this is mind, this chapter consists largely of a description of the evolution of thinking in this 
field which culminated with the ECDPM’s study of capacity. It will then demonstrate how this 
study has influenced relevant policy and practice. Whilst this chapter makes frequent critical 
                                                 
11 P. Morgan and P. Lyon, The Idea and Definition of Capacity: A Short Primer (Canberra: AusAID, 2009). 
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observations, the detailed and in-depth critical engagement with the concepts outlined here is 
pursued later in this thesis, particularly in the data analysis chapters and consequent discussions.  
2.1.1 Overview of capacity development  
In order to clarify the conceptual contribution of this chapter it is important to give a brief overview 
of the terms frequently referred to in the literature. Accordingly, this section outlines the concepts 
of technical assistance, technical cooperation and organisational CD. Whilst the terminology tends 
to be used interchangeably, technical assistance often refers to ‘the personnel involved in the 
implementation and management of Technical Cooperation services’.12 Technical cooperation ‘is 
often associated with actions aimed at strengthening individual and organisational capacity by 
providing expertise, training and related learning opportunities (peer exchange, tertiary education 
etc.) and equipment’.13 This is not always straightforward. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) describes technical cooperation as primarily technical assistance which is 
‘free-standing’ or at least can be apart from an overall CD program and was used to ‘compensate 
for skills’.14 This research project is concerned with the provision of CD and is therefore focussed 
on the provision of technical assistance as a component of CD. In the interests of clarity this 
research project will use the following definitions: 
Technical assistance: the provision of personnel and support functions for the delivery of 
expertise, mentoring, training, equipment delivery, education, professional development courses 
and workshops and other technical resource provision. This approach includes the use of donor 
personnel as advisers. Advisers are generally embedded in the host organisation to work alongside 
of host country counterparts to develop the capacity of host country personnel. In many cases 
advisers will take on an ‘inline position’ whereby they directly assume roles within the host country 
organisation and to varying degrees build capacity amongst host country personnel simultaneously. 
This will vary from the transfer of knowledge and technical skills to a more facilitative mentoring 
approach.  
Technical capacity development: The provision of CD which is primarily focussed on technical 
aspects of capacity including technical assistance and other direct resource injections with a 
technical focus. 
                                                 
12 EuropeAid, Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid Provided by the 
European Commission: A Backbone Strategy (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2008), 7. 
13 Ibid.  
14 S. Browne, Developing Capacity Through Technical Cooperation: Country Experiences (New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, 2002), 1. 
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Organisational capacity development: the provision of CD which is primarily focussed on the 
organisational capacity of a host country organisation, institution and/or agency. Technical 
assistance including adviser support will likely be a component of this approach. However, there 
will be a focus on the broader capacity of the organisation to function. It is this conceptualisation of 
organisational capacity and CD that has evolved in recent years and will be further clarified through 
this literature review.  
According to the UNDP, ‘capacity has traditionally been conceived in two dimensions: human 
resources and organizational functions’.15 In an effort to expand the understanding and consequent 
approaches to CD, the UNDP shifted its conceptualisation of CD to one that was ‘three 
dimensional’ to include systems outside the discrete recipient organisations and take into account 
broader enabling factors – defining capacity, then, as ‘the ability to perform functions, solve 
problems and set objectives’.16 Essentially the CD goal has become focussed on creating the 
enabling conditions for CD, including technical assistance, to be absorbed thereby making it more 
sustainable. This shift came from the recognition that technical cooperation, whilst arguably 
successful within its narrow scope, had a ‘limited impact on the ability of countries to sustainably 
manage their own development processes, and thus enable them to become more independent of 
aid’.17 
2.2 Historical Overview of Capacity Development Approaches 
The origins of CD as a form or technique of aid are debatable. However, it is often claimed that CD 
emerged as a solution to the general inability of aid to achieve sustainable outcomes. A simplified 
summary of the theory suggests that financial aid would continue to be swallowed up by 
underdeveloped (not seen at the time to be developing) countries while there continues to be limited 
capacities within those recipient countries to manage their own development and an incapacity to 
sustainably build upon the financial propping up that was provided by aid. The solution then was to 
transfer such capacities, which were presumed to be held by donor countries.18  
Other similar explanations for the rationale of the CD approach results from what is arguably an 
overstatement by donor countries of the centrality of state institutions in the role of development.19 
It began with identifying weak, fragile, developing or post-conflict states as being in need of 
strengthening. Following this logic a simple comparison was made between the ‘ideal’ state 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Ibid.; and Morgan and Lyon, Idea and Definition of Capacity. 
19 D. R. Panday, “Technical Cooperation and Institutional Capacity-Building for Development: Back to the Basics,” in 
Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems, ed. S. Fukuda-Parr, C. Lopes and K. Malik (London: 
Earthscan, 2002), 61-3. 
13 
 
(generally based on a Western system and particularly the system of the donor country) and the 
recipient or weak state. This analysis identified shortfalls in functions and capabilities and resulted 
in attempts to gap-fill such shortfalls.20  
The delivery of aid generally has been long criticised for being politically motivated, and evidence 
regarding the flow of aid in the post-Cold War period certainly demonstrates that it has been at least 
strategic.21 Technical assistance in CD has been particularly criticised in this respect. Donors have a 
history of propping up the capacities of ‘beneficiary’ country institutions in the interests of 
achieving their own strategic goals. Historically technical assistance was often delivered through 
embedding donor staff within host country government agencies and institutions where they have 
essentially taken over the roles, and often the agenda, within such critical organisations. Political 
motivations for technical assistance as a component of CD are still at least an aspect of the technical 
assistance agenda in some cases. Indeed RAMSI, the case study this research project draws upon, 
has not escaped such criticisms.22 According to Morgan:  
both international aid agencies and country governments have used the idea of capacity as a symbolic or 
legitimising device. The former can signal their willingness to help countries manage their own affairs. 
The latter can use it to give intrusive donor interventions a more politically acceptable and benign 
character.23 
The technical assistance approach to CD has also been heavily criticised for its tendency to 
diagnose capacity shortfalls from the outside and for attempting to fill these gaps in capacity 
through technical approaches to training and the inline provision of donor personnel. The problems 
with this approach are innumerable. However, the most commonly cited criticisms relate to the 
unsustainable nature of these arrangements, the in-built donor dependency and the lack of local 
ownership.  
In Peter Morgan’s earlier work for the Canadian International Development Agency he 
distinguishes between endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) CD. The former is ‘an 
                                                 
20 For more information on the origins of technical assistance as the ‘first steps in international development 
cooperation’ (in the post-World War II period, and with reference to preceding technical exchanges), and on the 
historical conditions setting technical assistance up as supplier driven, see P. Morgan, “Technical Assistance: 
Correcting the Precedents,” Development Policy Journal 2 (2002).  
21 Browne, foreword to Developing Capacity.  
22 For more on the political motivations of CD in RAMSI see Hameiri’s argument that ‘RAMSI should not be viewed as 
a technocratic exercise in state building and capacity development by outsiders, but rather as a political project that 
seeks to transform the social and political relations within the Solomon Islands’. S. Hameiri, “State Building or Crisis 
Management? A Critical Analysis of the Social and Political Implications of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009): 35.  
23 Morgan and Lyon, Idea and Definition of Capacity, 2.  
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indigenous process of change and evolution’ and the latter is understood ‘as a donor-supported 
intervention in that process’.24 According to Morgan: 
The first has to do with societal and organizational change in another country – the struggle for power and 
control, the influence of culture and history, the emergence of new values and attitudes, the growth of 
confidence, the search for legitimacy and many other aspects…The second has to do with technical 
assistance, the management of project resources, adaptation and adjustment, results-based-management, 
organizational learning and the pursuit and assessment of results.25 
Whilst the former obviously impacts upon the success and sustainability of the latter, early technical 
assistance provided by donor countries too often treated the delivery of technical CD as being 
separate from the broader aspects of capacity. There was an emphasis on the technical training of 
individuals and the treatment of recipient organisations as ‘pieces of techno-rational machinery that 
needed to be fixed’.26 
The Accra Outcomes Statement, produced through the early High-Level Round Table – ‘Towards a 
Capacity Development Agenda’ – held in February 2002, highlighted the shortfalls of the technical 
approach to CD leading up to the forum (and continuing beyond). In its ‘action points’ the 
statement points out the critical flaws of technical approaches to CD:  
The subject has been viewed through the wrong end of the telescope – the technical cooperation (TC) 
end. We need to look through the capacity development (CD) end to determine what needs to be done, 
and how TC can support the process.  In short, a supply-driven process needs to be replaced by one that is 
demand-driven.27  
The Statement goes on to elaborate that this means: 
• Identifying inadequacies and obstacles to CD. It implies examining factors affecting the use, 
retention, and continuous upgrading of capacities. 
• CD should not only be considered in the public sector but should embrace capacities in all 
sectors of society: academia, the private sector and civil society. This requires engagement of 
these non-state actors in dialogue with government in determining needs and priorities.28  
The Statement also outlines a range of necessary improvements in the approach to CD including all 
aspects to do with enabling local ownership and ensuring that technical assistance is used to achieve 
the objectives of the host government and all of its stakeholders, including civil society. Critically 
                                                 
24 P. Morgan, Capacity and Capacity Development: Some Strategies (Ottawa: Political and Social Policy Division, 
Policy Branch of the Canadian International Development Agency, 1998), 3. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance,” 27. 
27 Accra Outcomes Statement, “Towards a Capacity Development Agenda,” Accra, February 11-12, 2002, reproduced 
in Browne, Developing Capacity, vii-ix. 
28 Ibid. 
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the statement touches on one of the key underlining assumptions of technical assistance which had 
guaranteed its poor track record from the beginning – that being the assumption that knowledge can 
and should be transferred from one context (donor country) to another (recipient country) and that 
this relationship be based on the notion that donor personnel (technical advisers) can impart such 
knowledge to a passive recipient (counterpart) who is imagined as an empty vessel just waiting to 
be filled. Accordingly the Statement stipulates: 
2. Knowledge should be acquired and not merely transferred. 
TC [technical cooperation] has been operating under an assumption that knowledge mainly resides in the 
donor countries and needs to be transferred. But there is knowledge everywhere, and true partnership 
implies an equitable sharing of it…  
• Available indigenous knowledge and expertise must be acknowledged in responding to the 
challenges of CD.  
• Expertise brought in from outside should be in response to country demand and should be fully 
compatible with the local institutional context. 
• ‘Scan globally, reinvent locally’.29  
The statement acknowledges the absence of a framework for ensuring technical assistance and CD 
generally is accountable to the most important stakeholders and makes a strong recommendation for 
addressing this failure: 
7. Governments and external partners must be primarily accountable to the people they serve. 
New accountability frameworks are needed for both donors and recipients that satisfy constituencies on 
both sides, and in each case involve full civic engagement. Accountability is also a reciprocal condition, 
implying responsibilities of donor to recipient as well as recipient to donor.  
• The ultimate intended beneficiaries – the people most affected – should be fully engaged and 
have a decisive voice in determining priorities, taking action and judging actual progress. 
Appropriate instruments and criteria need to be urgently developed for measuring impact and 
outcomes of capacity development.30  
Since the Accra statement there have been other significant international aid reform forums and 
agreements which have paid particular attention to the manner in which CD is delivered. Building 
on the key recommendations of the Accra Outcomes Statement there has been a continued and 
growing emphasis on issues to do with country ownership and broader concerns to do with 
accountability and aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration, agreed upon in 2005, is one such 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
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critical agreement. The principles it outlines – including ownership, harmonisation, alignment, 
results and mutual accountability – all have particular relevance to the approach to CD and its 
associated management and governance practices, with serious implications for PMM&E. The 
Declaration ‘clearly defines capacity development as the primary responsibility of developing 
countries with development partners playing a supportive role through the delivery of TC [technical 
cooperation] services’.31 The Declaration’s ‘indicators’ 4 and 6 are specifically concerned with 
changes to the approach and consequent management and governance of CD as outlined in the 
ECDPM’s Policy Management Brief on Technical Assistance in CD: 
Paris Declaration – Indicators 4 & 6 
Indicator 4: requires 50% of TC [technical coordination] flows to be implemented through coordinated 
programmes consistent with national development strategies by 2010, where coordinated is 
understood to mean the following: 
• Capacity development programmes support partners’ national development 
strategies. 
• The partner country exercises effective leadership over the capacity development 
programme, supported by development agencies. 
• Development agencies integrate their support within country-led programmes to 
strengthen capacity development. 
• Where more than one development agency is involved, arrangements for coordinating their 
contributions are in place. 
Indicator 6: calls on development agencies to ‘reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel 
project implementation units (PIUs) by 2010, where parallel is understood to mean the 
following: 
• Parallel PIUs are accountable to external development agencies rather than to 
country institutions. 
• TORs for externally appointed staff are determined by the development agency 
rather than by the country agency. 
• Most of the professional staff of parallel PIUs is appointed by the development 
agency rather than the country institution. 
• The salary structure of staff of parallel PIUs often exceeds that of civil-service 
personnel.  
 Figure 1: Paris Declaration Indicators 4 and 632 
Whilst it is evident from the above outline that technical approaches to CD have been heavily 
criticised, it is important to acknowledge that such approaches can and have been highly appropriate 
                                                 
31 T. Land, V. Hauck and H. Baser, “Aid Effectiveness and the Provision of TA Personnel: Improving Practice,” Policy 
Management Brief No. 20 (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007), 2. See also, 
“Statement of Resolve,” Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and 
Mutual Accountability, High Level Forum, Paris, February 28-March 2, 2005, 1-4. 
32 Source: Land, Hauck and Baser, “Aid Effectiveness,” 2. 
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and effective in certain situations. In fact, when organisational capacity already exists and the host 
organisation is looking only to enhance skills or share technical information within a functioning 
organisation, technical CD can be valuable. It is important to also acknowledge that technical CD 
and technical assistance remain critical even when organisational capacity is low or the host 
organisation is dysfunctional. However, in such circumstances technical assistance is only a partial 
solution and it can only be pursued within a broader organisational CD approach if it is to be 
sustainable. As this research project is concerned with the wider and more complex issue of 
organisational CD and M&E in this context, it is important to consider advancements in the 
conceptualisation of broader notions of organisational CD. 
Notwithstanding the recognition that ‘the provision of TA [technical assistance] personnel has been 
the subject of significant criticism in terms of cost and limited impact’,33 according to the influential 
work of the ECDPM it continues to be an important factor in CD: 
TA [technical assistance] personnel (and TA generally) should not be looked at as something intrinsically 
good or bad, but as a potentially important resource for supporting country-driven processes… Thus, 
while a shift in thinking and practice with regard to the provision and use of TA personnel is needed, this 
does not mean that it is to be condemned outright, given the real value it can bring to development 
processes.34  
In line with the priorities of this research project, the ECDPM recommends that technical assistance 
be included in a broader conceptualisation and process of CD: 
improving the quality of support provided by TA personnel by adopting a ‘capacity development 
perspective’, within which TA personnel are seen as a potentially important ingredient in developing 
capacity and ensuring that this perspective is applied systematically throughout the design, 
implementation and review (including M&E) of interventions.35  
This research project now considers what is meant by a broader conceptualisation of CD, and in 
particular focuses on organisational CD, and the work of the ECDPM in redefining this concept.  
                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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2.3 An Overview of ‘Capacity, Change and Performance’36  
The Capacity, Change and Performance Study was a new approach to studying capacity, initially 
conceived of in late 2002, to build on the work of the UNDP in redefining and better understanding 
‘capacity issues’.37 It was initiated by donors and paid for by the OECD’s DAC Network on 
Governance and Capacity Development (Govnet) members, including the Australian Government.38 
The aim of the study was to: 
• enhance understanding of the interrelationships among capacity, change and performance across 
a wide range of development experiences; and  
• to provide general recommendations and frameworks to support the effectiveness of external 
interventions aimed at improving capacity and performance.39 
Importantly the study considered how capacity was developed within a system, or endogenously, 
and, with that understanding, how external agencies might support such CD. Of course there were 
some serious methodological issues in ‘disentangling’ internal and external aspects of CD given the 
hybridity that often evolves in countries that either receive development assistance of some sort or 
have in some manner ‘indigenised’ introduced institutions. Nonetheless the focus on internal 
processes of CD is important conceptually. In considering 16 case studies and engaging in an 
exhaustive process of consultation with donors, policy makers and practitioners, the study attempted 
to understand the value (if at all) and nature of capacity and ‘if capacity development processes 
have any common aspects regardless of their context, or whether they are customised responses to 
                                                 
36 As will become clear through the following overview, this study has been pivotal in redefining capacity and capacity 
development in policy circles and it is therefore given appropriate attention in this section. This overview for the most 
part references the study report: Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance” .However, all of the papers, 
policy recommendations and related research and references have been considered in writing this overview. Some of 
these references include: D.W. Brinkerhoff, Capacity Development in Fragile States (Discussion Paper 58D) 
(Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007); P Engel, N Keijzer and T Land, A Balanced 
Approach to Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity and Performance: A proposal for a framework. (Maastricht: 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007); D Watson, M&E of Capacity and Capacity 
Development: One theme emerging from the study on Capacity, Change and Performance – Presentation (Maastricht: 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2006); P Morgan, The Idea and Practice of Systems Thinking 
and their Relevance for Capacity Development. (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
2005); P Morgan, ‘The Concept of Capacity – Draft Version’, Study on Capacity, Change and Performance. 
(Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2006); P Morgan, RAMSI and Capacity 
Development: Report on a field trip to the Solomon Islands (Revised). (Maastricht: European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, 2007); and S Taschereau and J Bolger, Networks and capacity, (Discussion paper No 58c). 
(Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007).   
37 Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance.” 
38 The study was initially prompted by requests to the ECDPM from the UK aid agency (DFID) to conduct the research. 
It was then supported with funding from Govnet members and ECDPM itself. AusAID was acknowledged in the report 
as a key contributing organisation.  
39 Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance,” 7. 
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unique circumstances’. The study specifically considered the question is capacity ‘just an umbrella 
concept and a symbol or proxy for something else?’40 
Whilst the study was concerned with producing useable and practical findings relevant to policy 
makers and practitioners, its authors make a case for the inclusion and critical reflection of 
underlying theories and assumptions. They recognise a reluctance to engage with the abstract within 
CD circles but insist that it is nonetheless imperative to do so and that such apprehension can in fact 
explain some of the short falls in practice.  
We were struck during the case research by a common pattern. Some analysts and almost all practitioners 
disdained any interest in theories or abstract concepts. They would then proceed to outline their approach 
to capacity development by articulating a collection of assumptions and action steps which in many cases 
added up to a theory or world view about how capacity develops. Such theories about capacity 
development were, in the end, based on beliefs about human nature, the dynamics of cause and effect, 
implicit ends and means of development, and the current state of the world. Theory and practice are 
intertwined in almost all capacity discussions and interventions.41  
The study reminds us that addressing capacity issues purely from the perspective of ‘operational 
experience ... managing projects and programmes’ while neglecting the theoretical underpinnings 
results in analysis which is ‘instrumental and preoccupied with prescription, targeting, control, 
results and accountability’. In any case the evidence suggests that ‘the mistakes and dysfunctions 
surrounding capacity issues are as much conceptual and strategic as they are operational’. 
Furthermore, ‘learning about capacity issues will remain stunted if operational insights cannot be 
matched up and combine into some broader theories or frameworks with genuine explanatory 
power’.42  
In exploring the value of different theoretical and conceptual understandings of how capacity 
develops the study introduces a systems approach and explains the relevance of complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) in understanding CD. Whilst the study findings do ‘stress’ that they ‘do not regard 
CAS as the only way to explain capacity development’, it is considered important to at least 
supplement existing approaches and note that in some cases ‘capacity development cannot be 
understood without looking at it from a CAS perspective’.43 The relevance of a CAS perspective is 
summarised through highlighting the following key points: (1) ‘CAS thinking focuses on processes 
more than structures or outcomes as a way of managing’; (2) systems are understood ‘as 
functioning on the basis of interrelationships between people, groups, structures and ideas’; (3) 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 9.  
42 Ibid., 9-10.  
43 Ibid., 15.  
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human systems change through emergence – capacity is an emergent property which evolves ‘on 
the basis of countless interactions amongst a huge number of elements’; and (4) human systems 
have a tendency towards self-organisation.44 The overview of CAS provided in the report presents 
some interesting challenges to conventional approaches to CD and consequently its PMM&E. 
However, it is not always clear how such an understanding would translate into practice or 
operational strategies.45 In other words, the theoretical implications of CAS are not easily translated 
into a tangible framework for action in a holistic sense. Rather, abstract conditions are described 
based on CAS assumptions that stand in stark contrast to conventional conceptualisation of 
capacity, and then some practical implications for practice are described. The below table is 
provided in the report to summarise some of the key concepts as they relate to practice and program 
management approaches.  
 
Aspect 
Traditional planning 
approaches 
Complex adaptive systems 
Source of direction 
Often top down with inputs from 
partners  
Depends on connections between the 
system agents 
Objectives  Clear goal and structures  Emerging goals, plans and structures 
Diversity  Values consensus  Expects tension and conflict  
Roles of variables Few variables determine the outcome Innumerable variables determine outcomes 
Focus of attention 
The whole is equal to the sum of the 
parts 
The whole is different to the sum of its 
parts 
Sense of the structure Hierarchical  Interconnected web 
Relationships Important and directive Determinant and empowering  
Shadow system Try to ignore or weaken  
Accept that most mental models, legitimacy 
and motivation for action come from this 
source 
Measure of success 
Efficiency and reliability are measures 
of value 
Responsiveness to the environment 
[context] is the measure of value 
Paradox  Ignore or choose 
Accept and work with paradox, counter-
forces and tension 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 16.  
45 This is not a criticism. The report itself acknowledges that there remain significant challenges in this respect. 
However, it provides enough tangible examples and explanations to overcome the criticisms by some in development 
circles who suggest systems thinking is not a practical approach to thinking about CD and are therefore resistant to its 
use.  
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Attitude to diversity 
and conflict46 
Drive for shared understanding and 
consensus 
Diverse knowledge and particular 
viewpoints  
Leadership  Strategy formulator and heroic leader Facilitator and catalytic  
Nature of direction Control and direction from the top 
Self-organisation emerging from the 
bottom 
Control  
Designed up front and then imposed 
from the centre  
Gained through adaption and self-
organisation   
History47  Can be engineered in the present Path dependent  
External interventions Direct  
Indirect and helps create the conditions for 
emergence  
Vision and planning  
Detailed design and prediction. Need to 
be explicit, clear and measurable  
A few simple explicit rules and some 
minimum specifications. But leading to a 
strategy that is complex but implicit 
Point of intervention 
Design for large, integrated 
interventions  
Where opportunities for change present 
themselves 
Reaction to uncertainty  Try to control  Work with chaos  
Effectiveness  
Defines success as closing the gap with 
a preferred future  
Defines success as fit with the environment 
[context] 
 Table 1: Comparison of assumptions in different approaches to planning48 
2.4 The Concept of Capacity  
The ECDPM found through their extensive research that ‘there is no broadly accepted definition’49 
of capacity. Furthermore, ‘one is not likely to appear in the near future’50 not least because 
practitioners and policy advisers working in this space are generally not interested in exploring the 
concept. Even those practitioners working closely within the same program have differing views on 
what the term means and therefore what capacity needs to be developed and how.51 The ECDPM 
formulated an understanding of capacity based on what they ‘found the participants to be doing as 
they carried out their work’.52  
Typically capacity tends to be understood essentially as the collection of technical competencies 
which are deemed to be missing in any CD intervention context. For example, in a policing context 
it might be that the police organisation lacks the capacity to carry out strategic planning. Therefore 
                                                 
46 Note that this appears to be repetitive. I suggest what is meant by this point is that the traditional approach would 
attempt to reach consensus and ignore opposition – whereas a CAS approach would value the different knowledge and 
viewpoints and sit with the conflict or appreciate its productive value.  
47 This point is a bit at odds with my later analysis and findings regarding complexity theory. A few of these points are 
perhaps too brief to be easily understood. Nonetheless the comparison is a useful exercise.  
48 Source: Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance,” 19-20. 
49 Ibid., 22. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. Supported by interview data presented later in this research project.  
52 Ibid., 22. 
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strategic planning is the proxy for capacity and in turn what needs to be developed. The ECDPM 
attempted to ‘reverse this approach’. Treating ‘public sector reform or civil society strengthening as 
the context or the ‘playing field’’ for developing capacity, it tries to understand ‘the elusive nature 
of capacity’ and to define capacity as a stand-alone concept that is operationalised in specific 
contexts.53 The study therefore suggests five central characteristics of capacity.54  
1. Empowerment and identity: enabling an organisation ‘to be aware of itself, to grow, 
diversify and survive’ – to become ‘more complex’. 
2. Collective action: the ability for an organisation to pull together ‘collective capabilities’ to 
‘be able to do something with some sort of intention’ and with effectiveness over a period of 
time. 
3. Inherently a systems phenomenon: capacity is the ‘emergent property’ or the effect of 
‘multiple interactions’ – dealing with ‘a soup of complex technical, organisational and social 
activities’ unable to ‘be addressed through exclusively functional interventions’. 
4. Capacity as a potential state: performance is about ‘execution and implementation or the 
result of the application and use of capacity’. Described as being about ‘latent energy’ and 
dependent on intangibles ‘to a large degree’ it is ‘thus hard to induce, manage and measure’. 
It can come into being through the alignment of factors and conditions and it can also 
‘disappear’.  
5. The creation of public value: the ‘strengthening of the capacity of a group or system to 
produce public goods and public value’.  
  
                                                 
53 Ibid., 23. 
54 I offer here a summary of the key characteristics. For a full account see ibid., 23-5. 
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In considering the necessary collective capabilities of capacity the ECDPM found there to be five 
‘core capabilities’ or ‘elements of capacity’. These capabilities include the capabilities to: (1) 
commit and engage; (2) carry out functions or tasks; (3) relate and attract resources and support; (4) 
adapt and self-renew; and (5) balance coherence and diversity.55 The figure below was developed 
by the study to illustrate these capabilities: 
 Figure 2: Elements of capacity56 
The capability to commit and engage is an inherent aspect of what now is considered to be an 
unequivocal ‘truth’ of all development activities and that is the importance of local ownership. Seen 
as a capability that ‘energises all the others’ this notion goes beyond ownership in terms of 
inclusion in decision-making and refers to the system’s ability to ‘be conscious and aware of its 
place in the world, to configure itself, to develop its own motivation and commitment and then to 
act’.57 The counter condition is one of ‘stuckness’, where the organisation is trapped in patterns that 
it cannot escape, it lacks self-awareness and/or control and instead is reactive to forces that happen 
onto it (both internal and external). Essentially when this capability does not exist the organisation 
will be victim to circumstances and unable to act due to a lack of agency. In cases where this 
capability is weak, or in certain aspects of the organisation it is compromised, the result can be that 
citizens ‘withhold support and legitimacy’ leading to a ‘weak demand, weak response syndrome’ – 
locking ‘inaction in place’. Whilst this may manifest on the surface as technical shortfalls in 
practice, ‘the deeper explanations – usually political, social and psychological – do not lend 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 26. 
56 Source: ibid.  
57 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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themselves easily to the conventional ‘needs assessment’ or capacity analyses’. 58 The capability to 
carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks, relates to the more tangible aspects of 
capacity that are generally catered for in the technical assistance  approach to CD. This capability 
refers to the ability to ‘carry out functions, formulate policies, regulate activities, provide security’ 
and the like. This aspect of capacity is concerned with inputs, activities and outputs – it includes 
everything from strategic, financial and administrative management to carrying out day-to-day 
duties and tasks. This capability exists within the formal realm – it is informed by standard 
operating procedures and other protocols, policy and legislation.59  
The capability to relate and attract resources and support was found to be a large part of what 
successful organisations ‘actually did as opposed to what they reported’. The study found a great 
deal of time was spent on developing and maintaining relationships with enablers and clients or 
beneficiaries of the organisation. These relationships created legitimacy allowing the organisation to 
pursue its goals both by attracting necessary resources and support. According to the study’s 
findings ‘this capability has to do with consolidating and defending the system’s autonomy, 
functioning and existence’. Included in this capability was the actors’ ‘capability to manage 
symbolic appearances, to communicate effectively, to enter into productive partnerships, and 
alliances, to manage political conflict and, in general, to secure the organisation’s operating 
space’.60 Much of this relationship and network development and maintenance were informal – 
generated through informal relationships often with informal actors. This was found to be a highly 
political space and included systems and subsystems coevolving – that is they were changing in 
reference to, and through relating with, the other. Without this core capability (as with commit and 
engage) the organisation is acted upon rather than managing and maintaining its own integrity 
through managing its relationships.  
The capability to adapt and self-renew refers to the organisation’s ability to change and respond to 
internal and external dynamics, new information, expectations and policies. Critically this capability 
relates to the ability of the organisation to remain relevant in a fluid environment. This capability is 
directly linked to M&E systems and systematic organisational learning. It is fundamentally about 
being well informed and deliberately responding or adapting practice according to received 
information. It is about using such information and connections to recreate the organisation as 
necessary in the interests of capitalising on changes in the environment and minimising risks. 
Associated with this capability was the ability to: ‘improve individual and organisational learning; 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 27-8.  
59 Ibid., 29-30.  
60 Ibid., 30-1. 
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foster internal dialogue; reposition and reconfigure the organisation; incorporate new ideas; and 
map out a growth plan’.61 These abilities and aspects are often associated with other core concepts 
such as resilience and sustainability. The capability to balance diversity and coherence relates to 
the ability to ‘encourage both stability and innovation’. It also highlights the importance of 
absorbing and harnessing conflict and difference as a productive force. Diversity in a coherent 
organisation generates useful changes and accommodates competing goals and interests. Diversity 
without coherence results in fragmentation.62  
It is important to acknowledge that the ECDPM does not suggest that all CD programs need to sit 
down and attempt to systematically analyse their core capabilities and build a strategy for 
developing them. Rather this understanding offers a useful insight into what capacity might actually 
consist of and this can be used to inform CD practice. Importantly these insights allow us to be 
explicit about aspects of capacity that have so far been invisible or implicit. By making them 
explicit not only can we be mindful not to undermine these components and capabilities in our 
approach to CD, but we may also move toward incorporating them into our understanding and 
ensuring they are taken into account in PMM&E.  
2.4.1 Capacity development: Definition 
It is evident that the above outlined systems thinking approach is beginning to have an impact on 
how key organisations think about and define CD. I therefore provide, in the table below, the 
definitions of capacity and CD provided by the ECDPM and compare them with the most important 
definitions for this research project: (1) the definitions used by the OECD DAC, as it sets the 
parameters and frames understandings important for the reporting of CD activities as ODA – a key 
concern for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and therefore relevant to the case studies; and (2) 
AusAID’s definition of CD, which is the most relevant definition to this case study in terms of 
practical influence as it informs the approach to CD in RAMSI. 
 Capacity  Capacity Development  
ECDPM Is the emergent combination of 
individual competencies and collective 
capabilities that enables a human 
system to create value.63 
Is the process of enhancing, improving and 
unleashing capacity. It is a form of change which 
focuses on improvements. 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 32. 
62 Ibid., 33. 
63 Ibid., 34. 
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OECD 
DAC 
Is the ability of people, organisations 
and society as a whole to manage their 
affairs successfully. 
Is the process whereby people, organisations and 
society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt 
and maintain capacity over time.64 
AusAID  The process of developing competencies and 
capabilities in individuals, groups, organisations, 
sectors or countries which will lead to sustained and 
self-generating performance improvement.65 
 Table 2: Capacity and capacity development definitions 
Whilst there are some differences in the wording and emphasis of these important definitions, what 
is true of all of them is the far broader and more holistic conceptualisation of capacity and the 
approach to its development than the narrow technical assistance approaches of the past. It is clear 
that systems based understandings of capacity and CD, as articulated by the ECDPM, are becoming 
increasingly accepted in practice.  
2.5 Approaches to Capacity Development: Planned, Incremental, Emergence 
The ECDPM study report acknowledges the enormous array of approaches to CD, the lack of 
consistency in understanding exactly what CD is and the different manner in which approaches 
might be categorised, including ‘top-down and/or bottom-up, technical and/or organisational, 
individual and/or organisational’.66 With this qualification made the report usefully categorises CD 
approaches as planned, incremental and emergent. 
According to the study findings a planned approach was associated with ‘control and 
intentionality’. It strongly reflects the notion that capacity can be engineered through careful design. 
This approach was usually accompanied by detailed planning, defining and scheduling activities 
against specific objectives and timelines and predetermined outcomes. It was dependent on a degree 
of predictability. According to the case studies, ‘participants who favoured this perspective tended 
to see CD as an activity that could be managed like a project or programme’.67 The 
conceptualisation of CD in such an approach includes a linear understanding of cause and effect and 
problems are either simple or complicated but not complex. It was acknowledged that this approach 
had ‘genuine advantages in some situations’.68 Moreover, ‘all the case organisations employed it to 
                                                 
64 OECD DAC, The Challenge to Capacity Development: Working towards Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2006). 
65 This was AusAID’s recognised definition of CD at the time of the research and was in use by RAMSI. An explicit 
definition of ‘capacity’ was not (as far as I could establish) in use at the time. See OECD DAC, “Donor Capacity 
Development Innovation: Australia,” Issues Brief 5 (Paris: OECD, 2009). 
66 Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance,” 77.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. 
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some degree’.69 Interestingly, although ‘not surprisingly’, ‘the more participants relied on external 
funding, the more they claimed to be using a planned approach to capacity development’.70 
In an incremental approach there was a greater emphasis on ‘adaptiveness and flexibility’. It was 
still possible to have many of the elements above in terms of objectives ‘but they functioned more 
as guidelines than fixed targets’. This approach was appropriate or favoured if there was a degree of 
uncertainty in how to proceed with CD – this may be because the capacity needs were not clear or 
because the context or operating environment had a large degree of opaque activity or uncertainty 
surrounding it. Described as ‘using adjustments and small interventions’ – ‘participants could seek 
out opportunities, try different changes, move in fits and starts and try to learn what might work 
under different conditions’.71  
The emergence approach starts with a completely different emphasis, focussed on ‘relationships, 
interactions and system energy’.72 In this approach capacity ‘was seen to emerge and form out of 
the multiple interdependencies and the multiple causal connections that were operating and being 
encouraged within the system’.73 Whilst this approach certainly provides valuable insights into how 
programs might enable change and capacity to emerge, it was rather at odds with the above 
approaches and certainly lacked the level of control and prediction preferred by donors and 
government agencies. With a tendency to be favoured in endogenous approaches to CD, 
importantly this approach does not properly explain how capacity could be induced or managed at 
all.74 
The study found that the cases they considered used a range of approaches in practice and 
sometimes a combination of approaches were drawn upon within the same program. The success of 
CD approaches depended on the context, including the political environment, the degree in which 
capacity already existed, what stage the CD program was up to (for example emergence was used in 
some cases initially and developed into an incremental approach), the focus of CD (for example in 
one case there was a planned or incremental approach to institutional/formal CD with an emergence 
approach being adopted in the informal sphere), and a huge range of other considerations and 
factors. Importantly the study ‘found few capacity development strategies that worked well in all 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, 78. 
73 Ibid. 
74 According to the study, the approach ‘needed a shared sense of meaning and values, some sort of collective identity 
and a system boundary, some fungible resources, some basic rules of conduct and a protected space that allowed some 
freedom of action’. These conditions and approach however seem inconsistent with the concept of emergence in terms 
of recognising the complexity of the system – meaning such aspects can inherently be beyond the control of the CD 
program.  
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the cases’ – confirming that ‘no ‘code’ or recipe for effective capacity development’ existed.75 The 
study did, however, provide some insight into what does not work: 
What did not work were the mismatches between strategies to address capacity challenges and the 
context. Planned strategies could not deal with combinations of complexity and uncertainty. Emergence 
could not provide the clarity and structure needed in many public sector reform programmes.76  
Notwithstanding the above categories of CD approaches identified by the ECDPM, just how an 
external intervener might go about developing capacity, holistically defined, is still not clear. We do 
know how international development agencies have attempted to develop capacity in the past 
through technical approaches. As is highlighted above this was primarily through externally 
conducted needs or gaps analyses of the technical and functional aspects of organisations followed 
by an effort to fill such gaps through technical assistance, including: substituting host country 
personnel for donor personnel, mentoring, training, and equipment delivery. More recently 
(including presently) there has been an effort to strategically manage a path through CD by taking a 
slightly broader and more participatory approach but essentially relying on similar assumptions and 
techniques, only with greater host country inclusion in the problem diagnosis and planning process. 
What is less clear is how best to develop the kind of capacity which is now more widely accepted as 
being important – such as the capacity concepts and component core capabilities outlined by the 
ECPDM. The response of the international donor community has been to develop tools and 
guidelines for CD which at least take into account the more holistic conceptualisation of capacity in 
the interests of informing CD practice that might enable capacity to develop. The next section will 
consider how AusAID (as an example of international development practice) has worked to 
incrementally adapt CD approaches to be more able to support and enable the development of 
capacity in line with the above conceptual developments. AusAID’s approach will be explored 
through considering some of their CD policy notes, tools and guidelines for practice.77  
2.6 Practical Applications: AusAID’s Operationalisation of Capacity 
Development Concepts 
AusAID has worked closely with the ECDPM to further develop the above conceptualisations of 
capacity and CD into workable and practical procedures and principles for practice. AusAID started 
developing an approach to CD that was sensitive to many of the above outlined concepts and 
                                                 
75 Baser and Morgan, “Capacity, Change and Performance,” 80.  
76 Ibid., 81.  
77 It is important to point out that I am not considering AusAID’s approach in the interests of assessing whether or not 
they have effectively transformed the above conceptual developments into practice – but rather I intend to draw on 
these practice based documents in the interests of grounding these concepts in a practice framework for informing my 
interview design.  
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nuances in 2004 as a response to criticisms raised by an OECD DAC Peer Review.78 At the time the 
report criticised AusAID’s heavy handed technical assistance approach to CD – expressing 
concerns for the overuse of technical assistance personnel and the direct or inline approach that 
such personnel were taking. It was suggested that Australian CD was overwhelming the local 
institutions.79 In response to these concerns AusAID has quite deliberately increased its emphasis 
on CD, institutionalising CD as a field of specialisation and has dedicated resources to CD as a 
specialist function.  
The agency appointed a principle adviser for CD, established a CD panel, including a key ECDPM 
study author, Peter Morgan, and generated various comparatively innovative practice guidelines and 
principles. It now provides training to both its staff and in-country counterparts in the theory and 
practice of CD. Relevant to the case study research following in this thesis, AusAID’s CD course 
‘Making a Difference’ was offered to RAMSI personnel, advisers and counterparts including law 
and justice personnel, as well as Australian police officers in adviser roles along with the 
corresponding RSIPF counterparts.  
AusAID received an improved report card from the OECD with the Peer Review conducted in 
2008. Whilst the review noted some serious continued concerns with the reliance on technical 
assistance, AusAID was recognised for taking an approach that was ‘increasingly guided by partner 
government priorities’. According to an issues brief published by the OECD in 2009, ‘Australia is 
[now] one of the lead donor countries to relate the key principles of CD to its development 
cooperation’, and Peter Morgan has acknowledged the agency for ‘evolving towards ‘third 
generation technical assistance’’, which includes partner ownership, a systems focus and process 
approaches.80  
According to the OECD issues brief, AusAID now has an emphasis on ‘empowerment and partner 
country ownership’. There is now an increased recognition and change in practice to accommodate 
the necessary flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness through ‘fluid programme design’ – 
offering ‘room for experimentation and evolution ... the agency attempts to apply tailor-made tools 
... to fit the specific context’. The agency is said to encourage a mix between a planned approach 
and allowing for flexibility, encouraging staff to understand that ‘capacity often emerges 
organically’.81  
                                                 
78 OECD DAC, Donor Capacity Development Innovation. 
79 Ibid., 2. See also, OECD DAC, DAC Peer Review: Australia (Paris: OECD, 2005), 19-20, 31, 39.  
80 OECD DAC, Donor Capacity Development Innovation, 1, 3. 
81 Ibid., 1. 
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2.6.1 Principles for CD practice 
AusAID’s Capacity Development: Principles and Practices82 document provides us with an 
excellent example of the practical approach to CD and how this approach was beginning to change. 
Whilst the document was released prior to the findings of the ECDPM, it is evident that many of the 
conceptual shifts were already being at least partially implemented as the lessons from practice 
filtered through policy documents and operational guidelines. As is demonstrable from the 
reference list informing these guidelines AusAID was actively incorporating the preliminary work 
of the ECDPM and the concepts that were already being developed by it CD specialists.83 The 
principles outlined in the document are important to consider here for several reasons. For one, they 
were in the field and being drawn upon in the RAMSI context at the time of the research; secondly, 
the practically focussed document strongly reflects the conceptual insights outlined above; and 
thirdly it translates many of these issues into operational considerations in a manner that can 
usefully inform the wording and approach to the practitioner interviews undertaken as part of the 
case study research.  
According to the guidelines, ‘what differentiates capacity development in a foreign aid context is 
the way it is initiated84 and supported through providing resources from outside the country being 
assisted. This premise is an important one, for despite sustained advocacy for CD to be 
acknowledged as an ongoing endogenous process that should draw on outside assistance where 
available, CD programs in reality continue to be initiated and resourced from the outside. In setting 
up conditions for successful CD in this context the guidelines outline seven principles for ‘activity 
design stages’. According to the guidelines these principles inform an approach to CD that should 
not only achieve performance improvements throughout the CD process but should also set the 
organisation up to achieve ongoing performance improvement after CD withdrawal.  
Principle 1 starts off with the first of the contradictory, yet arguably still ‘true’ and important, 
principles coming out of the CD lessons-learnt literature and that is to plan to leave from the start. 
Included in the principle is the immediate need to define end points for CD interventions from the 
outset, to avoid dependency and to understand how long technical assistance is ‘likely to be needed’ 
and ‘what performance indicators can [be] set to ensure capacity is progressively developed’.85  
                                                 
82 AusAID, Capacity Development: Principles and Practices (Canberra: Australian Government, 2004). 
83 See for example: H. Baser and P. Morgan, Factors Underpinning Successful Capacity Development and Good 
Performance (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2003); Morgan, “Technical 
Assistance”; and P. Morgan, What is Capacity? Going Beyond the Conventional Wisdom (Maastricht: European Centre 
for Development Policy Management, 2004). 
84 AusAID, Capacity Development,1 (emphasis added).] 
85 Ibid., 2. 
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Somewhat paradoxically (although these tensions are acknowledged), principle 2 encourages 
practitioners to be flexible and analyse risk. It recognises that CD is a ‘fluid activity’, noting that it 
operates in complex environments and as such progress can vary in terms of time lines and impact. 
On the one hand the principle suggests a need to have ‘well articulated goals and objectives and a 
sound methodology’, presumably to overcome this uncertainty - whilst at the same time recognising 
that this process is unpredictable and that an approach which is too prescriptive will be 
counterproductive. It urges practitioners to adapt and respond to conditions on the ground – to 
‘remain relevant and responsive’.86 It also suggests a need to conduct sound risk analyses and 
establish contingency plans in the interests of responding to such risks eventuating in a timely and 
considered manner, whilst also acknowledging unintended outcomes can be difficult to predict.  
Principle 3 reminds practitioners that ‘capacity development takes time’ and it ‘eludes quick fixes 
and the search for short-term results’. This principle encourages practitioners to resist the urge to 
‘bypass partner organisations and staff’ as this will undermine sustainable CD.87 Essentially this 
principle warns of the danger of advisers moving into inline roles and actively ‘doing’ the work of 
counterparts in the interests of achieving performance improvements or completing activities to 
meet unrealistic targets and timelines. This time pressure should also be resisted in the interest of 
building relationships of trust between interveners and local organisations and personnel. It is also 
necessary to build time into the CD process/approach for reflection.  
Principle 4 cautions against overly ambitious targets and warns practitioners do not overestimate 
what can be achieved. Notably this principle acknowledges that: 
the people mapping out capacity development frameworks usually consult with an organisation’s most 
senior people. They are often the most highly educated and most articulate88 in the organisation but can 
be removed from the reality of the coalface. This can lead to miscalculations of what can be achieved and 
the timeframe within which it can be delivered.89 
Principle 5 notes that it is important to manage expectations. This concern, according to the 
guidelines, relates to the inclusion of host country personnel in the CD planning process. It is 
suggested that this may open the flood gates for expectations and can result in disappointment when 
not all of the expectations can be met. The guidelines go on to highlight the risk of the ‘Rolls Royce 
syndrome ... where everyone wants the world’s best yet a more basic model is perfectly adequate’.90  
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87Ibid., 3. 
88 Presumably in the dominant language of development – i.e. English with a mix of bureaucratic development industry 
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Principle 6 reinforces a long held view in CD circles that ownership and leadership is vital. It 
states that ‘supply-driven assistance rarely works’. However, it is acknowledged that achieving 
local ownership is complex and requires sustained engagement and dialogue at all levels. It is not 
enough to work with the aspirations and commitment of senior personnel, ministers and heads of 
government alone as this does not necessarily facilitate ownership at lower levels in the 
organisation. Without ownership, the guidelines warn, the ‘program will not survive the withdrawal 
of aid’. For achieving local ownership in a difficult and complex political arena the guidelines 
recommend taking time to understand power relationships, motivations and vested interests. It 
encourages working with ‘reform champions’.91 This may include prioritisation of the concerns of 
champions in the CD approach to assist them in influencing others. Finally, it is critical to maintain 
sustained engagement across all levels including establishing participatory processes to include 
stakeholders in strategic decision-making, change processes and in understanding impact and risks.  
Principle 7 begins to touch on the importance of systems and encourages the utilisation of ‘holistic 
approaches based on sound analysis’. The principle draws out the importance of understanding 
‘the interplay between individual, organisations and community to avoid designing interventions in 
isolation’.92  
In addressing CD implementation stages, principle 8 addresses inline work versus advising. This 
principle points to ‘the “help” don’t “do” dilemma’, acknowledging that this as a perennial problem. 
There is recognition here that advisers generally come from a working role whereby they 
themselves are responsible for achieving outcomes and this experience fuels their tendency to ‘do’ 
the work rather than advise their counterparts. The failure of CD design to properly account for the 
time necessary to achieve CD, and its associated tasks, often results in advisers stepping in and 
directly undertaking the work themselves. As a general rule the guidelines point out that this in fact 
undermines CD goals. However, there are exceptions where ‘doing the work is useful for practice’. 
These instances are outlined as follows: 
• It can be important for the adviser to win the respect and trust of counterparts by showing he/she 
is ‘one of them’, is prepared to ‘pitch in’; 
• The task is urgent and critical and to insist on only advising on its completion may appear too 
precious and pedantic and be counterproductive to relationships; 
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• In some cases it might not be practical to teach someone a job they are unlikely to face again in 
the future.93 
Under principle 9, ‘training: methods first, content later’,94 the emphasis is on ensuring that 
training is received in a manner that is useful to the person receiving the training. In other words 
training provision is not the end goal in itself. The document outlines two training types: on the job 
and formal sessions. In each case it is important that training relates directly to on the ground 
realities and that it is clear how newly acquired skills can be used in the job (rather than just being 
extra information). Technical experts are not always good trainers – accordingly support should be 
available to improve the adviser’s skills in this area.  
Principle 10 urges practitioners to build on what exists and outlines how it is critical that existing 
capacity, knowledge and practice is recognised and treated as important – and where possible built 
on. Relevant and sustainable capacity will be built in collaboration with local partners. Ignoring 
existing structures (enabling or disabling) and assuming what existed is not of value or needs to be 
completely replaced ‘is a recipe for failure’ in CD.  Partner organisations and personnel are not (and 
should not be) passive recipients of external knowledge, but rather a source of knowledge 
themselves and active participants in the creation of new knowledge and change processes. This 
principle recognises that ‘capacity development plans often focus on what is wrong and needs 
fixing rather than what is working and can be extended’.95 
Principle 11 is concerned with the importance of incentives and notes the necessity of considering 
incentives for change and being mindful of the disincentives that need to be managed or addressed. 
According to the guidelines it can be difficult to create the right incentives, making sure they do not 
generate perverse affects and to ensure they are sustainable. Potential disincentives are numerous, 
often including inadequate pay, working conditions, equipment, systems and housing. In most cases 
limited resources will mean that these problems cannot all be addressed (at least not immediately).96  
Principle 12 addresses the need to plan for staff turnover. As acknowledged in this principle, staff 
turnover in the partner organisation is an ongoing challenge in many CD environments. Sometimes 
CD itself can contribute to this problem by training staff thereby making them attractive to other 
organisations. There are a few basic things the principle recommends including: build capacity with 
a team approach (so not just one person knows what is going on); encourage those who are 
receiving the benefits of CD to nurture local staff and help build their capacity; work on the 
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incentives for staying in the organisation; improve recruitment practice to meet the needs created by 
high turnover; and do not assume that one person needs to perform a range of tasks – it might be 
more appropriate to have a team of people working on things.97 
Accounting for the cultural environment again brings the understanding back to the broader 
systems at play and in principle 13 it is considered in terms of practical CD impact. If CD programs 
attempt to introduce systems and practices which are incompatible with cultural practice or do not 
make sense within the cultural context they are unlikely to be successful. It is important not to see 
culture as something outside the organisation. Culture is fluid, multifaceted and permeates all 
aspects of life. It includes political culture, bureaucratic culture and societal culture(s). Informal 
practices impact upon formal institutions. This principle notes that work practices will be influenced 
by social norms and obligations and CD initiatives should be careful not to introduce practice and 
systems which conflict with other priorities.98 
Morgan and Lyon (2009) in their respective capacities as an AusAID Capacity Development Panel 
member and a senior capacity development adviser to AusAID, provide an excellent overview of 
the ‘shifts’ in CD thinking and consequent approaches in practice in their paper The idea and 
definition of capacity: A short primer.99 These shifts are worth summarising here as they 
encapsulate the importance of changing CD conceptualisations for practice, and are particularly 
relevant to the case studies included in this research project given they are at least in part a 
representation of the shift in thinking in Australian CD circles.100  
1. The shift from technical transfer to partnership and co-production 
This is essentially a shift from ‘building capacity by transferring ... universal techniques 
from developed to less developed countries mainly through the adviser/counterpart 
relationship’101 to an approach which would see a collaborative process which ‘co-produces 
solutions that are not obvious from the outset’. 102 This is often referred to in the literature as 
‘reinventing locally’.  
2. A shift in emphasis from the individual to the wider system or the ‘micro’ to the 
‘macro’ 
CD in the past, primarily through technical assistance, has been concerned with improving 
the performance of individuals through training and advice. It has now become clearer that 
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the performance of such ‘subjects’ is contingent on ‘macro’ factors or ‘the wider 
institutional and organisational systems of which they are a part. As such ‘systems thinking 
about capacity issues ... is now becoming more influential’.103  
3. The shift from ‘harder’ technical capabilities to ‘softer’ social ones 
Technocratic capabilities (or hard capabilities) were the primary focus of CD and have been 
conceptualised in previous thinking as a direct transfer of skills. It is now recognised that 
‘soft’ or intangible capabilities in terms of the ‘ability to change and adapt, to exercise 
power, to gain legitimacy, to relate or inspire’ are also critical. For instance, whilst strategic 
relationship management can in part be a technical skill that can be taught and learned, the 
actual nature of relationships and the actors involved can only be understood in context and 
local people hold this knowledge.  
4. The shift from the simple to the complex 
With a previous focus on micro elements, CD project methodology was utilised by drawing 
on ‘linear thinking’ including ‘results chains, cause and effect, predictable inputs and 
outputs’. The move towards macro understandings of CD has led to a recognition of 
complexity, and consequently ‘a rethinking of the planning and design of capacity 
development interventions given the need for much greater learning, adaptability and 
flexibility as implementation unfolds’.104  
5. The shift from formal to the informal 
Whilst the original emphasis of CD was exclusively on formal institutions and formal 
capacities, more recent conceptualisations recognise (at least in theory) the importance of 
informal institutions and capacities. In time, Morgan and Lyon state they have  
come to see, or at least sense, the influence of informal patterns of behaviour and relationships on 
the process of CD e.g. the effects of neo-patrimonial relationships, ethnic networks, institutional 
influences, the pattern of hidden incentives at both the political and bureaucratic levels, tacit flows 
of information and resources decisions by unseen actions and many others.105  
6. The shift from donorship to ownership 
CD at least until the 1990s was largely donor or supply-driven with some ‘participation’ and  
‘compliance’ from recipient countries. Given the resultant lack of ownership over CD there 
was a lack of legitimacy and ‘the creation of ‘shell’ capacity’ ensued with unsustainable 
technical practices put in place. The thinking has shifted, ‘if not always implemented’, and 
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‘country leadership, motivation and ownership’ is now recognised as being critical to 
effective CD.106  
7. The shift from capacity engineering to capacity as response and emergence 
Conventional approaches to CD have taken a ‘building’ approach as the capacity of an 
organisation is ‘engineered into existence’. In this vein ‘deliberate planned interventions 
focused on needs’ often result in the ‘design of formal organisations’ being ‘transferred or 
imposed from the outside through technical assistance personnel or the adoption of 
international best practice’. The remedy is then generic with ‘contextual factors ... seen 
mainly as constraints or conditions whose influence needs to be taken into account’. In an 
almost complete reversal of conventional practice new insights into capacity and its 
emergence has led to an approach whereby ‘participants start with the context and see what 
possibilities and opportunities exist’.107  
8. The shift from minimal donor coordination to harmonisation and collective 
approaches 
Through ‘project implementation units’ (PIUs) CD has often ‘operated outside the main 
systems and structures of the partner government’ and until the 1990s coordination between 
donors was often non-existent – with each pursing its own agenda and setting up parallel 
structures. The Paris Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have 
changed the emphasis, encouraging donors to ‘harmonise’ their assistance, including CD, 
and ‘coordinate under country leadership’ and within existent local structures.108  
9. The shift to capacity as an end in itself 
Capacity and developing capacity has been seen as a means to an ends. It was understood 
that capacity needed to be developed to achieve tangible development outcomes. With a 
focus on the outcomes there was a tendency to underestimate the inherent value of the 
process. There has been a change in thinking about capacity as an end in itself, with ‘many 
development agencies now’ having to ‘make some sort of broad strategic choice amongst 
capacity as a secondary means, capacity as both an end and a means or capacity as the 
primary development end’.109  
10. The shift from a marginal to a major donor capacity to support capacity development 
With the growing acceptance that CD was not merely a transfer of technical skills and 
competencies it became apparent that it was not appropriate to simply treat CD as an add on 
by placing technical assistance personnel within a broader general program. The importance 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., 4-5. 
108 Ibid., 5. 
109 Ibid., 5.  
37 
 
of CD as a discipline and a discrete practice became increasingly realised and it was 
acknowledged that donors had ‘lacked many of the capabilities to effectively support CD at 
the country level’. The need for such support and specialisation ‘implied changes to program 
planning, contracting and M&E. Most donors are still in the process of addressing these 
issues’.110  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Both the concept and practice of CD has changed significantly in recent decades. What began as 
technical assistance primarily focussed on training, equipment and resource delivery together with 
the importation of universal technical bureaucratic management mechanisms in a gap filling 
approach, has evolved to a more holistic understanding of organisational capacity. This shift 
resulted in an increasing focus on the relational aspects of capacity together with an understanding 
of organisations as complex adaptive systems. At least in theory, organisations and institutions 
receiving CD assistance are now less likely to be viewed as ‘pieces of techno-rational machinery’ 
that need to be ‘fixed’ and are more likely to be approached as living systems that are deeply 
embedded within their own peculiar context and inherently interconnected with the broader social 
and political systems in which they exist.  
This chapter has shown how the concept of capacity has shifted enormously to be now understood 
to encompass a range of core capabilities in line with those identified by the ECDPM, including the 
capabilities to commit and engage, carry out functions or tasks, relate and attract resources and 
support, adapt and self-renew, and balance coherence and diversity. Taking into account the 
interrelationships between the intangible aspects of such core capabilities, capacity is coming to be 
conceived of as an emergent property rather than something that can be engineered.  
The CD definitions of influential international development institutions illustrate that this more 
holistic conceptualisation of capacity has been broadly accepted – at least in theory. The AusAID 
policy and practice literature reviewed in this chapter demonstrates some early attempts to convert 
this conceptualisation into practice. Important aspects that have been incorporated into the 
operational guidelines arguably all relate to the fundamental recognition that CD must work with, 
and build on, what exists. Therefore every aspect of CD needs to respond to the conditions, and 
capacity must emerge in coproduction with the partner organisation and personnel with an explicit 
understanding of the complex reality of the operating context. Almost all of the operational 
considerations articulated in AusAID’s guidelines for practice can be understood as having been 
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informed by this understanding, including the principles of: (1) plan to leave from the start 
(avoiding dependency); (2) be flexible and analyse risk; (3) capacity development takes time; (4) do 
not overestimate (be realistic about) what can be achieved; (5) manage expectations (the importance 
of communication and relationships);(6) ownership and leadership is vital; (7) holistic approaches 
based on sound analysis; (8) inline work versus advising (advising rather than doing and technical 
assistance); (9) training: methods first, content later (the delivery of capacity development, training 
and technical transfers); (10) build on what exists; (11) the importance of incentives (motivation, 
and perverse or unintended consequences); (12) plan for staff turnover; and (13) accounting for the 
cultural environment.   
Other critical aspects of this shift in thinking include the focus on the wider system or the ‘macro’ – 
meaning that the micro aspects of the organisation cannot be treated in isolation. This in turn relates 
to the shift from focussing exclusively on formal institutions to including the wider social or 
informal systems in which capacity develops (or changes). The critical recognition of ‘soft’ 
capabilities as being at least as important as ‘hard’ or technical capabilities reflect the relational 
aspects of capacity and CD itself, and this is recognised in the understanding of capacity as both an 
end and a means to development.  
Not surprisingly, the understanding of CD explored in this chapter has brought about some 
considerable contradictions in internal operating guidelines and poses a significant conceptual and 
practical challenge for program management, planning and norms surrounding accountability and 
transparency. As this chapter highlights there tends to be three broad categories of the approach to 
CD internationally. These approaches are defined above as planned, incremental, and emergence. 
Whilst the emergence approach would appear most in line with the conceptualisation of capacity 
presented in this chapter, it remains unclear how such an approach could be usefully pursued in 
major CD operations which are funded by donors and therefore beholden to donor country notions 
of rational policy making and planning and technologies of accountability and transparency. The 
planned approach on the other hand appears largely at odds with the conceptualisation of the 
capacity but entirely consistent with the dominant public policy management frameworks of donor 
countries. The following chapter will consider these seemingly contradictory understandings as it 
explores the dominant approaches to the PMM&E of CD. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review II – Program Management Monitoring and 
Evaluation in Capacity Development 
 
3.1 Introduction: Monitoring and Evaluation – An Outstanding Challenge 
 
All models are wrong some models are useful.  
George Box111 
 
The work of the ECPDM revealed that ‘few of the case organisations or donor agencies had thought 
systematically about capacity as an independent objective or variable, or had made prior efforts to 
collect empirical data about it. Almost none monitored or evaluated it systematically’.112 M&E is 
acknowledged as a problematic and challenging area in international development generally – and 
is particularly complex in the field of CD. The OECD nominated M&E as one of the biggest 
challenges still facing AusAID in their moves to improve practice in CD. The challenges outlined 
included ‘clearly linking changes at the institutional or organisational level to local level outcomes 
or impact on the ground’.113 At the time of the 2009 OECD Issues Paper (referred to in the previous 
chapter), the agency was reported to be ‘looking to identify local approaches to performance 
measurement which may be particularly appropriate in the partner country context’.114 Whilst a 
commitment to developing local approaches to performance measurement is a commendable step in 
the right direction, this approach presents new problems – potentially undermining the 
standardisation of data and reducing the agency’s ability to make comparisons across programs and 
countries.  
Context driven processes versus technical standardised approaches to CD and its M&E is one of 
many constant tensions in the literature, guides to ‘best practice’ and practical implementation. 
These tensions relate to a broader conceptual challenge regarding the fundamental nature of 
capacity and how it might be practically measured. As will be outlined in this chapter, there is a 
widespread tendency amongst donor organisations to use ‘rational’, technical, linear approaches to 
PMM&E – these are variously described as logical frameworks or project management 
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(generically) and include a range of approaches including Results Based Management (RBM).115 
Inherent to these approaches is the need to neatly define the intended predetermined goals of CD, 
outline a direct path to achieving these goals and to break them down into steps and outcomes that 
lend themselves to measurement. The overall approach is usefully summarised by Watson as 
follows: 
... ‘performance’ tends to be seen as a proxy for ‘capacity’ (if an organisation is by some measure 
performing better, it is assumed to have improved its ‘capacity’). These approaches have been termed 
‘technocratic’ and ‘reductionist’ (i.e. they see organisations as ‘machines’, amendable to discrete ‘fixes’; 
they ‘reduce’ complex problems and systems to their constituent components). The project framework’s 
indicators of progress in relation to the objective become yardsticks for the purposes of monitoring over 
time.116  
Here we can see there is an ontological and epistemological tension emerging between the 
increasing acceptance of the complex/systems nature of capacity and the reductionist, logical, 
linear, cause and effect methodologies employed to manage and measure it. Whilst an important 
presumed and desirable consequence of capacity may well be improved performance, the treatment 
of performance as a direct proxy for capacity fails to take account of the wider aspects of capacity 
as outlined in the previous chapter. Otherwise termed as a ‘results’ orientation, such approaches 
systematically exclude process from the PMM&E framework and thereby undermine critical 
elements of capacity as it is now understood – as a means as well as an ends.  
This chapter begins by unpacking the logic of conventional approaches. It identifies the value and 
purpose of such PMM&E frameworks before exploring some of the practical shortfalls and 
criticisms of this dominant paradigm. I then consider the shortfalls of dominant PMM&E, referred 
to also as conventional PMM&E approaches, from the perspective of systems thinking before 
drawing the key points into a table of concepts, aligning the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 for the 
purposes of operationalising these understandings through the following case study.  
3.2 Dominant Approaches to PMM&E 
In providing an overview of the historical conditions of the provisions of CD and technical 
assistance, Morgan points out that the supplier-driven approach to early technical assistance ensured 
that the measurement of its effectiveness, the notion of accountability and the terms and priorities of 
M&E were destined to be shaped by the political and bureaucratic priorities of donor countries.117 
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Furthermore, the approach invariably adopts notions of accountability and transparency informed, 
and dictated, by public policy orthodoxy:  
The design and provision of international TA [technical assistance] became, for the first time, an issue of 
public policy; TA for development cooperation was funded from the government budgets of developed 
countries. This had two major implications. First, on the assumption that poor countries could not or 
would not pay for such services, the bulk of the financing was to come from the TA supplier rather than 
its recipient. This accelerated a shift of power and control from the recipient to the supplier – the reverse 
of the conventional pattern up to that time.118 Second, the provision of TA was now to be bureaucratically 
structured and controlled as part of a process of change. TA now became part of projects and programmes 
for which staff in new international development organisations were accountable.119  
The notion, alluded to above, that donor staff should, can or do take responsibility for achieving 
development outcomes is critical in understanding how PMM&E frameworks work in practice. As 
will be further explored in the following sections – the pivotal role donor personnel take in 
interpreting PMM&E frameworks and influencing the debate surrounding such frameworks is 
becoming increasingly acknowledged. Importantly for this part of the discussion, PMM&E has only 
recently begun to evolve from an approach which explicitly monitored and evaluated donor defined 
objectives. Historically accountability was seen to be the domain of donor organisations partly due 
to a belief that donors were bringing notions of ‘evidence’, ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ with 
them as well as ‘capacity’.  
3.2.1 The theory and practice of conventional PMM&E approaches 
Logical frameworks (logframes), including models such as RBM, tend to be used in bilateral and 
multilateral inventions which are funded primarily (if not exclusively) by donors and are generally 
concerned with developing capacities within, and/or reforming, the public sector in a ‘recipient’ 
country (also referred to as host organisations or ‘partner countries’). 120 The dominance of RBM 
and other logframe approaches which purportedly focus on results, demonstrable program delivery 
and outcome measurement in the development sector, are largely the product of the New Public 
Management reforms undertaken in OECD countries throughout the 1990s.121 In response to the 
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pervasive perception of waste and mismanagement in the public sector more widely there was a 
new emphasis on efficiency and accountability manifesting in various forms of performance 
management.122 The CD sector came to adopt this new public management in two ways: (1) CD 
was subject to this new modality of accountability as it applied domestically through the donor 
country’s bureaucratic structures; and (2) donor countries attempted to transfer these technologies to 
host organisations as part of the objectives/deliverables of the CD itself.  
3.2.2 Logical frameworks 
The broad category of program management models known as logical frameworks have their 
origins in military approaches to planning and evaluation. They were developed by the United 
States (US) military before being adopted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and then finally US Agency for International Development approximately 40 years ago.123 The 
logical framework is commonly understood to be a ‘four by four matrix ... which summarises the 
main elements of the programme of work and connects them to each other’.124 It is used for 
planning, monitoring and evaluation in an overarching program management framework. The 
matrix below provides an overview of the typical logframe approach. 
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Figure 3: Typical logical framework approach125 
The ‘assumptions’ column in the above table is designed to prompt program managers, practitioners 
and stakeholders (to varying degrees depending on the approach) to think critically about the 
conditions required to produce the desired outcomes and the assumptions which underpin the 
‘theory of change’.126 Conversely the ‘risk’ analysis that is often conducted as part of the logframe 
planning process is generally stated as analysing the risk that the assumptions are incorrect and/or 
identifying potential disabling factors which may undermine the realisation of intended outcomes. 
An example of this is the assumption that senior personnel in the host organisation are committed to 
CD and internal reform – the risk is that this assumption is incorrect and that senior personnel are 
disinterested or deliberately block institutional reform.127 The level of critical analysis undertaken at 
this stage will depend on the program manager, the degree of involvement of stakeholders and the 
overarching guidelines the program management framework is complying with.  
As is evident from the above description, logical frameworks, and indeed any approach to program 
management (and/or intervention), are built upon a theory of change – whether implicitly or 
explicitly. It is becoming increasingly understood that the theory of change needs to be explicitly 
identified and critically analysed in order to better inform program design and ensure that 
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assumptions are reasonable and understood. The theory of change approach is now a recognised 
tool for improved program management. Indeed developing a theory of change at the beginning of 
any intervention is now often a requirement of international aid agencies. 128  
Essentially what this means is that agencies are becoming more aware that they in fact employ 
theories in their CD work and that these theories are contestable and may differ from the theories of 
change implicitly understood by other stakeholders. In this respect the rise of the theory of change 
paradigm is very useful as it, at least rhetorically, acknowledges other ways of knowing, the value 
of local knowledge and the need to include stakeholders in developing a theory of change that can 
better work in the context. It also opens up other avenues of thinking about risks and assumptions 
consequently improving program managers’ ability to identify the risks and assumptions inherent in 
the theory of change being employed.  
In 2012 the UK’s DFID commissioned a report on the use of the theory of change approach in 
international development. According to the report, its use varies enormously:  
Some interviewees view it from a technical perspective as a tool and methodology to map out the logical 
sequence of an initiative, from activities through to the change it seeks to influence. Other people see it as 
a deeper reflective process: a mapping and a dialogue-based analysis of values, world views and 
philosophies of change that make more explicit the underlying assumptions of how and why change 
might happen as an outcome of the initiative.129  
Whilst the use of theory of change models certainly opens the door for greater critical reflection and 
stakeholder inclusion, two problems remain: (1) the degree of stakeholder inclusion and critical 
reflection is dependent on the practitioners involved, the culture of the implementing agency and 
the space provided for different ways to conceptualise change within the program management 
framework; and (2) the data and information derived from this process is still, in the end, presented 
as a linear program management framework, with the complexity that might be identified 
throughout the process generally being reduced to a logframe-type presentation of change.  
Whether or not agencies require a theory of change to be developed in consultation with 
stakeholders, the majority of more recent guidelines and tools on the use of logical frameworks will 
include a strong commitment to the inclusion of stakeholders in the design of the logframe and the 
identification of ‘objectively verifiable indicators’. However, the rigidity and level of prescription 
regarding what constitutes an appropriate ‘outcome’, ‘impact’ and objectively verifiable indicators 
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remains startling. For example, DFID’s guidelines for developing logframes released in January 
2011, states that there may only be one outcome for the project, the impact must be an MDG and 
the objectively verifiable indicators can only be selected if reliable data exists or can be 
generated.130 This is because to measure success you must have baseline data in which to outline a 
target against and then allow for ‘milestones’ to be determined. Furthermore, targets must be 
SMART – that is specific, measureable, achievable, relevant and time bound.131  
In the interests of clarity, standardisation, comparability, consistency and quality, guidelines such as 
DFID’s outline the right way to use logframes in extraordinary detail with specific approaches often 
mandatory – as is illustrated in the guidelines with this symbol and explanation provided below:  
 Figure 4: Excerpt from DFID guidelines (1)132 
To give a sense of the level of prescription it is worth noting that in a document with seventeen 
pages dedicated to the ‘how to’ of logframes this symbol appears fifteen times. As is evident from 
the below examples, managerial oversight and control is a strong feature and rationale in this 
approach:  
 Figure 5: Excerpt from DFID guidelines (2)133 
The compliance aspects of designing logframes and the specificity of detail required, together with 
the data quality expectations, results in complex outcomes being broken down into indicators that 
could not possibly be understood to capture the essence of change, and seriously undermines the 
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terms of engagement with stakeholders and consequent local ownership. For example, DFID 
provides an easy to follow ‘good and bad indicators’ table to clarify what constitutes good 
indicators – including the below example of indicators of capacity:  
Bad indicators  The problem?  Better indicators 
Strengthened capacity of 
parliament  
 
Vague, ‘capacity’ needs to be more 
clearly defined in order to be 
measurable.  
 
Published records of votes & 
position of parliamentarians  
Number of parliamentary inquiries 
conducted  
Public perception of parliamentary 
effectiveness  
 Figure 6: DFID table of ‘good and bad indicators’134 
The level of scrutiny that comes with the use of logframes is indicated above with the example 
compliance notes and can extend much further. For example, it is mandatory, in the case of DFID, 
for all new projects to submit a logframe with the necessary baseline data as well as a ‘Business 
Case’ at the beginning of all new projects.135 This data is then used to inform the ‘project score’ 
based on ‘underachievement’ or ‘overachievement’, whatever the case may be.136  
3.2.3 Results based management 
Notwithstanding the shifts in CD to reflect more complex theories of change, logical frameworks 
remain dominant and RBM is one form of logical framework that is particularly dominant in 
international development and the CD programs within it. As the name suggests RBM is concerned 
with managing all aspects of CD for results, and like other logframes it works on a logic model that 
relies on setting out a ‘logical’ cause-and-effect framework that links inputs, activities, outputs and 
outcomes (from short- to long-term), finally generating the desired impact. The logic model that 
comprises a RBM approach is often described in the jargon as a ‘results chain’.  
A ‘results chain’ is at the core of this process: human and financial resources (inputs) generate activities that 
produce results in the short term (outputs); in the medium, end-of-project, term (outcomes); and in the long 
term (impacts). At its heart, RBM therefore guides all management activities towards the ultimate achievement 
of defined results.137  
  
                                                 
134 Source: ibid., 24. 
135 ‘All proposals for DFID funding must be accompanied by a Business Case which sets out the need, justification and 
affordability of the intervention – making a sound case for the commitment of public funds…  It aims to provide a 
consistent approach to the choices and design of DFID interventions’. This includes explicit reference to DFID’s ‘Value 
for Money’ policies and frameworks. See DFID. A DFID practice paper: HOW TO NOTE, London: Department for 
International Development, 2011), 1. 
136 Ibid., 23. 
137 Hatton and Schroeder, “Results-Based Management,” 427.  
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This chain of results is illustrated in this UNDP example: 
 
 Figure 7: Results chain example (from UNDP)138 
RBM came to dominate the landscape, becoming the ‘management strategy of choice’ for a long list 
of donor agencies.139 There are, and have been, many variations of RBM in operation140 but in the 
interests of providing a tangible description, I unpack here the key components of one of the more 
influential approaches used by the UNDP. It is important to note that the UNDP’s approach has 
evolved over time having officially switched to RBM models in 1997.141 ‘Strategic Results 
Frameworks’, an operationalisation of RBM in the UNDP, were produced across all UNDP country 
offices in 1999. Perhaps surprisingly the initial change resulted in an emphasis on outputs rather 
than inputs – but still a long way from results.142 However, over time there has been an attempt to 
move the focus to results. The disconnect between the conceptualisation of CD, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, and its planning and measurement is clear in the points emphasised by RBM 
approaches. This is illustrated in the following excerpt from the UNDP guidelines: 
In RBM, inputs and the activities which transform them into outputs reflect the process of implementing 
projects/programmes rather than desirable end results in themselves. From a results perspective, the 
implementation process is significant only in terms of what it leads to – or what follows from the process 
of planning, managing and implementing.143 
                                                 
138 Source: UNDP, “Results Based Management: Concepts and Methodology,” UNDP Results Framework Technical 
Note: 2000 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2002), 3. 
139 Hatton and Schroeder, “Results-Based Management,” 427. Donor countries using RBM for managing and measuring 
the performance of their development agencies included: Canada, UK, USA, Australian, Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark. Multilateral agencies included: the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and United Nations. 
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“Results-Based Management,” 428. 
141 UNDP, Evaluation of Results-Based Management at UNDP (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 
2007).  
142 Ibid., 71-3 (Annex 5: Table 1). 
143 UNDP, “RBM: Concepts and Methodology,” 2. 
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In other words we know that CD is both an ends and a means, and that the process of CD should be 
inherently capacity developing and therefore cannot be separated from its goal. However, it is also 
true that RBM explicitly sidelines process. The UNDP’s technical note on RBM describes how to 
select outputs and outcomes and explains the difference between the two accordingly: 
Outputs are the specific products and services which emerge from processing inputs through programme 
or non-programme activities. Outputs, therefore, relate to the completion (rather than the conduct) of 
activities and are the type of result over which managers have a high degree of influence.  
Outcomes are actual or intended changes in development conditions that UNDP interventions are seeking 
to support. They describe a change in development conditions between the completion of outputs and the 
achievement of impact.144  
It acknowledges that outcomes are not within the control of the intervening organisation alone and 
require collaboration with other partners. As such the outcomes are not fully attributable to the 
intervening donor organisation. The document provides guidance on how ambitious defined outputs 
and outcomes ought to be, with a heavy emphasis on selecting goals and corresponding 
measurements which are predictable and controllable. The guidelines stipulate: 
The approach in UNDP is to select only those outputs that clearly have a significant role to play in 
contributing towards major outcomes.145 
Whilst the importance of ‘soft assistance’ is acknowledged, what constitutes worthwhile soft 
assistance is quite restrictive – presumably to ensure all invested efforts lead directly to tangible 
results. The guidelines equate soft assistance to ‘namely policy dialogue and advocacy’ and notes 
that ‘soft interventions should have hard results’.146  
M&E is considered a critical aspect of RBM. Embedded in the approach is a need to monitor 
indicators of progress toward achieving results under thematic categories of the reporting 
framework, as well as conducting periodic assessments for ‘Result-orientated Annual Reports’. In 
the UNDP’s approach to RBM the rhetoric of partnership with other organisations and country 
partners is present throughout the operational manuals. However, the manner in which indicators 
are defined is telling of the donor driven approach: 
UNDP makes use of three types of indicator: 
• corporate outcome indicators set centrally and providing a standardised basis for monitoring 
changes UNDP wants to be associated with globally; 
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• outcome indicators, identified by the country office measuring progress against specified 
outcomes; 
• situational indicators, which provide a broad picture of whether the developmental changes that 
matter to UNDP are actually occurring.  
Indicators are observable signals of status or change that are intended to provide a credible means of 
verifying results… If it proves difficult to identify an outcomes indictor, it usually reflects a lack of 
clarity in conceiving the outcome, or the excessively broad or ambitious nature of the outcome sought. 147 
The UNDP offers some commonly articulated guidelines and constraints on determining what 
indicators to use. Included in these considerations are issues to do with validity, practicality, clarity, 
clear direction and ownership. Validity is understood as an indicator that captures the ‘essence of 
the desired results’ - data availability and the costs of generating data are included in the practical 
concerns. Interestingly the guidelines do themselves identify a key risk in this approach. However, 
they do nothing to rectify this problem: 
… there is a risk that managers will be motivated to undertake certain activities simply because 
measureable results can be achieved. In this process, they may be diverted from less measureable, but 
ultimately more fruitful, development interventions.148  
As highlighted above, in the case of CD there is a need to identify a proxy for capacity and this 
generally results in indicators which defer to some aspect of improved performance. The UNDP’s 
explanation for identifying such indicators in CD illustrates this point: 
When dealing with capacity development projects and programmes, the critical questions in defining 
indicators is to ask the question capacity for what? Determining change depends on a careful analysis of 
the function that the specific institution performs or (seeks to perform). What is the essential service being 
provided, and who are the clients of the institution? The concept of client services may be helpful in 
defining results emanating from capacity development efforts. Even if there is no room for undertaking 
extensive client surveys, the data may exist on other aspects of client service: institutional outreach – the 
number of clients that have been serviced; the time it takes to process a complaint; the backlog of 
cases.149  
As this quote shows, performance is used as a proxy for capacity, and as tends to be the case, easily 
accessible, measurable and comparable quantitative data is preferred. In this representative case the 
process of CD is discounted as is quality in the assessment of performance. 
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The RBM framework adopted by the UNDP, the ‘Strategic Results Framework’, is designed to be a 
‘top-down and bottom-up approach’.150 Country offices must identify goals or desired results in line 
with the corporate priorities of the UNDP in a manner which makes sense in the local context. What 
is evident through the guidelines is that the strategic engagement and partnering approach is heavily 
weighted in favour of influencing partners to work towards and agree on objectives which are set by 
UNDP’s corporate priorities. Importantly the outcomes and corresponding indicators talk to each 
other in this top-down/bottom-up approach to maximise alignment and allows M&E to be built in to 
the approach. As noted in the guidelines ‘SRF [Strategic Results Framework] is used for strategic 
planning and forms the basis for performance assessment’.151 The figures reproduced below 
illustrate the relationship between UNDP corporate goal setting and in-country reporting: 
Figure 8: Top-down and bottom-up approach (UNDP)152 Figure 9: Strategic results framework (UNDP)153 
Inherent in this approach is the acknowledgement that outcomes cannot be achieved by the 
intervening organisation alone and therefore the importance of ‘securing the trust and cooperation’ 
of partners is recognised. 154 There is a notion that if the donors prove themselves as being valuable 
contributors and instigators of change the local participants will learn to trust them.155 There is also 
a strong sense that UNDP country offices need to influence the setting of outcomes – taking an 
instrumental approach to relationships with such partner organisations. 
3.2.4 The intended purpose of conventional PMM&E frameworks  
The most obvious benefit and intended purpose of conventional frameworks such as logframes, and 
those that fit within this modality such as RBM, is the purported streamlining of all inputs and 
activities into demonstrable results and outcomes. In a risk adverse environment with real and 
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significant pressures to demonstrate value for money and effectiveness of investments in public 
sector spending it is critical for programs to establish frameworks which can demonstrate efficiency 
and ‘bang for buck’. Given the logical and clear linear pathways illustrated by such frameworks, 
these approaches have had some success demonstrating targeted and planned spending and with its 
measurements of key indicators it purports to provide evidence of effectiveness.  
Importantly in the UNDP approach, and in others like it, the use of categories of indicators allows 
for the standardisation of data. In theory this provides a framework for consistency that allows the 
program to track progress by comparing indicators over time. Critically it also allows comparisons 
between programs under the thematic categories. This not only provides the data standardisation 
required for an assessment of effectiveness within the context but also provides the basis for 
evaluating comparative effectiveness between programs and countries – providing an evidence 
based justification for maintaining, increasing or withdrawing resources. This approach almost 
certainly goes a long way towards presenting the planning, implementation, delivery and 
measurement of CD in a manner which appears strategic and scientific and has done much to 
combat the image of ad hoc and haphazard development projects. In this respect conventional 
PMM&E should not be seen as merely enforcing draconian controls and accountability frameworks, 
but instead can be seen as providing a buffer of evidence – justifying aid funding and within it CD 
resource allocations.  
Standardisation in M&E allows for ‘snap shots’ of progress – through result plotting and similar 
graphical presentations of data, trends can be identified, patterns can emerge informing future 
predictions and abnormalities can be detected. Given the emphasis on accountability, another 
potential benefit of well-defined logframes and RBM models is that they can be populated in a 
manner that clearly identifies goals and expectations and lines these desired outcomes up with the 
monitoring of indicators demonstrating progression against these clearly defined objectives. Such 
an approach is therefore extremely attractive particularly in terms of its apparent transparency and 
conformity with public policy orthodoxy. 
In the case of organisational CD, expectations can be stipulated at every level (of the results chain 
for example) and broken down throughout every unit of the organisation – all relating back to the 
overarching goals of the intervention. In such a scenario of clearly defined expectations managers 
and practitioners are explicitly aware of the priorities, their respective roles in meeting these 
expectations and what measurements and indicators will apply when assessing progress and 
effectiveness. This approach not only breaks the task of CD down into discrete and manageable 
components but it also provides discrete start and end points along a timeline according to reporting 
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periods as well as the distinction between short-, medium- and long-term goals as well as impacts. 
To some degree such milestones overcome the perception of a never-ending process. With discrete 
allotments of time lining up with incremental achievements all leading to the ultimate overarching 
goal, this can help demonstrate results along the way – ensuring funding security and potentially 
acting as a motivator. Performance measurements utilising a framework such as RBM enjoy the 
perceived legitimacy of objectivity. 156 The flow of resources is easily traceable and one can follow 
the investment from resources injection through to outcomes (and even impacts). 
The approach to conventional PMM&E, including various logframes and RBM, have been 
constantly evolving and reviews of their use have led to improvements in operationalisation as well 
as concessions regarding the conditions required for successful implementation. Importantly even 
critics of RBM concede that it can be successful in certain types of interventions.157 The 
circumstances for success are usefully outlined by Watson: 
Carefully planned ‘reductionist’ approaches to monitoring capacity tend to work best in circumstances 
where: 
• an organisation ‘signs up’ voluntarily to accept capacity development support; 
• stakeholders themselves are willing and able to assess the capacities they need; 
• the abilities required can be defined precisely and unambiguously (from the author’s experience 
this is often easier said than done in the public sector); 
• there are incentives to improve performance; and  
• leadership of the organisation is firmly behind the capacity-improvement programme and thus 
there is unambiguous ‘ownership’.158  
On the other hand its proponents have acknowledged its common misuse and the necessity of 
partner country involvement and local ownership: 
RBM cannot be used effectively unless the developing-country partner also understands the paradigm, is 
well trained in it, and has made an explicit commitment to the approach. The best RBM reporting flows 
from reports that have included active participation by the developing-country partner.159 
Of relevance to the following critical analysis and case studies it is also acknowledged that 
conventional approaches generally require not only high level partner country knowledge and 
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commitment but also an understanding, commitment and contribution from lower levels of 
management and personnel within the partner organisation.160  
3.3 A Critique of Conventional Approaches  
3.3.1 Practical considerations 
The practical shortfalls in the design and implementation of conventional PMM&E are many and 
varied and it is noted that there are continual improvements being made in the interests of 
addressing these problems. I provide an overview here in the full knowledge that some 
organisations have had more success than others in overcoming these challenges. However, 
regardless of attempts to remedy these issues in practice, it would appear that these problems 
remain persistent and are almost certainly due the inherent nature of such frameworks and the 
bureaucratic/administrative environments in which they operate.  
Despite an emphasis on results and the arguable necessity to focus then on outcomes and impacts, 
the implementation of RBM has so often focussed on what can generously be described as short-
term outcomes that commonly equate to outputs.161 Furthermore, it is regularly apparent in the 
implementation of conventional PMM&E that accountability only extends to outputs. This is partly 
due to the challenges of attribution and the difficulties in proving causation when it comes to 
outcomes and impacts. Whilst it certainly seems reasonable to only hold practitioners accountable 
to that which is within their control, it is undoubtedly a weakness in this approach. The focus on 
results as opposed to process is again noticeable and problematic. The UNDP for example, 
acknowledges that managers cannot control outcomes when other partners are involved, but says 
nothing about what indicators might ensure the process enables an environment conducive to 
achieving outcomes: 
… because outcomes are not the result of one single actor’s intervention, enforcing individual and 
personal accountability in respect of the substantive attainment of outcomes would be unreasonable. The 
attainment of outcomes is subject to share accountability among partners… While managers can be held 
accountable for ascertaining that outcomes are monitored, their full accountability can be applied only to 
outputs.162  
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Given this research is concerned primarily with M&E which is embedded in ongoing program 
management the attention to impact in evaluation is limited. M&E in program management is 
focused on ongoing monitoring and data collation and evaluating whether or not a program is on 
track by assessing its achievement of results along the way. Impact generally refers to broader and 
longer-term social change. That said, it is not uncommon for program evaluations to consider 
impact at the end of a program cycle or periodically in longer-term projects. Furthermore, outputs 
and outcomes are at least in theory monitored to ensure the program is on track for achieving 
desired impacts. Any intervention looking to claim an impact will run into serious methodological 
and conceptual problems to do with attribution. As outlined above, the UN and other agencies 
acknowledge the problem of attributing impact to one particular actor or program and many 
agencies offer detailed advice for practitioners regarding how to estimate the level of attribution and 
how different programs and interventions may be disaggregated and measured – with the combined 
effort then re-aggregated to account for the whole impact. The below diagram is a recent DFID 
example: 
 Figure 10: Example of attributing outputs to impacts (DFID)163 
Whether or not a program has achieved an impact, or ‘40 per cent’ of an impact (whatever the case 
may be), is a question for impact evaluations that are generally outside of the M&E of the program 
management cycle. However, whether or not the impact is feasible, how it might be within the 
control of the intervention to bring about such an impact, how such an impact is best achieved 
(theory of change) and what the steps are along the way is central to the M&E of program 
management. What is striking about RBM and other conventional approaches is the lack of 
recognition for all the other factors in any operating environment that will contribute to, enable or 
disable the realisation of impacts; that is, not the intervention of other partners or other programs, 
but the broader social system in which the intervention is taking place. It is these elements that 
undoubtedly contribute significantly to the impact of any program and are noticeably absent or at 
best superficially considered in these conventional linear models. These considerations are 
                                                 
163 Source: Value for Money Department, “Guidance on Using Revised Logframe,” 15.  
55 
 
inextricably linked to stakeholder participation and broader local ownership. The very idea that 
PMM&E can be implemented and the impact measured and attributed without regard to the broader 
social systems at play directly informs the consequent ‘add on’ approach to local stakeholder 
inclusion and the inability of conventional PMM&E to account for the centrality of local systems. 
Perhaps the strongest and most frequent criticism made of conventional PMM&E approaches is 
that, due to the tendency to be derived from an interventionist mode of operation, they are heavily 
skewed towards external problem diagnosis. In a common approach the partner organisation will be 
analysed to provide a ‘baseline’ of capacity which is then compared to an ‘ideal’ institution. It is 
important to note that the ‘ideal’ institution is likely to be a fiction in that it is informed by the 
donor partners’ imaginary of their own institutions and often will have little to do with reality. 
Through this comparative analysis gaps and shortfalls in capacity, policy, practice and procedure 
will be identified. The M&E process is a product of this analysis as steps toward improving 
identified shortfalls are prescribed and translated into indicators and measurements of success. 
Local ownership is therefore systematically undermined from the outset and this is embedded in the 
ongoing M&E of the CD intervention, compromising not only the relevance of the M&E 
framework, but also critical relationships between intervening practitioners and their counterparts, 
local motivations, and opportunities for mutual learning.164  
There is no doubt that the commitment to improving local ownership has significantly increased in 
recent years. However, the reality is local engagement is almost always sought from within the 
framework of predetermined goals, mission objectives and ‘corporate priorities’ and always within 
the bureaucratic knowledge system of the dominant donor organisation. Despite the above outlined 
acknowledgements that meaningful local ownership and partner driven approaches are 
preconditions for success and that local partners must be committed to and fully understand 
conventional PMM&E frameworks ‘commitment to full inclusion of the developing-country partner 
in RBM planning and reporting is often weak’.165  
Conventional PMM&E approaches are by nature heavily reliant on specific problem diagnosis and 
even the proponents of conventional approaches will acknowledge that they are not effective if 
‘targeted results are not realistic’.166 In a workshop held in 2011 by the Australian Council for 
International Development, facilitated by AusAID, there was recognition of a growing ‘discomfort 
with traditional logic or results based management models including logical frameworks’ as they 
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‘oversimplify the complexity and dynamism of the development process: ‘the perfect solution to the 
perfectly understood problem’’.167 The multitude of complex contributing disabling and enabling 
factors in a CD environment makes simple problem-solution strategies extremely unlikely to 
succeed and to attempt to address capacity issues in this manner is to achieve only partial solutions 
which may in fact undermine capacity on the whole.168  
Conventional PMM&E plays a central role in creating, or at least perpetuating, what Atkinson and 
Coffey term as ‘documentary realties’ – whereby the organisation creates extensive self-referential 
paper trails that construct a recorded reality about the nature of the donor organisation and manner 
in which it goes about its business.169 Planning documents and evaluation reports connect the dots 
between these bureaucratic artefacts with little correlation to the practical conditions on the ground. 
With all this centred around, and relying upon, a particular language of donor/bureaucratic 
orthodoxies its relevance is often challenged – undermining the valuing of the PMM&E system.  
The construction of artificial timelines, required in order to demonstrate incremental change and 
staged progress towards the overarching goal, produces a tendency to create an often detrimental 
focus on short-term goals. In the interests of demonstrating success in line with reporting periods 
resources can be diverted towards areas of quick realisation and quantifiable outcomes. 170 This 
tendency is noted by the UN even within its own guidelines for the operationalisation of RBM. 
However, it is not overcome but rather just noted. This can be problematic for long-term 
sustainability if it results in a reduced focus on ‘soft’ less tangible aspects of CD as these tend to be 
difficult to demonstrate while being critical enabling factors.171 The demand to demonstrate outputs 
and outcomes within such often unrealistic timeframes can result in the sidelining of counterparts 
and in-country personnel. Whilst this will result in the demonstrable achievement of short-term 
goals it will ultimately undermine CD outcomes.  
The focus on hard indicators, through quantitative measures, encourages prioritisation of things that 
can be counted such as equipment delivery, number of people trained, technical skills delivery and 
the like. Apart from distorting program delivery and resulting in the inefficient allocation of 
resources, this can create serious problems in a data poor environment as baseline indicators are 
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notoriously unreliable. It appears that one of the most obvious problems with conventional 
PMM&E is reflected in the adage ‘what gets measured gets done’. Instead of these models being 
utilised as reporting mechanisms alone, they too often serve a prescriptive function. The 
overwhelming lack of flexibility built into many of the major donors’ approaches to conventional 
approaches belies the possibility of meaningful stakeholder inclusion and demonstrates the 
enormity of the administrative and bureaucratic burden placed on program managers and 
practitioners.  
3.3.2 Practitioners and conventional PMM&E 
In 2002 Morgan noted that ‘the current collection of mechanical measurement techniques can push 
participants back into unproductive practices such as acting against innovation and experimentation, 
manipulating data and indicators for the sake of appearances and disregarding process issues’.172 It 
is fair to say that the history of RBM and other logframes has been littered with examples of these 
problems and the overall commitment to using these PMM&E techniques by practitioners and in-
country partners has been varied and even quite low in many cases. This response has impacted 
upon the quality of all aspects of the program management cycle, from planning to reporting. In the 
case of the latter, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs commissioned a study on the 
‘progress and challenges’ in RBM implementation for the quadrennial comprehensive policy review 
in 2012, demonstrating a remarkably low standard of reporting. The study found that RBM 
reporting is heavily dependent on the quality, and robustness, of the ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation – that is to say the framework is only as good as the data and ‘it is not consistently 
good’.173 The study found that: 
Evaluation is an essential component of [the] results-based management cycle, but the level of investment 
in the evaluation function appears insufficient for the task. Furthermore, a number of agencies have 
decentralised their evaluation functions and these decentralised evaluation units appear to lack the 
necessary skills and resources to produce quality evaluations.174 
The study found that despite the centrality of M&E in the effective working of RBM, evaluation 
was often peripheral, with the evaluation capacity ‘in country’ routinely neglected. In 2010 the 
UNDP Independent Evaluation Office’s annual report found that only 28 per cent of country offices 
completed all planned evaluations (with 36 per cent partially compliant). Of those evaluations 
completed only 64 per cent were ‘satisfactory’ or ‘moderately satisfactory’.175 
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The promise of standardisation and comparison across space and time was also undermined in the 
actual use of RBM. According to the study findings the different approaches and levels of 
compliance between individual agencies ‘inadvertently may weaken or undermine efforts’ for 
‘interagency results frameworks’.176 Despite considerable rhetoric regarding the use of RBM 
reporting and data for informing practice and program adaptation in a timely manner, the study also 
found this was largely not the case, stating that ‘the managing for results aspect of results-based 
management in the form of using information for programme improvement is less prominent’.177  
The considerable challenges that have beset the implementation of RBM and other logframe 
approaches have not deterred their proponents as many of these reports, studies and related 
publications insist that these shortfalls do not mean conventional approaches should be abandoned, 
but instead there should be greater emphasis on them and implementation should be improved. 
However, achieving this goal of improvement requires meaningful commitment which is becoming 
increasingly doubtful as in-country partners and practitioners question the usefulness of these tools. 
As Hatton and Schroeder report: 
Often, and only half-jokingly, RBM is referred to as part of the problem, a requirement that consumes 
time, energy and resources and obstructs the actual doing of development work. In the words of one 
colleague: ‘I’ll just bide my time until the next management fad comes along’…  
While this is not a firm position taken by all players or at all levels in development work, it is a view not 
infrequently adopted – in particular by many of those directly involved in project implementation. Donors 
and at least some international implementing agencies tend to be more supportive of RBM as a 
management and evaluation tool. Broadly speaking, local governments and beneficiaries are less 
enthusiastic.178 
Despite the tensions and the lack of support for RBM and conventional frameworks on the ground, 
development professionals are nonetheless expected to mask over the inconsistencies and work to 
promulgate ideas that are demonstrably derived from a particular social, cultural and political 
context and present them as universally applicable. In Notes on the Ethnography of Expertise and 
Professionals in International Development, Mosse explores this notion explaining that 
the work of professionals of all kinds is precisely to establish (against experience) the notion that socio-
economic and technical change is brought about by generalisable policy ideas; and that ‘global 
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knowledge’ produced by international organisations occupies a transcendent realm ‘standing above’ 
particular contexts (and a globalised contemporary ‘now’ that compresses historical time).179  
According to Mosse ‘development professionals are often intensely aware of their dilemma and the 
contradictions they face’:  
Backstage scepticism and the escape into irony, self-criticism, spoof, or humour are common responses. 
There is little external criticism of development that is not prefigured within expert communities.180  
Mosse goes on to say that those within expert communities who are aware of the shortfalls of the 
dominant paradigm may ‘marginalise themselves from the zealous naivety of “true believers” and 
from their own power’.181 However, he contends that most are resigned to ‘the immovable 
dominance of official knowledge which ensures that scepticism is closeted and concealed’.182 
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this resignation and concealment and the wisdom of 
conventional PMM&E frameworks has recently come under attack from within the expert tent.  
‘The Big Push Forward’ is one prominent example of practitioner resistance to conventional 
frameworks. Launched through an initial meeting entitled ‘The Big Push Back’, held at the Institute 
of Development Studies in the UK in September 2010, the group met to discuss and push back 
against ‘a narrowing of what is valued and how value is measured’ in transformative development 
processes. From this initial forum an informal network of practitioners was launched to seek 
‘constructive ways to advance conceptually and methodologically development aid’s support of a 
fairer world, beyond the narrow bureaucratic protocols that assume guaranteed predictable 
outcomes’.183  
The network website hosts blogs and forums for debate amongst practitioners and provides a 
collaborative forum for sharing knowledge and developing new knowledge around the complexities 
of program management in aid projects. A central theme and argument of this forum is well 
illustrated by a particular exchange that was generated in response to a blog written by a 
contributing practitioner, Bernward Causemann. The post, entitled Results and Culture: How our 
Traditions Frame the Agenda, makes the case that results and logical frameworks are cultural 
constructs and they are incompatible with experienced reality and different knowledge systems.184 
A series of responses for and against this argument followed, including a response which makes a 
                                                 
179 D. Mosse, “Notes on the Ethnography of Expertise and Professionals in International Development” (paper 
presented at Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere, Lisbon, June 20-23, 2007), 2.  
180 Ibid., 10.  
181 Ibid.  
182 Ibid. 
183 “About The Big Push Forward,” http://bigpushforward.net/about.  
184 B. Causemann, “Results and Culture: How our Traditions Frame the Agenda,” The Big Push Forward (blog), April 
18, 2013, http://bigpushforward.net/archives/2270#more-2270. 
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familiar argument: it is not the framework that is the problem, it is the way people use it. This is 
followed by a response from Benedict Wauters, the coordinator for the EU-based Community of 
Practice on Results Based Management, who acknowledges the purported benefits of RBM and 
logframes generally but then poses the question: ‘if the reasons for logframes not function[ing] is 
improper use, and we have known this for decades, but still people (ab/mis)use them, then surely, 
we must ask whether there is anything in the tool that makes it so prone to (ab/mi)use’.185 Rosalind 
Eyben, a highly experienced practitioner and academic behind ‘the Big Push’ provided the 
following response which encapsulates the theme: 
A good question from Benedict about whether there is something inherent in the tool that makes it prone 
to misuse and abuse. But also to be taken into account is the changed politico-managerial environment in 
which such planning and performance measurement tools have become mandatory requirements… I used 
to be a fan of log frames and was one of its early advocates in DFID in the late 1980s. I found it useful in 
encouraging colleagues to ask themselves why they wanted to undertake certain activities. A log frame, I 
argued, requires you to state a purpose – for example, increased incomes of landless families – and then 
work out what you could do to achieve that purpose… I also appreciated the Log Frame’s assumptions 
column, which in the early days [had] been used to identify the dynamic social and political environment 
of aid projects, thus introducing uncertainty and requiring iterative planning ... Today, tools like log-
frames serve as props in support of an almost pathological desire to be in control (or to be seen as if the 
donor were in control) in complex and unpredictable circumstances. Consequently, they function as 
instruments of power that demand obedience rather than independent and above all, critical thought.186 
These observations are important and it is critical to understand the perceived necessity of senior 
aid bureaucrats to appear to be in control of an unpredictable/uncontrollable operating context. The 
environment of ‘accountability’ in which such agencies operate invariably feeds this need to 
demonstrate a kind of managerialism that indeed creates the illusion that the variables are knowable 
and under control and therefore success is assured. In this sense the quest to appear scientific in the 
evidence based approach to program management is highly political. 
Accordingly the political aspects of these development frameworks and bureaucracies are at the 
forefront of the Big Push network’s enquiry into the hierarchies of evidence – illustrated by the 
recently held conference ‘The Politics of Evidence’.187 Most if not all of the foregoing criticisms of 
conventional frameworks in PMM&E were reiterated and confirmed by the conference attendees – 
as such I will not reproduce these here. What is interesting to note however, are the further insights 
generated by this conference including observations regarding the potential usefulness of 
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conventional frameworks and the need for practitioners to engage in resistance or ‘creative 
compliance’. The conference found that ‘whether artefacts or tools create problems or benefits 
depends on how they are contextualised within projects, organisations and partnerships’.188 Positive 
examples of the use of ‘results artefacts’ and conventional frameworks were discussed with 
participants suggesting that such mechanisms can work in some contexts provided that they: 
incorporate a stakeholder driven approach; use participatory methods for needs analysis and 
collating evidence; embrace flexibility and tailor the framework to the context; include local 
stakeholders in developing a well-considered and adaptive theory of change that successfully 
explores and critically accounts for underlying assumptions; and focuses on contribution rather than 
attribution.189 
The conference found that transparency is critical and useful for internal and external accountability 
and legitimacy. However, in practice, increased attention to accountability essentially equates to 
increasing pressure to demonstrate success. In this environment program management is in fact less 
transparent as there is an overwhelming reluctance to embrace critical appraisal and reflection 
because negative feedback and findings are seen to jeopardise funding and are associated with 
‘reprisals’ on a program and its personnel. Ironically an increased focus on transparency and 
accountability within the results framework paradigm ultimately reduces transparency and 
accountability. There is a tendency within existing conventional frameworks to manipulate 
monitoring and program data, creating ‘sausage numbers’,190 to present ‘evidence’ in a manner that 
seeks to demonstrate success against predetermined objectives rather than providing critical 
learning and evidence to account for what is actually happening on the ground. This reduces the 
program management’s ability to make informed adaptations to goals and implementation in the 
interests of improving effectiveness and sustainability.191  
Importantly, central figures in the Big Push raise some interesting epistemological and 
methodological questions using remarkably similar language as that articulated by the ECDPM and 
others in framing the systems approach to CD. For example, Rosalind Eyben and Chris Roche 
acknowledge that many of the practical shortfalls of conventional approaches can be addressed 
within the paradigm and such shortfalls are largely agreed upon between critics and proponents. 
                                                 
188 Adopting the language employed in ethnographies of bureaucracies, the conference refers to the tools and 
mechanisms of bureaucratic protocols such as planning and M&E frameworks and their corresponding documentation 
and reports as evidence artefacts – more specifically ‘results artefacts’ and ‘evidence artefacts’. Ibid., 5. 
189 Ibid.  
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‘sausage numbers’ became a metaphor during the conference for data of unknown origin and dubious provenance. 
People do not consciously understand what they are entering into a data system. ‘Sausages’ are the result, with users 
unclear about what has gone into producing them’. Ibid. 8. 
191 Ibid., 7-8. 
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However, ‘the principle difference’ between the sides of the debate remains. Those differences 
concern the ‘assumptions about: how different kinds of change happen and what we can know 
about change processes’.192 Eyben and Roche elaborate on this by putting forward their position as 
follows: 
... we understand social change to be emergent and messy. Organised efforts to direct change confront the 
impossibility of any of us ever having a total understanding of all the sets of relationships and contested 
meanings that generate change and are in constant flux. New inter-relational processes are constantly 
being generated that in turn affect and change those already in existence. Complexity theory privileges a 
concern for process as much as goals and supports an approach that seeks to make a difference by 
working through relationships rather than focusing on narrowly defined pre-set projects and outcomes. It 
encourages being explicit about values and a concern for how an organisation’s intervention is judged by 
others, in particular by those that are meant to ultimately benefit, and the creation of effective feedback 
mechanisms...193 
3.4 Epistemological Tensions with the Conceptualisation of Capacity: 
Systems Thinking and M&E 
As is abundantly clear from the preceding chapter, capacity as a concept and CD as both a means 
and an ends do not easily fit into a logical framework or a RBM model. In fact I would argue that 
there is a stark ontological and epistemological clash between the increasingly accepted 
understanding of capacity and the conceptual and methodological basis of conventional PMM&E. 
Mosse offers an interesting summary of how bureaucratic knowledge is in conflict with the type of 
situational knowledge that is paramount to a systems understanding of CD: 
These policy models are formalistic: framed by the universal logic of new institutional economics and of 
law (accountability, transparency etc.) these are ‘travelling rationalities’ with general applicability that 
assert the technical over the political, the formal over the substantive, the categorical over the 
relational.194 
In 2002 Morgan forecasts a future of ‘monitoring and measurement’195 which he predicted would 
be ‘collective monitoring and evaluation’ and that this would ‘likely replace traditional control 
techniques’.196 In their final report, ‘Capacity, Change and Performance’, the authors highlight one 
of the key implications for PMM&E in a systems approach to CD as being the implicit need to deal 
‘with uncertainty and complexity’. They note that conventional approaches to detailed planning 
which ‘assume the feasibility of predictability and intentionality’ needs rethinking. By implication 
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the question for M&E is therefore: what do we measure and how do we determine success if we 
cannot predict the outcomes of intentional CD interventions? The report recommends a need for 
‘mastering the processes of adaptation, experimentation and constant learning’.197  
It is evident in the changes in language used in conventional approaches to PMM&E that there is a 
transformation underway and that conventional frameworks are bending to accommodate many of 
the factors highlighted by the systems based critiques. The question remains as to whether systems 
thinking and the complex adaptive systems conceptual framework can be drawn upon and 
accommodated within conventional approaches or if there is a fundamental 
philosophical/epistemological shift required in program management.  
3.4.1 Practical implications of a systems approach to M&E 
The preliminary findings of the ECDPM reported a tendency for M&E to fall into two broad 
schools of thought: RBM, and systems thinking approaches. Through the case studies considered in 
their research project they found that the latter was more likely to be used by NGO CD programs. 
Due to the relative success of such approaches Watson suggested that donor driven public sector 
CD operations could learn something from these systems orientated approaches to PMM&E.198 
Some of the reported critical differences in the systems approach included an emphasis on learning 
from experience and an approach to PMM&E that was informal but nonetheless established 
routines and became integral to the building of capacity itself – particularly analytical capacities. In 
this approach there was minimal interference with existing structures and a tendency for interveners 
to support locally driven changes. There was minimal insistence on detailed planning and an 
acceptance of reporting, routines, formats and evidence that made sense to ‘recipients’. In general 
there is trust in the ‘recipient’ as a learner and less need for an ‘expert’.199  
Unlike the prescriptive and detailed approach to planning inherent in the conventional approaches, 
systems thinking results in the ‘clarity of the mission of the organisation ... arising from regular 
dialogue on what is being done and its contribution to achievement of goals’.200 Systems 
frameworks were flexible ‘in structures, team formation, partnerships and approach’ allowing the 
CD program to respond to changing circumstances and emergent factors, opportunities and risk. 
M&E systems were responsive, adopting evidence and knowledge relevant to the recipient.201 The 
systems implications for PMM&E practice can go much further to a complete rejection of 
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prediction and a move to embracing endogenous change processes and emergence. Whilst such an 
approach is supported by arguably convincing theory and has proven to be effective in specific 
cases of practice (in the case of NGO CD), it remains a long way from the reporting and 
accountability notions of mainstream donor countries. Moreover, a systems understanding of 
PMM&E in CD does not pretend to achieve the kind of strategic and scientific approach to 
PMM&E that conventional approaches aspire to.  
3.5 Conclusion 
As a result of the increased attention to accountability, transparency and effectiveness, conventional 
approaches to PMM&E, including logical frameworks and RBM, have dominated the international 
development and CD landscape for the last two decades. Despite the overwhelming criticisms of 
these approaches they continue to be entrenched in mainstream donor driven CD programs. The 
persistence of these approaches can be explained, at least in part, by the benefits such approaches 
purportedly achieve or at least aim to achieve. Importantly this approach presents the planning, 
implementation and measurement of CD in a manner which appears strategic and scientific and in 
this respect these approaches have been critical in justifying ongoing funding and meeting the 
accountability and transparency onus of the bureaucratic machinery. 
Conventional approaches to PMM&E provide a framework for accounting for inputs, outputs, 
outcomes and impacts in a manner that clearly demonstrates the link (or results chain) between 
resource injections to the results achieved. The approach provides clarity in a complex environment 
and is helpful for clearly defining expectations and sharpening the focus of practitioners and the 
host organisation. Importantly this approach clearly identifies milestones along the way allowing 
the progress of a CD program to be measured. It also generates standardised, quantitative data that 
fits neatly into the reporting frameworks of donor agencies and allows for comparison across 
programs and along timelines.  
Notwithstanding the purported benefits of conventional PMM&E frameworks, many problems 
remain outstanding and indeed many of the intended advantages of these frameworks are not 
realised in actuality. Importantly, conventional approaches to PMM&E have not overcome the 
problems with attribution and the improbable claims of direct causation which are implicit and 
explicit in the results chain understanding of change processes. This inability to account for impact 
relates to the tendency to use methodologies and frameworks which are best suited to closed 
systems and fail to take account of the wider local systems at play. This relates to a widespread 
inclination to treat local participation as an ‘add on’ with the inclusion of stakeholders bounded and 
framed by predetermined donor defined objectives within bureaucratic knowledge systems which 
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severely limit the terms of engagement. Partner country personnel, practitioners and scholars alike 
are becoming increasingly critical of the linear and reductionist representations of the process of CD 
as systems understandings of the processes at play appear to hold far greater explanatory power. 
Many of the criticisms of conventional approaches to PMM&E appear to stem from a clash between 
the ontological perspective informing contemporary conceptualisations of capacity and CD and the 
epistemological foundation of dominant program management approaches. Whilst systems 
understandings do provide some insight into how PMM&E systems are flawed and suggest some 
principles for improved practice, how such an understanding could be comprehensively put into 
practice is still not clear. The following case study explores these issues in the context of a police 
CD operation in Solomon Islands. The case study approach is framed by a ‘table of key concepts’ 
derived from: (1) the exploration of capacity and CD concepts presented in Chapter 2; and (2) the 
preceding exploration of PMM&E (Chapter 3). Importantly this case study considers the relevance 
of systems conceptualisations of capacity and CD to an international policing operation. It then 
explores how PMM&E can best account for, manage and monitor the complex realities of such a 
police CD operation. Whilst I certainly accept the relevance of systems concepts in conceptualising 
‘capacity issues’, I also sympathise with the understandable reluctance of those policy makers and 
practitioners in the CD space to engage in abstract theoretical ponderings when there ‘is work to be 
getting on with’.202 There is also a reasonable argument to be made that these theoretical 
understandings may be superfluous to PMM&E on the ground. That is to say that whilst systems 
thinking and related concepts of complexity do provide a useful theoretical framework or mental 
model for conceptualising capacity, all the utilisable and practical implications of this thinking need 
to be translated into tangible guidelines for practice and a workable framework for PMM&E.  
In operationalising these concepts through my case study, I will therefore be considering the 
practical implications of the foregoing theoretical conceptualisations for CD and its PMM&E. I will 
explore how these theoretical and conceptual issues have been adopted in practice or translated into 
policy documents, operational guidelines and the like by focusing on the preceding practice 
orientated documents such as AusAID’s principles of CD. I will use this practice based approach to 
inform my interview questions so as to engage practitioners on the subject of CD and PMM&E in a 
systematic and practice relevant manner. Through this approach to the case study I expect to better 
understand the relevance of contemporary conceptualisations of CD to police CD operations and the 
implications for PMM&E. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study Background – Institutional Capacity 
Development in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
 
4.1 Case Study Introduction 
The purpose of the following case study is to explore the potential relevance and practical utility of 
a PMM&E framework informed by the conceptual understandings and implementation of capacity 
and CD (in the field of international development) to police CD operations. The findings and key 
concepts generated through the preceding literature review (in Chapters 2 and 3) are therefore 
operationalised here in the interests of understanding how these findings and concepts might inform 
a framework for PMM&E in police CD operations. Accordingly this case study considers the 
practical applicability of the above findings in relation to the concept of capacity, the process of 
CD, and the consequent approach to the PMM&E of CD in the case of the Royal Solomon Island 
Police Force (RSIPF).  
The case study begins by outlining the historical circumstances of the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and the record of the RSIPF and the CD contingent of the assisting 
force, the Participating Police Force (PPF). This section is based largely on a documentary analysis 
including both primary and secondary source documents and informal expert interviews. It briefly 
touches on some of the key literature and government and academic reports in an effort to provide a 
summary of the status of the mission at the time of the case study research (2010). It is important, 
however, not to dwell long on these assessments as the focus of this case study is the process and 
PMM&E of CD and how personnel have experienced such CD, rather than the mission itself. The 
success or otherwise of the mission is relevant only to the extent that it provides the context for the 
analysis. 
4.1.1 Approach and methodology  
In the interests of understanding how police CD happens in practice and how it is perceived by its 
key implementing stakeholders this case study is concerned primarily with the experienced reality 
of practitioners. Consequently it is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with police CD 
practitioners (advisers) and host country police officers (counterparts). The interview questions 
have been designed to ask systematic questions about the approach to CD and PMM&E in the 
interests of determining the relevance of the above conceptualisation of capacity, CD and PMM&E 
in a police CD environment, and to inform a proposed framework for PMM&E in the future.  
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In an effort to ensure my case study approach and interview questions were grounded in the context 
of the RSIPF CD operation and in line with contemporary issues experienced by Australian policy 
advisers, program managers and practitioners in this space, I undertook an extensive process of 
preliminary interviews and consultations. During this period of consultation (over 12 months of 
sustained engagement), I was involved in a number of workshops concerned with the issue of CD 
and PMM&E with policy advisers and practitioners from the AFP’s International Deployment 
Group (including at the level of senior management), as well as AusAID and the Australian Office 
of Development Effectiveness. Further to this I have conducted a number of preliminary/formative 
informal interviews with CD program management personnel and practitioners in Solomon Islands. 
These informal interviews and consultations included discussions with the RSIPF Commissioner, 
several senior RSIPF officers, the PPF Commander and senior PPF in program management. 
Further informing the interview questions and enriching my understanding of the context I have 
also had the opportunity to informally interview senior RAMSI law and justice personnel, senior 
Solomon Islands Government officials (including ministers and permanent secretaries) and I have 
had extensive involvement in a ‘capability study’ – reviewing the effectiveness of AusAID’s CD 
program in Correctional Services of Solomon Islands. I have also co-facilitated two community 
focus groups (and been involved in the data analysis of two more) in rural communities regarding 
issues to do with informal justice, police effectiveness and community safety as well as undertaking 
informal interviews with PPF and RSIPF at remote posts (including Malu’u and Avu Avu).  
Through this preliminary research and extensive consultation process I have been able to better 
understand how the preceding conceptual issues regarding CD and program management play out 
in practice and this has allowed me to design questions for semi-structured interviews which are 
sufficiently relevant to the context and directed at the specificity of the day to day experience of 
practitioners. I have found this approach necessary as abstract questions concerned with conceptual 
issues, trialled in these preliminary interviews, largely generated confusion and often led to 
practitioners agreeing in the interests of moving on.203 On the other hand questions which were 
grounded in the context of a particular detail of policing or CD and PMM&E often led to 
practitioners (advisers and counterparts alike) expanding upon the wider ramifications and 
philosophising and speculating about the broader systems at play. 
Based on this understanding of the context and the foregoing literature review I have summarised 
the issues into the following table for operationalisation in the case study research. The first column 
provides a summary of the key CD concepts and issues. The second column provides an overview 
                                                 
203 It was clear through preliminary informal interviews that practitioners either did not understand the conceptual issues 
or they did not consider them to be important.  
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of the related PMM&E concepts and issues. Where PMM&E issues are directly related to CD 
concepts and issues they are presented alongside the corresponding concept (in the adjacent 
column). These concepts are numbered. The concept numbers then correlate with relevant interview 
questions. The interview questions are designed to elicit views from interview respondents relating 
to these concepts. A full list of the interview questions is provided in the appendix.204  
4.1.2 Table of concepts: For operationalisation in case study interviews205 
Concept 
No. 
Capacity and Capacity Development  Program Management Monitoring and 
Evaluation  
1. Plan to leave from the start – avoiding dependency  
The literature demonstrates a need to avoid 
dependency, and to attempt to approach CD in a 
manner that is likely to be sustainable by ensuring 
that progress towards capacity is progressively 
monitored, that creating unnecessary parallel 
structures is avoided, and that practitioners and 
counterparts are always mindful of the pending exit 
of donor personnel.206  
PMM&E systems should be capable of designing a 
strategy – outlining every input, output and 
outcome – from the point of intervention to the 
point of withdrawal. It should systematically 
articulate what needs to be done, how it should be 
done and the timeline for achieving such objectives. 
This approach should be mindful of ensuring a 
timely exit (usually a politically acceptable one) and 
it should attempt to avoid dependency. On the other 
hand it is understood that efficient pathways to 
developing capacity require that it be built upon 
what exists and this is not possible to know at the 
point of intervention (or possibly for many years 
into the intervention).   
2. Be flexible/adaptable, and analyse risk 
There is an understanding that CD is a ‘fluid 
activity’ and therefore the outcomes are 
unpredictable. The CD approach must work with 
such uncertainty as well as adaptively respond to 
the ever changing and evolving context. This 
concept includes the ‘capability to balance diversity 
and coherence’, as it requires the encouragement of 
‘both stability and innovation’. It also relates to the 
‘capability to adapt and self-renew’, as flexibility 
and risk management require an ability to change 
and respond to internal and external dynamics, new 
information and the like – making monitoring 
PMM&E must be flexible and adaptive and respond 
to the changing circumstances. There is a need to 
plan for achieving outcomes and yet accept the 
unpredictable nature of CD and the CD 
environment. Conversely, PMM&E must generate 
detailed plans and demonstrate efficiency with each 
input converting directly (and in a straight line) into 
outputs and outcomes. In the interests of securing 
funding PMM&E must demonstrate the clear 
realisation of predetermined outcomes.  
                                                 
204 The interview questions are coded to correspond with the concept numbers provided in the table below (Table 3). 
205 The concepts summarised in this table are informed by the literature reviews presented in Chapters 2 and 3 providing 
an overview of capacity, CD and PMM&E. Whilst the broader literature is accounted for here the sources referred to in 
this table are selected because they provide overviews of the literature and are useful for informing interview questions. 
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and elaborate on these themes. The intention is that the responses and interview data will generate a more holistic 
picture of what is important. 
206 Sources: This reflects AusAID (2004) Principle 1; ECDPM Key Concepts Table ‘Objectives’ ‘Vision and Planning’. 
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systems critical for allowing the organisation to 
remain relevant in a fluid environment.207  
3. Capacity development takes time  
CD takes time and eludes quick fixes. There is a 
need to resist the temptation to undermine 
sustainability in the interests of demonstrating the 
realisation of short-term goals.208  
It is important to demonstrate the realisation of 
short-term outcomes/outputs as this is how 
conventional approaches to M&E provide evidence 
of progress and the achievement of milestones. 
Such achievements are required in a relatively short 
time frame due to reporting and funding cycles. 
4. Be realistic about what can be achieved 
It is important not to attempt to completely 
transform the environment. It is unlikely to be 
successful, can be counterproductive and may not 
be necessary. To avoid this tendency it is important 
to consult a wider group of stakeholders including 
those lower ranked in the host organisation, as the 
views of the elite of a country or organisation may 
not reflect the wider view.209  
Conventional approaches to PMM&E are also 
mindful of being realistic. However, this emphasis 
is somewhat different in that program managers are 
encouraged to be very clear about how they can 
achieve change and if they are unable to articulate 
change in terms of a results chain it is suggested 
that this is due to a lack of clarity in what is to be 
achieved and how. This is seen as a flaw or shortfall 
of the practitioner (as opposed to the framework 
itself), rather than a reflection of the inevitable 
complexity. Being realistic in a conventional 
approach also means only pursuing changes that can 
be measured and can be accompanied by 
objectively verifiable indicators. 
5. Manage expectations, and the importance of communication and relationships 
It is important to engage with at levels about what is 
needed and what is possible. There is a need to steer 
expectations away from the ‘Rolls Royce 
syndrome’ and to attempt to keep stakeholders and 
counterparts engaged in what can and should 
happen given the context.210  
In conventional program management approaches, 
managing expectations and relationships is seen to 
be crucial. However, there is an emphasis on 
instrumental relationships and attempting to get 
stakeholders to agree to donor driven objectives and 
outcomes. Whist this aspect is seen as important, it 
is not explicitly accounted for within the framework 
and the process of relationship management is not 
monitored or measured. 
                                                 
207 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 2; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 4; ECDPM Key Concepts Table 
‘Objectives’, ‘Roles of Variables’ 
208 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 3; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table ‘Measures of success’ 
209 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 4; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table ‘Focus of attention’ ‘Relationships’ 
‘Sense of Structure’ ‘Shadow system’ ‘Paradox’ ‘Attitude to diversity and conflict’ ‘Leadership’ ‘Nature of direction’ 
‘Control’ ; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 2 & 6 
210 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 5; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table ‘Diversity’ ‘Relationships’; Morgan & 
Lyon (2009) CD Shift 3 
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6. Ownership and leadership is vital  
Supply-driven assistance does not work. It is 
important that CD and reforms are locally driven 
and owned. This includes ownership at all levels of 
the organisation and also outside of the organisation 
where relevant. This principle relates to the 
‘capability to commit and engage’. The policy 
literature suggests also a need to pick and support 
champions.211  
Local stakeholders must be included in PMM&E 
design and planning processes at a range of levels 
throughout the organisation. Conventional 
approaches suggest a need to influence local 
stakeholders toward donor defined outcomes. 
Systems approaches suggest local people should 
drive a messy process whereby competing views are 
valued and that planning emerges from dialogue. 
7. Holistic approaches based on sound analysis 
It is important to focus on the whole (not just 
component aspects) of the organisation. Such an 
approach must be able to recognise and analyse ‘the 
interplay between individuals, organisations and 
community to avoid designing interventions in 
isolation’. This also relates to the ‘capability to 
commit and engage’ as a host organisation must ‘be 
conscious and aware of its place in the world, to 
configure itself, to develop its own motivation and 
commitment and then to act’. This concept also 
encapsulates the ‘capability to relate and attract’ 
and the ‘capability to adapt and self-renew’.212  
PMM&E literature is divided. Conventional 
approaches deliberately isolate aspects of the 
organisation and break the CD process down into 
discrete, manageable and measurable tasks. Systems 
approaches contend a holistic approach is required – 
treating the host organisation as a whole and 
recognising the overlap with other systems. 
Capacity is then emergent in this approach. 
However, it is unclear how to manage/approach this 
from a program management perspective. 
8. Advising rather than ‘doing’, and technical assistance 
Advisers should avoid ‘doing’ and rather focus on 
supporting, advising and mentoring. This ensures 
that changes are embedded in the local context and 
personnel and systems are not being supplanted by 
donor staff. It is also a useful measure of whether or 
not the practitioner is introducing something that 
will work in the context. There are exceptions to 
this rule driven by contextual issues and what is 
necessary for a productive adviser/counterpart 
relationship. Technical skill transfers are important 
but there is much more to this relationship. This 
concept relates to the ‘capability to carry out 
technical, service delivery and logistical tasks’.213  
In practice conventional approaches to PMM&E 
result in short-term goal orientation. This can trap 
practitioners in a vicious cycle of attempting to 
meet timelines and demonstrating verifiable 
indicators of success by sidelining host organisation 
personnel and directly undertaking the tasks 
themselves. The results that are reported through 
performance indicators (as proxies for capacity) 
mask an unsustainable situation whereby the 
organisation appears to be functioning better 
(increased capacity) but there is a dependency of 
donor staff to do the work. 
9. The delivery of capacity development, training and technical transfers 
                                                 
211 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 6; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table: ‘Relationships’ ‘Leadership’ ‘External 
interventions’; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 6. 
212 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 7; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table: ‘Roles of Variable’ ‘Sense of Structure’ 
‘Relationships’ ‘Shadow systems’ ‘Focus of attention’; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 2 &4. 
213 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 8; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table: ‘Relationships’; Morgan & Lyon (2009) 
CD Shift 1 & 3. 
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There is less emphasis now on generic training and 
more on learning for the context and from the 
context, including an increasing recognition of the 
importance of the co-production of knowledge 
rather than technical knowledge transfers. CD 
generally happens on the job and to varying degrees 
facilitates this shift in knowledge production. In 
cases where formal training is appropriate the need 
should be established by the context and locally 
driven. The training itself must be directly relevant 
and incorporated into practice. This concept relates 
to the ‘capability to carry out technical, service 
delivery and logistical tasks’.214  
Conventional PMM&E, by implication, values 
measurable indicators of progress. As a result there 
is a privileging of things that can be counted, such 
as the number of the people trained and equipment 
delivery. In practice PMM&E implicitly rewards 
and encourages formal training over co-production 
of knowledge on the job. 
10. Build on what exists 
Existing capacities must be recognised and 
explicitly acknowledged and built upon in a co-
production approach. There is a need for interveners 
to learn how to see capacity that looks different. 
Any approach to capacity development or change 
must be built on the local context. A strengths-
based understanding and approach to identifying 
existing capabilities to be harnessed and built upon 
is preferable to an intervention informed by a 
needs/weakness analyses. This concept includes the 
‘capability to adapt and self-renew’ as monitoring 
systems grounded in the context are critical for 
keeping the organisation informed allowing it to 
respond to changes and recognise emergent 
capacity.215  
 
11. Importance of incentives, motivation, and perverse or unintended consequences 
The importance of incentives and motivations for 
change and CD recognises the complexity of factors 
which influence the behaviour of individuals and 
the flow on impacts throughout the organisation and 
between systems. It is difficult to understand what 
motivates people and even more difficult to 
understand how other actors will respond to 
changes or how the wider system will respond. 
There is a need to understand incentives and 
motivations in a manner that takes into account the 
wider systems and recognises the possibility of 
unintended consequences as people will respond in 
unpredictable ways. Whilst there may be a 
reasonably clear incentive to act in one way within 
the professional and official realm, it is critically 
 
                                                 
214 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 9; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 1. 
215 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 10; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table ‘History’; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD 
Shift 1 & 7. 
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important to recognise there may be strong 
disincentives emanating from external systems 
which overlap. This too relates to the ‘capability to 
commit and engage’ as strong disincentives or 
hidden barriers and countervailing forces can create 
a state of ‘stuckness’. This also includes the 
‘capability to relate and attract resources and 
support’ and the ‘capability to balance diversity and 
coherence’.216 
12. Plan for staff turnover 
Also related to the importance of a ‘macro’ 
understanding of the whole system, CD can 
contribute to unintended consequences such as high 
staff turnover. Personnel who have received CD 
may become valuable to other organisations and 
there is a need to move the focus away from 
individuals exclusively to focus on units and the 
wider organisations so as not to create a 
dependency on a small few.217  
 
13. Accounting for the cultural environment 
If CD programs attempt to introduce systems and 
practices which are incompatible with cultural 
practice, or do not make sense within the cultural 
context, they will not be sustainable. Instead CD 
must be grounded in the context and this includes 
the values, motivations, knowledge systems, etc., of 
the broader social and cultural environment. This 
includes understanding and working with the 
culture(s) of the organisation, the culture(s) of the 
wider formal system and the culture(s) of related 
systems including informal systems. This concept 
includes the ‘capability to balance diversity and 
coherence’ and is particularly critical in terms of 
negotiating social and cultural pressures and 
expectations with professional and formal 
expectations that often include imported notions of 
‘ethics’.218 
Systems approaches to PMM&E frameworks 
should include broader cultural and social systems, 
values and knowledge. Success of CD depends on 
the incorporation and absorption of such knowledge 
for sustainability. Local knowledge must be part of 
the evidence collected to design and plan the 
approach to CD as well as monitor and evaluate the 
program. Conversely, conventional approaches 
favour scientific, strategic and quantifiable 
evidence/knowledge. Reportable information must 
fit the bureaucratic formats of donor organisations. 
Furthermore, a focus on the formal organisation is 
essential and built into the mandate of the 
intervention. Consequently a focus on the formal 
system in PMM&E is required to demonstrate 
success against such a mandate.  
14. Capacity is both a means and an end 
Capacity has long been seen as an important means 
to achieving development. It has become clear, 
however, that capacity is in fact an important end in 
itself and furthermore the means of reaching that 
Conventional approaches to PMM&E explicitly 
emphasise a focus on the end rather than the means. 
With PMM&E designed to manage for results, 
process is only seen as important to the extent that it 
                                                 
216 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 11; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 2, 3, 4 & 5; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts 
Table: ‘Shadow systems’. 
217 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 12; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 2. 
218 Sources: AusAID (2004) Principle 13; ECDPM (2008) Key Concepts Table ‘Focus of attention’ ‘Relationships’ 
‘Sense of Structure’ ‘Shadow system’ ‘Paradox’ ‘Attitude to diversity and conflict’; Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 2 
& 5. 
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end are important. In short CD processes are critical 
and the manner in which capacity is built has a far 
greater impact on sustainability than was previously 
understood.219  
contributes directly to such results.  
Table 3: Table of concepts for operationalisation in case study interviews 
4.1.3 Interview questions 
The semi-structured interviews were based on a list of 39 possible questions for the RSIPF and 37 
possible corresponding questions for the PPF which were broken into themes informed by the 
findings of the literature review (summarised in the table of concepts (Table 3) above). I asked the 
questions necessary to solicit a response to all the themes and as many questions within those 
themes as possible given the time frame allowed (approximately 90 minutes with each participant). 
The approach was designed to ensure that all the themes of CD and PMM&E were addressed 
without stifling the flow of responses by insisting on a question-and-answer format. This is 
particularly the case when interviewing RSIPF personnel. The approach was useful for avoiding one 
word answers and to get the interview participants talking freely, rather than carefully considering 
each response in a manner that may have undermined the authenticity of the responses being 
offered.220 All RSIPF participants were given the option to respond in Pijin and the wording of 
questions was carefully tailored to ensure they were easily understood using a mixture of Pijin and 
English commonly spoken in Solomon Islands. The approach to interviewing attempted to strike the 
optimum balance – achieving enough consistency to allow responses to be compared and collated, 
while avoiding the closed question and answer format that would likely have missed important 
information and compromised the sincerity of responses.221 All respondents were asked at least one 
(in most cases several) question(s) from each of these categories. When interviewing I encouraged 
respondents to elaborate and allowed the conversation to flow often resulting in several questions 
being addressed at once. All interview participants approved the audio recording of these 
interviews, allowing me to fully transcribe them and refer back to the recordings throughout the 
analysis. 
4.1.4 Interview participants  
The sampling strategy was designed to capture the opinions of senior management, unit level 
management and the executive of the RSIPF (local members) and to compare those responses with 
                                                 
219 Morgan & Lyon (2009) CD Shift 9. 
220 J. Mason, “Semistructured Interview,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods, ed. M. S. 
Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman and T. Futing Liao (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2004), 1021-2. 
221 Whilst by no means a generalisable fact, Solomon Islanders are known for giving responses that they feel are polite 
or agreeable. There is also a tendency in a CD setting for there to be a power imbalance which is likely to skew the 
results as it impacts upon what people feel they can and cannot say. Importantly this interview approach achieved a 
level of informality to encourage, and generally achieve, a much more open and relaxed interaction, therefore to some 
extent, mitigating this pitfall.  
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their corresponding PPF advisers. To this end I interviewed ten local members222 across all sections 
of the organisation, including Directions and Standards, Administration, Operations, Criminal 
Investigations, and Community Policing. In the interests of comparing their responses and 
achieving a different perspective I was careful to interview the corresponding PPF advisers as well 
as those PPF members in planning and M&E positions – in total 17 PPF members223 were 
interviewed.224  
While I am happy with the range of perspectives I was able to collect and feel confident that I have 
achieved a good representation of opinion within the more senior ranks of the RSIPF, there were 
inevitably some shortfalls in the sampling. For example, I would like to have interviewed more 
operational staff but not surprisingly they are difficult to get a hold of and those selected were not 
available within the time frame of my visit.225 In particular I was unable to speak to the Provincial 
Police Commander of Honiara due to a police fatality occurring at that time. I acknowledge that the 
sample provided a roughly representative spread of opinion at the senior level of the PPF and 
RSIPF only. By virtue of the significant experience these officers generally possessed, their views 
of the situation were almost certainly more sophisticated than those of other members of the PPF 
and the RSIPF (?). This would account for the thoughtful responses and often insightful views 
expressed by respondents. It is important to note that whilst this sample is therefore skewed in this 
respect, it does not impact upon the usefulness of the findings. This is because I am not attempting 
to evaluate or judge the level of competence or achievement in this operation but rather I am trying 
to understanding the operation environment and intervention mechanisms (program management 
issues and M&&E). Such well-informed officers are therefore well placed to provide this 
information.  
The interviews were carried out in various work venues – usually the participants’ offices, 
conference or meeting rooms, or outside in informal recreation areas. In the majority of these cases 
the interview spaces were private, with limited or no interruptions. On one occasion, however, I 
began an interview in a vacant open office setting – half way through this interview several RSIPF 
officers and one PPF officer moved through the space, with a few officers staying in the room (at 
adjacent desks) for several minutes. Whilst this would have had some impact, I do not believe this 
compromised the sincerity or openness of the responses to a great extent – as the officer had earlier 
                                                 
222 Three of the RSIPF interviewed were women. 
223 Four of the PPF interviewed were women. 
224 My sampling strategy was deliberately designed to interview a spread of RSIPF across the organisational chart – 
including senior personnel in all relevant units. This was achieved without any problems as I had been in contact and 
visited previously on several occasions. I already had  permissions in place and a relationship with the RSIPF 
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as the PFF Commander. 
225 That said, I was able to interview senior personnel in operations and tactical response units as well as a provincial 
commander – together with all of the PPF in these areas.  
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established he had a particularly good relationship with his adviser and he was strikingly candid in 
most of his responses. On another occasion an interview with a PPF officer was cut short by an 
interruption. 
I did not experience any significant problems with language barriers. I have had some experience 
communicating in Solomon Islands – so I was careful to reword the questions in a combination of 
Pijin and popularly spoken English. I had no trouble understanding responses that were provided in 
Pijin, and all participants were given the option to speak in Pijin if they preferred. In any case, 
RSIPF respondents generally spoke English well. Being able to communicate in Pijin did help me 
somewhat with credibility. Nonetheless, I was clearly an outsider and respondents were certainly 
wary for any numbers of reasons. In particular, I was aware that respondents were worried that they 
might be being evaluated or that I might influence decisions regarding the exit strategy of the PPF. I 
dealt with these concerns at the outset of each interview and this certainly put respondents visibly at 
ease.  
The obvious and most critical impediment to soliciting honest responses was the fear of 
consequences. Both PPF and RSIPF undoubtedly had times in which they held back their opinions 
because they were aware of the possibility of more senior RSIPF and PPF reading their responses. I 
overcame this problem, to the extent it was possible to do so, by giving respondents the opportunity 
to say things that were off the record. I was also careful not to ask questions that would make 
people uncomfortable as they were generally not necessary for answering my research questions. I 
had off the record conversations at length and this has been helpful in framing my understanding 
but has not been included in the data. I also gave strong assurances of anonymity. Whilst I warned 
participants of the possibility of being identified, I also assured them that I would not give any 
identifying information in reporting the data – unless it was for some reason necessary and they had 
given express permission to do so. For this reason I do not provide information regarding position 
and rank in the reporting here. Whilst I appreciate that this may make making judgements regarding 
the weight of these statements difficult, I am convinced that the benefits of offering such anonymity 
by far outweigh the costs.  
4.1.5 Informed consent 
Those officers who were interviewed gave their informed consent as did the Commander of the PPF 
and Commissioner of the RSIPF.  As stated above, all were given the opportunity to say things ‘off 
the record’ and all were aware of the possibility that their answers may have made them 
identifiable. That said, in the interests of maintaining as much anonymity as is possible the 
reporting of interview responses does not include names or identifying ranks or positions unless it 
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was absolutely necessary and the interview participant had indicated they were comfortable with 
being on the record.226  
4.1.6 Data Analysis  
Interviews were recorded and all responses were transcribed against the corresponding questions. 
The responses were then coded and collated into the previously outlined categories presented in the 
table of concepts (Table 3). The data was then grouped into categories of general consensus and 
points of difference. The data was compared against the key concepts to determine the relevance of 
these concepts to the case of police CD and the implications for practice and PMM&E.227 
4.2 Background  
4.2.1 Solomon Islands context  
Solomon Islands is a former British protectorate.228 It is a young state,229 having achieved full 
independence as recently as 1978.230 Solomon Islands is made up of approximately 900 islands and 
4000 village communities.231 The population is comprised of 94 per cent Melanesian, 4 per cent 
Polynesian (making up the majority of the population on some islands), and other migrant 
minorities – particularly a substantial Chinese minority.232 There are at least 64 distinct ‘living 
languages’233 and many more dialects, with Solomon Islands Pijin serving as a national language 
that allows local people to communicate across language groups. Ethnic factionalism is strong and 
those from different islands, and indeed groups from within those islands, have long experienced 
conflict between groups. The cultural practices and traditions of these varied groups remain 
significantly different and the manner in which these differences manifest is complex and not 
always apparent to outsiders. Solomon Islands lacks a sense of nationhood and the diversity of the 
social and cultural practices which exist makes any generalisations fraught. Given the difference 
between and the fluidity within these different cultures any analysis of the culture of Solomon 
Islands (or even the culture of particular groups) will be oversimplified.234   
                                                 
226 On occasion I do not ascribe an interviewee number to particular comments or data – this is generally to avoid 
linking those particular comments with others the respondent has provided. For example, if a section of data has the 
potential to identify the respondent I will not provide a number. For more information on ethics, the ethical clearance 
form and corresponding forms on informed consent can be made available for review.  
227 For more information on the approach to the data analysis refer to the end of this section. 
228 M. Fullilove, The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-Building (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2006), 5. 
229 Ibid. 
230 “Timeline: Solomon Islands – A Chronology of Key Events,” BBC News, accessed September 3, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1249397.stm. 
231 J. Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands (Canberra: The 
Australian National University E Press, 2010), 13. 
232 Ibid.  
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid., 14-5 
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With these qualifications in mind, social order in the country is generally described as being 
relatively flat and is known for being inclusive – although this characterisation is not particularly 
accurate for some groups. Another commonly cited shared system throughout the islands is known 
as the wantok system or wantokism. Whilst it is experienced in different ways by different groups, 
wantok is commonly understood as a social system of networks amongst Solomon Islanders. These 
networks constitute pathways of recognition and mutual/reciprocal obligations amongst a wantok 
group. In a positive interpretation it is often simply described as an informal social welfare and 
network system. In a negative (and rather unsophisticated) portrayal, wantokism is often described 
(particularly by outsiders) as a system of networked responsibilities amongst Solomon Islanders 
which can be mobilised for the purposes of corruption and for placing undue pressure on family 
members to guarantee one’s security and the provision of resources – providing the opportunity for 
some family members to drain or leech off of others. According to Brigg: 
we can better define wantokism as a system of generalised obligations and supports that permeates 
contemporary Melanesian social and political life. The system in Solomon Islands is closely related to 
kinship relationships, but it is a modern phenomenon that emerged in the colonial era as people were 
drawn into plantation and administration work. Wantokism (wantok = literally ‘one talk’) arose as 
different tribes with shared language found commonality and provided support to each other in new 
settings, at least in part in juxtaposition to colonial overseers. This experience was repeated among shared 
language groups through the development of Solomon Islands pijin. Wantokism can refer to those who 
share kinship ties but also includes, on larger scales, those who share the same language, are from the 
same area, from the same island and the same region of the world. So, in a village context, one’s wantoks 
are direct kin, but as one moves further away from local contexts one’s pool of wantoks expands.235 
The wantok system is of significant importance in terms of ensuring a basic level of provision, 
order and security in the country – not least of all because the state does not provide basic welfare 
or security to the majority of its citizens.  
Most villages continue to draw most of their needs for food, water, security, recovery from natural and 
human disaster and recreation from village, church and kinship-based social systems that are little 
buttressed by national and international markets or by state taxation or state service provision.236  
Together with the wantok system, religion strongly shapes Solomon Island society. A colonial 
import, Christianity is by far the dominant religion in Solomon Islands, with more than 90 per cent 
of the population regularly attending church.237 Whilst the adoption of Christian values and 
teachings is widespread, it manifests in different ways in different contexts as Christianity mixes 
                                                 
235 M. Brigg, “Wantokism and State Building in Solomon Islands: A Response to Fukuyama,” Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 24, no. 3 (2009): 152. 
236 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 13.  
237 A. A. Pollard, Givers of Wisdom, Labourers without Gain: Essays on Women in the Solomon Islands (Suva: 
University of South Pacific, 2000), 3. 
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with local traditions and local people have actively shaped its incorporation into social practice. 
Church leaders typically work with customary leaders in the informal maintenance of social norms 
and order. Whilst the population is divided between five major formal denominations, the Christian 
network is strong and these networks and collective resources were effectively mobilised during the 
tensions238 with churches playing a significant role in minimising the violence.239  
As noted by Braithwaite et al., ‘Christian traditions of forgiveness and their blending with 
indigenous practices of reconciliation have proved useful in transcending outbreaks of warfare’.240 
This has also frequently been useful in the wake of violent conflict as well as in ordinary day to day 
life. In fact due to the geography of Solomon Islands, the limited resources of the Solomon Islands 
Government and its law and justice institutions,241 the vast majority of Solomon Islanders outside 
the urban centres rely on the informal mix between custom and church to maintain social order and 
provide the only means of justice available to them. Whilst these informal systems are critical and 
do provide some level of community safety and order, there is significant evidence of their 
weakening in recent years and particularly in the post-conflict environment.242 There are also 
significant problems with some aspects of cultural practice in some places in terms of human rights 
violations. In particular these informal practices are renowned for failing to adequately protect and 
respect women.243 Whilst the position of women in Solomon Islands is beyond the scope of this 
case study, it is important to acknowledge that their generally assumed subordination is an overly 
simplistic view of gender relations and significantly underestimates the power that women hold in 
these complex dynamics.244  
                                                 
238 The conflict is generally referred to as ‘the tensions’ – this is outlined below. 
239 The work of the churches to reduce the violence during the tension and move the country towards peace is 
illustrative of their incredible influence as well as their centrality in terms of social order. For example, Melanesian 
Brothers and Sisters, as well as other church organisations, undertook extensive negotiations with villages to encourage 
‘weapon free’ communities. They were highly successful in their work and handed over significant numbers of weapons 
to the National Peace Council.239 Melanesian Brothers also answered the calls of frightened and vulnerable people and 
stayed in their homes offering protection through providing a witness (essentially with a connection to God) to 
harassment and ultimately deterring visiting militants from carrying out intended assaults or evictions.239 . See: 
Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 39; supported by Interviews with Melanesian Brothers, Honiara, 2010. Seven 
Melanesian Brothers also infamously travelled to the Weather Coast and attempted to negotiate a peace with Harold 
Keke, who had been a major spoiler of peace and was known for being ‘murderous’ and mentally unstable. Initially 
only one Brother went – the others followed when he did not return. The Brothers were all murdered. 
240 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 15. 
241 Together with the lack of legitimacy, some of these institutions hold in some areas of the country. 
242 V. Boege and J. Curth, “Grounding the Responsibility to Protect: Working with Local Strengths for Peace and 
Conflict Prevention in the Solomon Islands” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Asia Pacific 
Conference, Brisbane, September 29-30, 2011), 14; S. Dinnen and N. Haley, Evaluation of the Community Officer 
Project in Solomon Islands (Washington, DC: Justice for the Poor, World Bank, 2012), 7-8. 
243 Boege and Curth, “Grounding the Responsibility to Protect,” 13. 
244 The power of women to negotiate and influence was clearly on display during the tensions – with women being 
credited with actively mitigating violence and working to reduce the fatalities of the conflict through organised and 
consistent negotiations with militants. According to a leading regional women’s activist, Afu Billy, women were 
instrumental in quelling the violence ‘in demanding that their own young men stop fighting’. They were bold in their 
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4.2.2 The tensions 
The conflict in Solomon Islands, commonly understood to have begun in 1998 and ultimately 
triggering the RAMSI intervention in 2003, is generally referred to locally as ‘the tensions’. It must 
be acknowledged from the outset that any overview of the conflict dynamics leading up to and 
fuelling the ongoing tensions will be lacking. This is particularly true here as an analysis of the 
complexity of the conflict environment is beyond the scope of this case study. In the interests of 
providing some critical context, however, I provide a brief description in the full knowledge that it 
is inevitably simplistic. It is worth noting that although it was beyond the focus of my research, I 
did ask a number of people that I interviewed and met informally what they considered to be the 
drivers of the conflict.245 People provided accounts of causal factors, and their interpretations of 
these factors, that were so contradictory and complex that it would be impossible to reconcile them 
(or reproduce here). Some attributed the conflict to single issues – such as the flow of weapons and 
the militant sensibility coming over the border from Bougainville.246 Others suggested it came 
down to the disrespectful and opportunistic treatment of Guale women by Malaitan men.247 What is 
fair to say is that in the 40-some interpretations I have heard, each interpretation was different – 
many profoundly so.248  
The most obvious contributing factors leading to the tensions related to conflict surrounding land 
disputes and internal migration. In particular the tensions were fuelled by the huge number of 
Malaitan migrants to the capital and the associated land stresses which came with that urbanisation. 
Maltaitans moved to Honiara (on the island of Guadalcanal) to work for the US military during 
World War II. Having come from an increasingly overpopulated island, many stayed on.249 
Malaitans were also privileged by the colonial power. They were regularly employed by the 
Administration, and dominated public service positions.250 Over time the Malaitan population in 
Honiara became significant and land and housing problems were inevitable. In short many Guales 
                                                                                                                                                                  
endeavours and were known for visiting militant bunkers and talking conflicting parties into meeting together – thereby 
facilitating a human connection between warring men. According to Oxfam: ‘If it wasn’t for the women of Solomon 
Islands the armed conflict wouldn’t have ended’. See Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 31-32; C. Moore, Happy 
Isles in Crisis (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004); and Oxfam, Australian Intervention in the Solomons: Beyond 
Operation Helpem Fren; An agenda for Development in the Solomon Islands (Melbourne: Oxfam, 2003), cited in 
Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 31. 
245 Informal informants included a range of people, from taxi drivers, tourist operators, and community members in 
regional areas including Malu’u, to senior bureaucrats, police and political advisers.  
246 Like most accounts of the conflict this was no doubt a factor. Indeed, members from the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army were directly involved in some of the violent clashes.  
247 Guales are indigenous people of Guadalcanal. Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands is located on Guadalcanal. 
Malaitans are indigenous people of Malaita, an island to the north-west of Guadalcanal.   
248 See also M. Allen, Greed and Grievance: Ex-Militants’ Perspectives on the Conflict in Solomon Islands, 1998-2003 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013).  
249 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 18. 
250 Many informal interview respondents claimed that the colonial characterisation of Malaitans as being hard working 
and competent – therefore justifying their positions – has been internalised and is often seen as what sets them apart 
from the local Guale population. This is a view that is also strongly resented. 
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came to see Malaitans as ‘disrespectful guests on their land’, and tensions over Malaitan land 
acquisition and their domination of positions of paid employment have caused widespread 
resentment.251 Resentment was further flamed by the marital arrangements between Malaitan men 
and Guadalcanal women resulting in the transfer of land entitlements to Malaitans.252 The manner 
in which Maltains have acquired land in Guadalcanal varies and includes land acquisition through 
marriage and through purchasing land, often from local people who did not own the land as such to 
start with: 
[M]any Guadalcanal people (predominantly males) from areas around Honiara were selling customary 
land to those from other provinces, even though Guadalcanal is a matrilineal society where females are 
regarded as the custodians of land. Many individuals were selling land without consulting other members 
of their line (laen, tribe), often causing arguments among landowners. What is important to note here is 
that many of those who purchased land did so legitimately either through customary procedures or 
through legal means. The sale of land has, over the years, been resented by a younger generation of 
Guadalcanal people who view the act as a sale of their ‘birth right’.253 
Whilst it is fair to say that these issues surrounding Malaitan migration, uneven economic 
opportunity, consequent cultural tensions and land disputes, and the attempts by Guale militants to 
reclaim the land provided critical impetus for the eventual eruption into conflict, it cannot fully 
account for the conflict dynamics, nor does it explain the spiralling conflict, the motivation of many 
of the parties to the conflict and the ensuing complexity that emerged. It would, however, seem to 
be at least an adequate description of the majority of Guale militants’ justification for the initial 
violence.254 Allen’s extensive research on this subject found the ‘motives for Guale militancy to be 
varied’, but he was able to cluster the motivations into two groups: ‘development [in]equity and 
cultural [dis]respect’.255  
Nonetheless, according to Braithwaite et al., the conflict consisted of two major stages. The first 
was the initial attempt of young men from the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal (the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army  – later known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement) to force Malaitan settlers 
off traditionally held Guale land,256 followed by a more widespread effort to evict Malaitans from 
Guadalcanal. The second phase is understood as being the response – ‘with the creation of the 
                                                 
251 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 18. 
252 People of Guadalcanal pass their land through matrilineal lines – transferred through marriage. Malaitan tradition is 
on the other hand patriarchal and this has been continued. 
253 T. T. Kabutaulaka, “Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in the Solomon Islands,” 
Working Paper 01/01 (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 2001), 15, cited in Braithwaite et al., Pillars 
and Shadows, 19. 
254 The IFM was essentially a coalition of differently motivated groups and criminal gangs – with opportunistic 
criminality more prevalent later in the conflict. Some groups had more specific grievances related to Gold Ridge mine 
and palm oil plantations.  
255 Allen, Greed and Grievance, 104. 
256 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows, 21. 
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Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), initially to defend Malaitan interests against the Guale rebels’.257 In 
contrast to the simple understanding of an ethnic based struggle for land, Malaitan militants 
reportedly saw ‘the root cause of the tension more in terms of an elite political conspiracy – than in 
terms of land’.258 During this time Malaitan elites granted compensation payments to Malaitans 
who had been forcibly removed, further fuelling claims of corruption and this together with the 
formation of the MEF resulted in the escalation of violence.259 
Several requests for Australian intervention were at the time denied and the Solomon Islands state 
began to collapse.260 Politicians and public servants were drawn into the clash – with some seen as 
driving it and the RSIPF becoming deeply entrenched in the conflict.261 In January 2000 the MEF 
obtained 34 ‘mainly high-powered weapons, a grenade launcher and ammunition’262 from the 
police station in Malaita’s capital, Auki. It is almost certain that police commanders were aware of 
this and at least implicitly supported it. In June 2000 the MEF raided the national police armoury, 
followed by other police armouries and prisons. Supported by the Malaitan dominated paramilitary 
wing of the RSIPF, the MEF forced the prime minister to resign.263 A substantial number of police 
were part of the ‘joint operation’ which captured the prime minister and the governor general, the 
Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation and other communications such as Telekom. 264 
After the replacement of the incumbent prime minister (Ulufa’alu) with the opposition leader 
(Sogavare), the Australian and New Zealand Governments265 finally intervened, facilitating the 
Townsville Peace Accord in October.266 Despite comprehensive instructions for fostering enduring 
peace and reconciliation267 the support to enforce and monitor such peace failed.268 Arms were not 
surrendered and the militia groups split into a number of criminal groups. In December 2001 
through corruption and coercion yet another prime minister (Kemakeza) was ‘elected’.269 The 
tensions were accompanied by an economic collapse. With the virtual evaporation of paid 
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employment and the ‘formidable youth bulge’270 there was a significant increase in the pool of 
young men ‘in the market for a rumble’.271 By early 2003 the state was again on the brink of 
failure.272 The State apparatus ceased to function, as police were compromised by their connections 
and unable to prevent, and too often participated in, the violence and social upheaval. Public funds 
were stolen through extortion273 and the armed robbery of the Treasury.274 Theft, assault, murder, 
rape, kidnapping, torture and intimidation were frequently occurring in conflict affected areas.275 
It is important to acknowledge that the common representation of this conflict as being primarily 
ethnically motivated between groups from Guadalcanal and Malaita can certainly account for a 
great deal of the tension events, but it is an overly simplistic analysis of a far more complex reality. 
Other contributing resentments were fuelled by government corruption and general impotence in 
handling migration issues,276 economic development and land ownership.277 Factions and alliances 
within government were complex and did not divide evenly along ethnic lines. Politicians and other 
political actors manipulated the tension issues and mobilised young people for their own, often 
dubious, causes.278 The lines of conflict were in the end difficult to describe from the outside – with 
violent conflict occurring within as well as between ethnic groups.279 
The conflict is commonly described as a small scale civil war but this tends to underestimate the 
significant impact of the tensions on Solomon Islands as well as the potency of the tension at the 
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time of intervention. According to reports approximately 35,000 people were displaced as a result 
of the conflict by November 1999 and this caused enormous upheaval. There were political reasons 
for downplaying the number of deaths but reasonable estimates suggested in excess of 400 people 
died280 as a result of the conflict and many more were injured and assaulted. There is little doubt 
that the RAMSI intervention was one of the critical factors in preventing significantly more deaths. 
There were of course other critical factors and the role of women and churches (see footnotes 
above) should not be underestimated as ‘at every stage [of the conflict] it might have spiralled into 
something much worse without the restraining influences of church leaders and women leaders, and 
the efforts of many ordinary Solomon Islands villagers in general’.281  
4.2.3 The intervention – RAMSI 
In April 2003 the then prime minister, Kemakeza, appealed again to Australia for help. This time 
the request resulted in the ‘Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Islands’,282 which 
outlined the provisions for an Australian-led intervention. Following further official requests from 
Solomon Islands,283 the foreign affairs ministers of the Pacific Islands Forum284 agreed to enact 
commitments made in the Biketawa Declaration,285 accepting the Australian designed assistance 
package.286 The Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 was passed by the Solomon 
Islands Parliament on the 17th of July.287 The Act provides the legal framework for the virtual free 
rein of the armed forces and policing contingents. The provisions included the appointment of 
visiting police officers to executive policing roles and the jurisdiction to take over policing powers. 
Together with the wide-ranging powers, immunity from legal proceedings under Solomon Islands 
law was granted.288 Further provisions were made placing the ‘Command and Control of the 
Visiting Contingent’ exclusively in Australian hands.289  
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RAMSI is a police led mission with military support and whilst this approach is unusual, it has been 
suggested it will become increasingly utilised.290 The policing contingent of RAMSI is known as 
the Participating Police Force (PPF), operating under the control of the AFP’s International 
Deployment Group. It is comprised of AFP members, Australian state police, and officers from 
New Zealand and 13 Pacific Island countries. The objectives and priorities of the operation were 
broken down into a phased approach whereby the first phase aimed for stabilisation in the area of 
law and order, the second was envisaged to consolidate and normalise, and the final phase sought to 
build the capacity of the RSIPF. 
The first phase which has been described as a deliberate ‘shock and awe’ approach was remarkably 
successful, with the mass apprehension of criminals, violent group members and militants, as well 
as the confiscation of weapons.291 The initial strategy addressed areas of lawlessness through 
increased police presence and a wider distribution of forces. The PPF quickly established police 
posts throughout the islands.292 According to RAMSI Police Commander Ben McDevitt, 74 RSIPF 
officers were prosecuted for corruption related offences and significantly more were dismissed 
(approximately 400).293 By the end of 2003 most militant leaders were arrested, with the total 
number of arrests above 1,340 – 611 of which were ‘very serious charges’.294 By May 2006, 160 
former police officers were reportedly arrested. A new recruitment program was introduced in the 
interests of establishing a culturally, ethnically and gender295 diverse and representative force.296 
The operation was, at the time of the research, in phase three, albeit overlap between phases is 
obviously necessary.297 As the PPF moved through the phases success was increasingly difficult to 
achieve and define.298 Whilst RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands is generally supported, the 
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commonly held view that its departure would see the country revert to a state of lawlessness says 
little for the sustainability of its capacity building so far.299 
4.2.4 The role of the PPF: The transition to capacity development 
In simple terms the PPF was essentially responsible for delivering an environment of immediate law 
and order upon arrival and to then gradually improve the capacity of the RSIPF to maintain such 
law and order.300 The PPF were initially occupying inline roles – meaning they were policing the 
country – generally replacing the RSIPF in their functions. During this period the RSIPF was 
hollowed out through tension and corruption related arrests and dismissals. Consequently the PPF 
were largely filling an existing and growing vacuum. The PPF/RSIPF relationships suffered at the 
outset as the PPF quite reasonably doubted the integrity of their RSIPF colleagues, given the key 
role that many RSIPF had played in the conflict. Some PPF viewed RSIPF members as ‘potential 
suspects’.301 Understandably this caused resentment amongst the RSIPF who were not involved in 
the conflict (although undoubtedly those who were had cause for resentment as well). Over time, as 
the mission moved through its phases, the RSIPF were to ‘step up’ and the PPF to ‘step back’302and 
move into an advisory role, offering CD, mentoring and support. This CD was primarily delivered 
via an adviser/counterpart relationship – whereby PPF would stay embedded within the RSIPF and 
provide support to a direct counterpart, and usually support the broader unit as well.303  
The RSIPF police commissioner’s role was too taken over by intervening forces and all of the 
commissioners since have been sworn into the RSIPF from another force (AFP/NZ Police).304 At 
the time of the interviews the police commissioner’s position was held by a New Zealander, Peter 
Marshall, who was seconded to the RSIPF. He was sworn in as RSIPF and was effectively 
embedded in an inline role overseeing the organisation and capacity developing its executive, at the 
same time as being ultimately responsible for its operations. There was at the time a great deal of 
speculation and debate regarding the origin of the next commissioner appointment – with many 
suggesting that it should be a local RSIPF member to take the position. Some maintained it would 
likely be another ‘expat’ and there was some concern regarding the vacuum of power and 
experience that may be left at the senior levels of the organisation after the early voluntary 
retirement scheme had run its course.305 As such some felt it would be important to have another 
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inline appointment to the commissioner’s role. It was also commonly felt that a local appointment 
to the position would require close advisory support to the role – if not a team of advisers.306  
4.2.5 The PPF contingent 
PPF headquarters were established at the former Guadalcanal Beach Resort, approximately 10km 
east of Honiara. The security operation and consequent CD program is essentially run from this 
base. Behind the fences, the offices of the police commander, program management and the CD 
management centre can be found. The base also houses the military contingent and is a site for 
RAMSI accommodation. Program management staff and the bureaucratic and administrative 
functions of the PPF are all on this base. Advisers reportedly spent a great deal of time here – 
although many are far more embedded in the RSIPF and have less cause to frequent the base. The 
use of Guadalcanal Beach Resort by the PPF is commonly criticised and it is felt by many that it 
creates a barrier between the PPF and local people as well as the RSIPF. At times when PPF have 
been accused of a failure of intelligence or of misreading the context it has been attributed to the 
isolation created by its use of Guadalcanal Beach Resort.307 According to Allen, this isolation was a 
contributing factor in the PPF’s failure to anticipate the April 2006 riots:308 ‘an architecture of their 
presence that locked PPF away in remote air-conditioned bases and patrol cars, rotations that were 
too short to build relationships and limited efforts to learn Pidgin ’.309  
Whilst it was beyond my research interests and certainly beyond my area of expertise to comment 
on the validity of some complaints about Guadalcanal Beach Resort, it was suggested by several 
informal informants, as well as the occasional interviewee, that the bureaucratic contingent of 
RAMSI and the PPF was unnecessarily large and that they tended to operate in a bureaucratic 
model imported from Australia and inappropriate for the environment. The size of the bureaucratic 
and administrative contingent, its physical distance from local people and embedded advisers, and 
its reportedly slow, cumbersome and disconnected practices were all cited as cause for resentment. 
It is very possible that this view fails to account for the logistical and administrative reality that 
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would come with the enormous task of managing such an operation. Nonetheless, these perceptions 
were at least a problem for the PPF’s image and relationships. 
The PPF contingent, as noted above, is drawn from the range of RAMSI participating countries. 
However, the large majority of advisers are from Australia with a significant New Zealand 
contingent. The Australian contingent is made up of AFP police officers (usually referred to as blue 
shirts), unsworn AFP professional staff (referred to as brown shirts or brownies on account of the 
colour of their uniform), and state and territory police from various jurisdictions (also generally 
blue shirts). The adviser roles were also commonly held by NZ police (also blue shirts and brown 
shirts). Whilst the AFP and its members are well versed in operating in an international context and 
well known for their strategic capabilities, police officers from state jurisdictions were often 
experiencing this for the first time. The state police officers were on the whole known for being 
very good tactically and certainly quite experienced in community policing. However, their 
effectiveness as capacity developers was often questioned, and this was also true of some AFP 
members as well. Many interview participants volunteered their views surrounding the suitability 
and effectiveness of police officers as capacity developers and advisers, and the opinions were 
certainly mixed. Quite a number of PPF advisers received high praise for their effectiveness as 
capacity developers by PPF and RSIPF alike. However, it was regularly reported that police are 
more comfortable with policing than capacity developing and consequently they are only too happy 
to jump into operational roles, and this has continually undermined CD. It is fair to say that there is 
a great deal of evidence for both of these opinions and many variations in between. Nonetheless, 
whatever the shortfalls, it is worth noting that the RSIPF members interviewed were unequivocally 
in support of the mentoring and advice being provided by police officers (i.e. the PPF – as opposed 
to development professionals presumably) and regularly noted that their shared identity as police 
officers had been helpful in the CD process. Several RSIPF interviewed also made it clear that the 
level of respect they afforded to PPF members directly related to their rank and that they were not 
interested in advice from people who were not highly experienced police officers.  
Despite this, having police as capacity developers continues to attract criticism. Amongst the often 
unfavourable assessments there have been criticisms of the sometimes poor understanding PPF 
advisers have demonstrated regarding the nature of CD and the priorities of their work.310 The PPF 
have also attracted significant criticism regarding the sustainability of the police CD program and 
this is often directly linked to the fragility of law and order and the potentially unsustainable peace 
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created by the intervention. As will become apparent in later sections, however, sustainability is a 
highly complex issue in a police CD environment. 
4.2.6 Capacity development in the broader RAMSI context 
RAMSI constitutes ‘one of the most substantial [interventions] in terms of personnel and resources 
deployed in proportion to the size of the country’.311 The approach saw the deployment of a 
massive contingency of personnel and resources in the interests of achieving its core goals under the 
‘three pillars’ of RAMSI and its whole-of-government approach. The pillars included: law and 
justice; economic governance and growth; and the machinery of government. Upon arrival RAMSI 
issued a pamphlet to communicate with local people what the mission had ‘come to help with’. 
Number one was ‘restoring law and order’ – it was followed by ‘corruption: making the system 
more open and honest’; and ‘sorting out the government finances’.312 As was the case with the PPF 
model, 
execution within each pillar was by a hybrid of expatriates working in-line within departments until it was 
felt that an indigenous counterpart was trained to do the job. At that point – which varied from department 
to department and job to job – the expatriate moved from an in-line position to being an advisor (and 
sometimes back again, as we saw with the police).313 
 Figure 11: The three pillars of RAMSI’s whole of government approach314 
                                                 
311 Braithwaite et al., Pillars and Shadows. 
312 Ibid., 70. 
313 Ibid., 76. 
314 Source: ibid., 78. 
89 
 
For all its problems with coordination, and there have been many, RAMSI was an integrated 
approach to state building from the beginning. Its architects recognised the interdependence of these 
‘pillars’ and the fluidity of CD, and included such an understanding in its design. The challenges 
incurred by other pillars are largely beyond the scope of this research but it is fair to say perhaps the 
greatest criticism of the RAMSI approach has been its overemphasis on the state and its failure to 
engage with enabling and disabling social factors and the underlying conflict dynamics. RAMSI did 
initially shy away from engaging with reconciliation and peace-building in these terms – and many 
defended this approach by insisting that RAMSI was there to provide the space for local people to 
undertake the process of peace-building and reconciliation themselves.315 The PPF has not escaped 
this criticism. However, it is fair to say it was well on the way to addressing these issues at the time 
of my research – including the piloting of the community officer project316 and dealing with internal 
conflict issues of the RSIPF in the pursuit of reconciliation.  
The success or failure of the PPF contingent and law and order agenda is clearly dependent on the 
success of other aspects of the RAMSI CD intervention. The challenges faced in other agencies 
were arguably insurmountable and have severely impacted upon the CD goals of the RSIPF/PPF. 
For example, the local courts were essentially ‘full of RAMSI lawyers’ and at the time of my field 
research most law and justice personnel I encountered were, in practice, working inline despite their 
CD role – because as it was explained to me ‘there is no one to capacity develop’.317 Whilst the 
enormous efforts by some RAMSI and local personnel towards achieving a functioning court 
system must be recognised – the courts are certainly known for being a weak link. Through field 
research conducted on a related project (in September 2010) it was revealed that in many places 
outside of major centres the court circuit was unreliable and in some places the court does not sit at 
all.318 The courts were placed under enormous pressure due to the massive number of post-
intervention arrests (many not resulting in a conviction). By 2009, the ‘local magistrates courts had 
completely broken down’.319 
Whilst the PPF has been continually criticised for their approach to capacity and their apparent 
enthusiasm for stepping into direct inline roles, this problem was widespread throughout RAMSI. A 
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tendency for RAMSI personnel to work inline or to take over whole areas and marginalise local 
staff by doing the work instead of capacity developing was highlighted regularly throughout my 
interviews.320 To be fair, Australian personnel working in CD roles were continually required to 
directly undertake the work themselves due to a lack of options – with up to 75 per cent of local 
senior legal positions vacant, the counterparts to capacity develop simply did not exist.321 
4.2.7 Capacity development approach – PPF  
As outlined above, the mission has had several phases with the most obvious transition being from 
the PPF providing frontline policing and direct provision of security to a PPF CD focus. At the time 
of this research the transition remained incomplete as the PPF continued to hold ‘executive policing 
powers’ and were still responsible for underwriting the security environment. Broadly speaking the 
policing aspect of RAMSI and its CD plan was framed by several key policy documents/positions 
which overlapped and occasionally conflicted. These documents do have several things in common, 
including the CD of the RSIPF and the vagueness in how this is defined. In most cases they are 
largely aspirational and do not lend themselves well to meaningful measurement – or at least that 
was the view of senior CD program managers and many if not all PPF interviewed.  
The primary frameworks that the PPF were operating under included: the RSIPF ‘Strategic 
Directions’ – a plan developed largely by the RSIPF themselves; the RAMSI ‘Forward Strategy’ – 
defining what the Australian Government was technically funding the PPF to do in practice; and the 
RAMSI-Solomon Islands Government Partnership Framework – an overall agreement between 
RAMSI and the host government on policy directions and CD priorities. As was highlighted by 
senior PPF CD and program management personnel, the M&E of these overall ‘objectives’ was 
extremely complex. The plans were often competing (although none were completely inconsistent 
with the other), and most of these plans or policy frameworks failed to provide the detail that could 
allow them to be measured or to link them ‘empirically’ with tangible outcomes.322 In cases where 
the outcomes were measurable, such as the more specific aspects of the RSIPF Strategic Directions, 
the desired outcomes were often unrealistic and certainly not sustainable after the withdrawal of 
PPF assets and personnel.323 What was agreed upon was the goal – that being, as a PPF program 
manager stated, ‘that they don’t need us anymore’.324 All agreed this goal was desirable but as the 
same program manager pointed out, ‘something like 70% of Solomon Islands Government revenue 
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is funded by donors’325 – so this is not really a realistic goal for RAMSI. According to one program 
manager, by this measure, ‘I don’t think anything we are doing is sustainable’.326  
The priorities of the overall PPF CD program were varied and the description of the overarching 
focus and approach differed depending on the position of the interview participant. In summary, the 
four components of the CD program were reportedly: infrastructure/police accommodation; targeted 
training; the numeracy and literacy program; and the change management program.327 The 
infrastructure/police accommodation project area was aiming to provide suitable housing for all 
RSIPF officers. There were several key reasons for this priority, including the need to address the 
uninhabitable conditions in which police were living, so as to improve health and well-being 
standards for officers and their families, in the hope that this would have a positive impact on 
morale and attendance.328 There was also a desire to ensure police were not beholden to family or 
wantok through shared living arrangements as this was seen to compromise police impartiality. In 
particular housing was necessary to allow police officers to live and work in areas outside of their 
home communities – again this was seen as having the potential to improve police impartiality. The 
infrastructure program was well on the way at the time of the field research and considerable 
resources had been dedicated to the project. Nonetheless, funding was far less than what was 
required to achieve the conditions and housing numbers it was felt were necessary329  
The targeted training program was focussed on training which had the capacity to bring about 
organisational change. The program was in its second phase of leadership training and it also 
provided training on other strategic level tasks as well as strategic thinking. The leadership training 
had proven to be an effective forum for developing some innovative concepts and approaches to 
organisational change. One such concept included the proposition to undergo a reconciliation 
process within the RSIPF and provide the space for reunification.330 RSIPF involved in this training 
put forward the proposal to restate their oath and to undergo a renewal of their commitments to the 
RSIPF (refer to below description).  
The numeracy and literacy program was also concerned with ‘institutional building’. The older 
generations were beginning to move on and the younger RSIPF tended to have a better level of 
education (albeit often still limited). The approach was designed to lift the baseline of basic 
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326 This comment is referring to RAMSI more broadly not just the police contingent. Interview with PPF capacity 
development program manager, Honiara, June 2010. 
327 Interview with PPF – program management, Honiara, June 2010. Supported by various policy documentation and 
interviews with two other PPF advisers. 
328 Interview with senior PPF adviser, Honiara, June 2010. 
329 Interview with PPF – program management, Honiara, June 2010. 
330 Ibid. 
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education within the organisation making certain aspects of policing much easier. It was also to 
provide a basis for receiving more advanced CD in the future. The program was designed to be 
holistic in its focus and outcomes, with PPF management expressing a desire that such numeracy 
and literacy skills would help officers in their day to day lives and allow them to support and 
mentor their own children and families through their education.331 
The change management program was multifaceted and the projects within it were at varying 
stages, from research, consultation and design phases to partial implementation. This program 
included: (1) various health and well-being considerations for RSIPF members that were to further 
build on the benefits of police accommodation; and (2) ‘institutional right-sizing’ (refer to 
explanation below). In conjunction with this ‘right-sizing’ was the consideration of an appropriate 
policing model for urban vs. rural and remote areas and the police reconciliation and reunification 
plan were also considered.332 The approach to police CD appeared to be taking an increasingly 
holistic focus. The living conditions and social circumstances of RSIPF officers were seen as 
undermining the effectiveness of CD and consequently issues such as police accommodation, as 
addressed above, were seen as priorities. Other major factors identified as undermining performance 
were the pressure on RSIPF officers to care for their families, and the health problems that they and 
their families were exposed to. Consequently the PPF were considering a social welfare and health 
program. It was noted that police do not turn up for work because they are sick or their kids are 
sick, so the idea of a basic clinic that could provide triage and preventative health services was 
being developed.333 
The concept of ‘institutional right-sizing’ refers to the work the RSIPF was undertaking to examine 
the size of its force (current and future), and what could realistically be expected of this force given 
budgetary constraints and pending retirements (due to the purging mentioned above, as well as a 
number of officers reaching retirement age). ‘Right-sizing’ is also connected with the approach to 
police reunification, and this will be discussed further below. The RSIPF was considering what it 
cost to run a police force, and what could be expected in terms of service delivery commensurate to 
the size of the force.334 Work in this area suggested that the urban policing model that was being 
pursued in Honiara could not realistically be achieved in non-urban locations and there were 
discussions of the possibility of different approaches to policing outside of the capital. This need 
was informed by the basic budgetary realities and size of the police force, and it suggested the need 
to draw on the informal sector in rural and remote areas to provide some level of social order and 
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333 Paraphrasing PPF capacity development program manager, Honiara, June 2010. 
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reduce the need for a formal police presence in the outer areas in line with the economic realities 
and likely affordability issues dictating the size of the force.335  
The related project, ‘The True Cost of Policing’, was looking at these budgetary realities in terms of 
force size as well as considering other resource issues. It was exploring the cost of running a force 
with 1,134 personnel in the establishment (the current figure at the time of the study) and the costs 
associated with fundamental equipment and transport, as well as providing a breakdown of 
operational expenses. It was taking into account the rate of recruitment, the number under 
suspension and out on leave (approximately 100 at any one time), and considering the services that 
can realistically be provided by a force with these operating constraints in its particular 
environment. This was all part of planning for a sustainable future – informing CD priorities and 
trying to establish a realistic benchmark for service delivery and performance to work towards. The 
likely reality was, however, that the RSIPF would not be able to police the vast majority of the 
geographical space of Solomon Islands for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, there were certain 
priority safety issues that needed to be addressed, such as child abuse and domestic violence, and 
these things were, in reality, extra to what the force realistically policed – so this would require 
extra resources.336 This ‘fact’, it was predicted by some senior PPF, was not going to be ‘palatable’ 
for governments or the aid sector.337  
4.2.8 Police reconciliation and reunification 
In early 2010 the PPF and RSIPF were putting into place arrangements for the reunification of the 
RSIPF based on the findings of a consultation conducted by their appointed special adviser – the 
strategic and cultural adviser. This local adviser was considered to be influential and respected both 
in the community and in political circles and as such was able to facilitate conversations with 
police, community members and members of the government and public service to understand the 
outstanding issues within the police force, to get a sense for how the community see the outstanding 
tension issues within the police force, and to work with government to facilitate possible 
solutions.338 According to these consultations the police force remained divided along tension lines 
and continued to be viewed as such by the community. It was commonly seen that RSIPF members 
involved in the tensions were continually being promoted instead of being dismissed. This 
                                                 
335 This work is coinciding with the development of the community officer project – see overview below. 
336 It was also emphasised that this is not primarily a policing issue. That is, the police may be able to effectively police 
this in the future if it is properly funded but only if there is a focus on dealing with this at the community level. It 
requires investment in achieving social and cultural change before it can be policed with any level of effectiveness (it 
was not suggested that police ignore this until there is social change – only that police will not be effective unless it 
coincides with social change).   
337 Interview with PPF – program management, Honiara, June 2010. 
338 The appointed special strategic and cultural adviser is from the Solomon Islands. He speaks many of the local 
languages, had served in three previous governments and was a head of Transparency International Solomon Islands. 
He was also on the task force that set up the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003.  
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undermined the effectiveness of the force and its standing in the community.339 Many community 
members felt that the RSIPF could not be trusted while known participants in the tensions remained 
in the force. This concern was exacerbated by the reportedly senior roles held by some RSIPF who 
were reported to be associated, by some sources, with the tensions.340 It was also implied by several 
interview participants that the division within the RSIPF created informal allegiances which 
impacted upon decision-making, the morale of members and influenced the relationships between 
members thereby undermining their ability to operate in some circumstances.341  
Consequently, the renewal of the RSIPF was to be two-fold. Those reaching retirement age were to 
be given a one-off offer to retire with their full entitlements paid for with PPF funding, and other 
officers identified as being involved in the tensions were too going to be given the opportunity to 
leave with an appropriate package. Through the consultation process, conducted by the special 
adviser, a list of RSIPF identified as being involved in the tensions was compiled. The plan was 
then to establish a steering committee or body342 to make recommendations regarding who should 
be invited to leave and what matters could potentially be reconciled. This body would include the 
vice chair of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide advice on 
admissions. The idea was for the body to address identified officers, explain to them that they had 
been identified and invite them to utilise the protections under the truth and reconciliation 
commission to make disclosures (which could not be used against them criminally).343 Then if it 
was deemed by agreement that it would be better for them to leave the RSIPF they would be offered 
a package.344 The approach was designed to be a ‘negotiated exit’ for those people who might be 
holding the organisation back.345 At the time of this research it was considered feasible that some of 
                                                 
339 Interviews with PPF capacity development program management personnel, Honiara, June 2010. Supported by 
several interviews with RSIPF and PPF personnel, Honiara, June 2010.  
340 Whilst I did receive some information on ‘offending’ parties and those within the RSIPF and their alleged role in the 
conflict, it was beyond the scope of this research to verify this information. Furthermore, the use of unsubstantiated 
information even if acknowledged as rumour is unnecessarily defamatory and inflammatory and as such has not been 
included here.  
341 Informal interviews with informed sources, Honiara, 2010.  
342 When the body was established it was called the Voluntary Early Retirement Steering Committee. 
343 The objective of the TRC was to ‘promote national unity and reconciliation by engaging all stakeholders in the 
reconciliation process, by discovering and helping to understand what happened in the tensions and why. It was to 
examine the patterns of human rights abuses’ and to contribute to the ‘process of reconciliation and peace-building in 
the country’. Importantly for the purposes of the reconciliation and reunification project, ‘no statement, written or oral, 
made by any person before the TRC could be admissible against him/her in any legal action’. See Solomon Islands 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Confronting the Truth 
for a better Solomon Islands; Final Report (Honiara: Solomon Islands TRC, 2012), 9, 14. 
344 This system was devised in part to avoid offering redundancies because redundancies technically remove the 
position from the organisation (i.e. a replacement cannot be appointed).  
345 This was the status of the emerging plans at the time – the approach to the scheme changed slightly over the course 
of the year, and officers were provided with confidential nomination forms and information packages, allowing them to 
nominate themselves or fellow officers for Voluntary Early Retirement. The overall summary given here provides an 
accurate description of plans at the time and the actual scheme did not change dramatically according to reports. See 
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the identified officers may be able to reconcile these issues with the force and with the community 
(depending on attitudes, sincerity and the severity of alleged involvement). The removal of 
identified officers was, therefore, arguably not prejudged. At the conclusion of this process, 
described by some as purging, it was proposed the RSIPF would partake in a reunification 
ceremony – giving the officers an opportunity to restate their oaths. As was noted above this 
process was responding to local demand and it was originally initiated by the ideas suggested by 
RSIPF members coming out of leadership training, and these initial concepts were built upon by 
locally driven consultations.346  
4.2.9 Capacity development and monitoring centre – A project-based approach 
In June 2010, when the interviews were conducted, the PPF’s CD approach had recently moved into 
a new phase. In this phase there was to be a renewed emphasis on M&E and attention given to 
demonstrating the effectiveness of CD primarily through a project-based approach to discrete CD 
initiatives. In restructuring the mission, $41 million was put aside for the direct CD of the RSIPF. 
This was separate from the ongoing funding arrangements, which support the continued 
adviser/counterpart arrangements and the funding of the PPF’s administration and support 
operations. This money was specifically for direct injection into sustainable CD outcomes for the 
RSIPF through discrete PPF managed projects. Given the reporting requirements attached to this 
funding, a new Capacity Development Monitoring Centre was established. This unit was to be 
responsible for the reporting and governance mechanisms required for demonstrating appropriate 
funding allocations and the effectiveness of CD projects. This approach was informed by the 
‘Forward Strategy’ policy document.347  
There were generally two potential approaches to funding allocation: either the projects were 
designed and planned at the senior level through strategic planning decisions, or they were proposed 
by advisers who were working in CD roles and who developed project proposals based on the 
demonstrated needs they could identify on the ground. At the time of the interviews, a senior 
member with the Capacity Development Monitoring Centre acknowledged that they were still 
working out the approach to M&E and noted that the monitoring of these early projects had been 
evolving and emerging as they were rolled out. The projects being implemented at the time (39 in 
total) ranged from $3.92 million propositions down to $2,000-$3,000.348 Designing an approach to 
monitoring such projects presented a major challenge in that a standardised approach was not 
                                                                                                                                                                  
RSIPF Police Media Team, “Positive Response to RSIPF Early Retirement Scheme,” Media Release, Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force, Rove, September 14, 2010. 
346 Interviews with PPF capacity development program management personnel, Honiara, June 2010. 
347 Interview with PPF capacity development program management personnel, Honiara, June 2010.  
348 Ibid. 
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appropriate given the enormous difference in the focus of the projects, their scale, and their 
complexity. The most difficult reported challenge faced in the approach to the M&E of such 
projects was the need to demonstrate sustainability.349  
Whilst it might seem reasonable to assume that the provisions of any resources or assets that require 
ongoing maintenance or regular replacement would be unsustainable, this is not necessarily the 
case, as it would depend on the priorities of long-term aid as well as the budget priorities of the host 
government. If a case can be made for the centrality of certain resources or equipment then it is 
possible they will continue to be funded by one government or another after the withdrawal of CD 
assistance. The lack of a realistic and transparent assessment regarding the long-term provision of 
aid funding and the imagining of sustainability in terms of an aid free future creates ongoing 
uncertainty and an unrealistic expectation for CD and M&E. The uncertainty of the political 
environment means that the likelihood of future funding to ensure the ongoing availability of 
critical resources could not really be known in advance. This complexity and the contingencies 
involved in making decisions around sustainability is illustrated by the following dialogue between 
myself (as the interviewer) and a senior PPF member involved in CD and M&E. This example is 
just one of many but it demonstrates the complexity of monitoring and evaluating sustainability 
even for small projects. 
Respondent: … we just bought $8,000 worth of new heavy duty GP boots for their bomb disposal team – 
doesn’t sound like much but it changes how they do their work – it allows them to go into places they 
couldn’t necessarily get into with their old boots … it gives them a way to do things differently … it can 
change the way they do work … it’s progress. That may have just been a straight procurement … but it 
could change the way they do work … 
The trick is to put in the right frameworks so we can keep monitoring to see the status of each project and 
try to ensure that the outcomes are beneficial to the RSIPF and not just now but sustainable into the 
future … 
Interviewer: How do you make the procurement of boots sustainable? 
Respondent: Well … the Solomon Islands Government is basically broke, it’s no secret, and the police 
don’t get much funding out of that. However, with foreign donors … coming out of the World Bank etc. 
etc. … if the Solomon Islands Government can show that it’s being more effective and efficient in its fiscal 
management, it gets more donor [funds] – if corruption can be reined in a little bit there’s a better 
chance through fishing … and tourism … to boost their internal revenue … if that happens there might be 
more money available to the police … if they can show they’re effective and efficient … the government 
might … get a little more funding and that might go to boots … but is it sustainable? Who knows? That’s 
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a gamble we take … there’s a lot of crystal balling … but to be able to give them the ability right now 
while we’re here and can fund this stuff to do it … it’s a fair start.350  
The continual challenges faced by those making decisions around CD funding allocation, project 
design and M&E were largely issues to do with sustainability. The likelihood of Australia’s 
ongoing bilateral aid to Solomon Islands was not explicitly factored into questions surrounding 
sustainability. Therefore CD and its M&E were ideally based on the assumption that the end of 
RAMSI would constitute the end of funding – despite the fact that this was the least likely scenario. 
With these political uncertainties the CD mission was constantly up against the challenge illustrated 
above: should they provide equipment while they are there and completely change the face, and 
technique, of policing - creating potentially debilitating dependency based on the assumption that 
the funding will come from somewhere to make it sustainable? Furthermore, how do you monitor 
and evaluate a project against the priority of sustainability when it is dependent on a wider system 
that is beyond the control of the project and is only sustainable if the broader economic situation 
changes or if aid arrangements continue to fund it?351 
Senior personnel in the Capacity Development Monitoring Centre acknowledged that the political 
environment, in terms of the continuity of aid provision and the likelihood of economic 
development in Solomon Islands –together with the potential for conflict reigniting after withdrawal 
– made CD and M&E highly unpredictable. Several personnel noted that RAMSI was a ‘peculiar 
beast’ and as such it generated a great deal of international attention. The pressure for CD to be 
more sustainable was considerable. This is partly because it was to be assumed that RAMSI would 
likely scale-down beyond 2013 and that the RAMSI framework might be devolved into a project-
based approach to CD after the withdrawal of much of the police contingent. The funding approach 
at the time of the interviews created a separation between this newly created project-based CD and 
the direct adviser/counterpart approach to CD that included ongoing mentoring and inline CD 
provision (together with its attached underwriting of security and the bureaucracy that existed to 
manage this arrangement).352 At the time of the interviews it was at least reasonable to expect that a 
project management approach might be adopted after the drawing down of PPF numbers. Informed 
by this ‘best guess’ at the time, it was then the role of the current advisers in direct 
adviser/counterpart roles to ready the RSIPF to function in their absence but with the assumption 
that project-based funding for CD would be ongoing in some manifestation. Unfortunately the 
uncertainty of this political environment meant that none of the advisers interviewed had any real 
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sense of what their end goal was or when it needed to be achieved by and consequently there were 
no real exit strategies in place.  
4.2.10 Summary of the PPF capacity development approach at the time of research 
With all this uncertainty in mind, it is fair to summarise the status of the mission as follows: the 
mission was in its CD phase; this CD approach was largely comprised of embedded PPF working in 
an adviser/counterpart framework and/or in inline positions within the RSIPF; this CD was 
primarily characterised by the PPF providing direct planning and operational advice within their 
respective RSIPF units to their counterparts and other RSIPF including the executive as required; 
CD was being provided at the same time as the PPF was underwriting security in the country; many 
of the advisers were sworn police officers, some were sworn officers of the RSIPF and as such they 
were responsible for security as well as CD;353 the mission was moving into an election period 
putting increased pressure on the PPF to guarantee security and to prepare to step into frontline 
policing roles if necessary;354 a newly developed approach to project-based CD was evolving with 
significant funds being invested into discrete projects designed to build sustainable capacity within 
the RSIPF; within this project framework the PPF were implementing targeted approaches to 
aspects of capacity including: improving the numeracy and literacy of the RSIPF, the reunification 
of the RSIPF, and the building of public confidence in the RSIPF. As part of the latter and as part of 
the ‘change management program’ the PPF was working with the RSIPF and other law and justice 
agencies to bring about a community officer project.  
The community officer project was being trialled at the time of the interviews. The project 
explicitly recognised that people living in communities outside of the urban centres have limited or 
no contact with the RSIPF. Due to logistical constraints and for reasons relating to the involvement 
of some RSIPF members in the tensions, a large proportion of Solomon Islanders rely on informal 
law and justice actors and mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, to provide a level of 
community safety, and to provide the basis for social order.355 The community officer project was 
designed to bridge the gap between formal and informal law and justice actors and systems.  
                                                 
353 The manner in which inline positions manifest in practice varied enormously. One senior PPF officer who was acting 
in an inline position explained that he was inline to give him the authority required for discipline, and that whilst he 
could technically give orders he still preferred to take a mentoring approach and his major focus was still on CD – not 
direct inline policing. Another inline PPF officer interviewed was essentially responsible for security so whilst he also 
stressed a CD and mentoring approach it was very clear from his responses that he was working primarily as a police 
officer as his position and responsibilities required this approach from him.  
354 The PPF was under considerable pressure to provide a seamless security environment for the 2010 elections – this 
pressure was mounting at the time and it was further exaggerated due to the determination of the PPF to not have a 
repeat of the April 2006 riots.  
355 Dinnen and Haley, Evaluation of the Community Officer Project. 
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Community officers were to be appointed by the community and to serve as a link between the 
community and the formal law and justice system (particularly through the RSIPF). Whilst 
descriptions of the community officers’ role varies, communities generally understood their role to 
be twofold: ‘working closely with local leaders and chiefs in helping to resolve minor disputes and 
settle kastom356 matters’, and act ‘as a liaison with the RSIPF’.357 The community officer project 
was initially trialled in Solomon Islands in late 2009 in four trial sites. It was expanded to cover 
another 23 communities across the nine provinces in 2010. The community officer project is 
addressed in more detail throughout the data analysis section. 
The following data analysis is based on interviews conducted with PPF advisers and their RSIPF 
counterparts as well as PPF CD Management personnel as outlined in the methodology section. The 
focus of these interviews is primarily the then current CD phase of embedded PPF working in an 
adviser/counterpart framework and/or in inline positions within the RSIPF. Guided by the foregoing 
literature review, as summarised and coded in the ‘table of concepts’, these interviews were 
designed to assess the relevance of generic CD concepts (derived from international development 
practice) to the CD process and PMM&E of a police CD environment. Moreover these interviews 
are designed to ascertain what has worked well in this environment and to better understand the 
challenges in the interests of informing a proposed framework for PMM&E in a police CD context.  
4.3 Data Analysis  
The following section (Chapter 5) is a summary of the data generated through the above outlined 
interview process. The data has been coded and collated against each category (derived from the 
‘table of concepts’ (Table 3)) and analysed to determine the relevance of the key concepts in 
accordance with the description provided in the methodology section. Through this data analysis I 
aim to answer the following questions which are used to structure the data analysis section:  
1. Are contemporary conceptualisations of capacity and CD (in the field of international 
development) relevant to the police CD intervention in Solomon Islands? 
2. Are conventional approaches to PMM&E adequate for capturing, managing and monitoring 
the complexity of police CD environments and processes, and do they reflect the manner in 
which capacity emerges? 
3. What processes and data need to be captured to better account for the realities of a police 
CD operation? 
  
                                                 
356 ‘Kastom’ refers to indigenous knowledge systems and practices, including customary law. 
357 Dinnen and Haley, Evaluation of the Community Officer Project, vii. 
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Chapter 5: Stage One Data Analysis 
 
The purpose of this first section of data analysis is to address the first question (outlined above) in 
order to establish an understanding of the relevance of capacity and CD concepts (given in Table 3: 
Table of Concepts) to the context of police CD in Solomon Islands. The initial focus then is to 
understand what these concepts look like in practice, before going on to address the subsequent data 
analysis questions and consider what the implications are for PMM&E. 
1. Are contemporary conceptualisations of capacity and capacity development relevant to the 
police capacity development intervention in Solomon Islands? 
All of the concepts presented in the table of concepts for operationalisation regarding the nature of 
capacity and CD proved relevant to this case study. However, some concepts were clearly more 
important than others. Importance is understood here as the extent to which the concept was clearly 
influencing the environment in the view of the respondents. Concepts that were clearly important 
significantly featured in responses to questions that did not directly ask about such concepts. For 
example, technical questions invariably led to respondents talking about the importance of 
relationships and informal practices. On the other hand, less important concepts are those that did 
not come up unprompted and did not elicit resolutely convincing or relevant responses when 
directly inquired about. Perhaps not surprisingly the concepts that appeared to be most dramatically 
influencing the CD environment were those that related to the manner in which CD was grounded 
in the fluid reality of the context. According to the data the most important concepts appeared to be 
as follows (in order of importance):358 (10) Build on what exists; (2) Be flexible/adaptable, and 
analyse risk; (6) Ownership and leadership is vital; (4) Be realistic about what can be achieved; 
(13) Accounting for the cultural environment; (1) Plan to leave from the start – avoiding 
dependency; (7) Holistic approaches based on sound analysis; (14) Capacity is both a means and 
an end; (8) Advising rather than ‘doing’, and technical assistance; (3) Capacity development takes 
time; and (5) Manage expectations, and the importance of communication and relationships. In the 
interests of exploring the relevance of these concepts and to get a better sense of what the 
implications may be for PMM&E, I consider all concepts (both important and less important) below 
in the order in which they appear in the table of concepts.359 
                                                 
358 The numbers correspond with the concept numbers provided in the table of concepts. 
359 After much consideration and conflicting advice, I have decided to present the data against the concepts in the order 
in which they appear in the operationalisation table, rather than in order of importance. This provides a consistent 
structure that allows the reader to follow the logic of the analysis through the length of the thesis.  
101 
 
5.1 Plan to Leave From the Start – Avoiding Dependency  
The need to systematically avoid dependency and to attempt to approach CD in a manner that is 
likely to be sustainable is a critical lesson of this CD operation. The need to monitor progress 
towards requisite capacity development, to avoid the creation of parallel structures and to ensure 
practitioners and counterparts are always mindful of the pending exit of donor personnel is striking 
in its importance and in its absence in this case study. The question of sustainability is no doubt a 
real problem for all CD operations. However, it appears to be a particular problem in this case 
because the Solomon Islands Government and RSIPF simply do not have, and will not have, the 
finances and resources to provide a minimum standard of policing. Given that the PPF were 
mandated to provide such a minimum level of law and order, the introduction of unsustainable 
practices and unaffordable equipment and resources appeared to be inevitable. Certainly this is the 
view of most PPF and RSIPF interviewed.  
Senior PPF program management personnel were mindful of developing exit strategies and 
achieving a level of sustainability was indeed the overwhelming priority of their work. As outlined 
in the background section of this case study, approaches to CD had recently shifted to attempt to 
address broader enabling factors such as housing, literacy and numeracy, and other environmental 
factors to increase the likelihood of sustainability. Furthermore, the newly developing project-based 
approach to CD was explicitly designed to pursue demonstrably sustainable approaches to CD and 
enable the successful withdrawal of PPF advisers. That said, there was no exit strategy. Only one 
adviser interviewed reported having developed an exit strategy, and withdrawal was not considered 
in any systematic way at the unit level. Approaches to CD by advisers did not systematically 
consider sustainability or withdrawal. As noted in the background section, the political environment 
was initially charged by the emergency of the conflict. Later the political and economic situation 
was far too uncertain to predict the likely timing of withdrawal and the likely manifestation of 
ongoing bilateral support. Many advisers reported that their corresponding units and/or counterparts 
would not survive withdrawal and that it was far too early to consider a strategy for exit. This was 
particularly the case in support-function roles such as planning, policy, administration, finance and 
newly established policing units. The following quote is indicative of PPF responses regarding an 
exit strategy in such units: 
Yes, we have thought about that … Largely it comes down to staffing… We have one RSIPF in the [name 
removed] unit. They should have three to four here. We know that if we withdrew tomorrow this unit 
would cease to exist … So we have had many discussions with [PPF adviser – name removed] [and he] 
has had discussions with HR [Human Resources] about getting some more staff here. The challenge is 
that we could get bums on seats but we need ones who have the skills. It’s not much good to this unit 
having people who are just going to sit here and drink coffee and take off because they don’t want to be 
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here. They’ve got to have some sort of an interest in developing the skills even if they don’t have them 
now, and the work. And unfortunately this is a unit that didn’t exist prior to the tensions so it’s quite new 
to RSIPF. They don’t understand it. All they see is that there’s a whole bunch of more things to adhere to 
coming out of this office.360  
It is critical to acknowledge that nearly half of the PPF respondents were able to articulate strategies 
that they had in place for improving outcome sustainability. For example, advisers in the 
professional units (enabling services such as Human Resources, Finance, etc.) were implementing a 
strategy to ‘civilianise’ the units by employing professionals from outside the force – recognising 
that training police officers to do the work of an accountant was not practical or sustainable.361  
Any questions put to RSIPF members regarding preparations for, and mindfulness of, the PPF’s 
pending withdrawal brought an array of responses. It was obvious from the beginning of the 
interview process that several RSIPF were loathed to discuss withdrawal in any way and instead 
talked about the ongoing need for a PPF presence. Presumably they were guarding against the 
possibility that their responses might be used in determining an exit date. Nonetheless, all of these 
responses were telling in that they overwhelmingly confirmed an entrenched dependence on PPF 
resources to carry out day-to-day functions.362 The level of dependency and the manner in which 
unsustainable practices had been introduced were clearly linked to the nature of the initial 
intervention. The PPF were there to restore peace and law and order first and this was considered 
absolutely necessary by all respondents. However, with that emergency and executive police 
function came a way of policing and a structure for operating that sat parallel to the RSIPF, setting 
up unsustainable practices which carried through into the CD phase.  
Interestingly nearly half of the RSIPF respondents took personal responsibility for ensuring that 
they got what they needed from their PPF counterparts prior to withdrawal, and they were prepared 
to be strategic about what knowledge and resources needed to be transferred to them or their unit 
and by when. One senior member was quite critical about the lack of an overarching RSIPF strategy 
for preparing for withdrawal. There was a sense that the RSIPF executive needed to take 
responsibility for ensuring CD was working towards a realistic exit timetable which included the 
                                                 
360 P14. 
361 Prior to this policy change ‘enabling services’ were made up of sworn officers. Quite often these officers were 
unable to carry out normal police functions for a myriad of reasons and this was their only qualification. It is important 
to acknowledge that most solutions bring more problems. In this case the non-sworn officers are not technically 
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progressive elimination of unsustainable systems and a shift towards what could reasonably be 
sustained taking into account the economic realities. At least three of the respondents critically 
considered CD and resources being offered by the PPF based on an informal sustainability 
assessment, and several actively refused the introduction of resources or practices that would create 
a dependency that would only weaken them in the long-term and/or be unlikely to survive 
withdrawal.  
Whether RSIPF members were advocating for the PPF to stay longer or if they were advocating for 
a more strategic approach for preparing for withdrawal, all were concerned with the current level of 
dependency. All RSIPF agreed there was considerable uncertainty regarding how long the PPF was 
likely to be in Solomon Islands from the outset. There was also little or no discussion regarding the 
temporary nature of the PPF’s presence which led to an approach to the intervention, and later CD, 
that was not explicitly mindful of PPF withdrawal. In short the RSIPF (below the executive level) 
were not aware of the PPF planning to leave from the start and there was no strategy for avoiding 
dependency in the approach to planning, implementation or monitoring. Some RSIPF appeared 
satisfied with how this had led to the PPF’s seeming entrenchment as they benefited significantly 
from their ongoing presence. Other members were obviously deeply concerned with this 
entrenchment and dependency. All RSIPF reported ongoing CD practices and approaches to 
policing that were entirely dependent on PPF assets. All RSIPF reported procedures, and the 
ongoing introduction of such procedures, that required PPF personnel to carry them out. Several 
RSIPF acknowledged that PPF were occupying inline roles within the organisation formally and 
informally (that is some were sworn RSIPF officers and were officially inline while others were 
advisers that unofficially worked inline) in positions that fundamentally reorientated the 
organisation, making it difficult for RSIPF step into these positions. One RSIPF officer observed 
that the PPF ‘hold onto roles that RSIPF should be doing’363 and that PPF advisers will often talk on 
behalf of their counterparts, breaking down the working networks between RSIPF personnel. Whilst 
these practices did still exist at the time of the interviews, all respondents categorically 
acknowledged that this was less and less the case.  
5.2 Be Flexible/Adaptable, and Analyse Risk 
There is certainly an understanding by both PPF and RSIPF that CD is a fluid activity. Specific 
outcomes remain largely unarticulated particularly at the unit level as there is a sense that the 
environment is unpredictable and that CD must work with, and adapt to, the changing and evolving 
context. Both advisers and counterparts appear to possess an intuitive understanding that there is a 
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need for structure and coherence as well as a need to respond to cultural and contextual factors – 
meaning that one size does not fit all. There is an enthusiasm for achieving illusive stability, 
particularly amongst RSIPF respondents, but at the same time there is an acknowledgement that 
approaches to CD must be innovative and this requires an element of well-considered risk. 
Consequently I found this concept to be highly relevant, including the desirable capability ‘to 
balance diversity and coherence’.   
The majority of PPF acknowledged that there was a lack of detailed guidelines for how they were to 
implement and measure CD and for this reason there was the potential for a great degree of 
flexibility in their approach. Most advisers acknowledged that this was a problem for those that are 
not well suited to CD as it resulted in police officers from Australian jurisdictions attempting to 
introduce and enforce the style of policing they were most comfortable with – essentially importing 
Australian methodologies regardless of its suitability. Both PPF and RSIPF interviewed felt this 
was less of a problem more recently and that most PPF were inclined to use this space to respond to 
RSIPF needs and to the context. One adviser reinforced the value of this flexibility and noted that 
having predetermined goals would only lead to failure: 
If you came into this role with specific expectations, you would leave very disappointed. You have to learn 
the corporate capabilities and willingness. You have to learn the personalities, the pressure, the day-to-
day realities before you can hope to achieve anything.364   
Another adviser supported this observation and added that it was important to have some sort of 
guiding framework for CD and this did require monitoring (both were lacking in this operation at 
the time) but it was critical to maintain the flexibility: 
I think it’s such an imprecise science – it really is. And you might have a set of norms and values that 
capacity development reflects, but I think that you could also adopt other methodologies and practices as 
long as they’re sound, they’re ethically right, and they’re lawful and fair. And we’ve certainly adopted a 
lot of those techniques.365 
Despite this apparent flexibility there is still a tendency for some advisers to be quite rigid and this 
is often linked to the nature of police and policing institutions. Such rigidity regularly resulted in the 
importation of inappropriate procedures and practices because many police officers acting as 
advisers were uncomfortable with the level of uncertainty. This discomfort was reportedly due (at 
least in some part) to the security environment and the responsibility the PPF had to underwrite 
such security. This was particularly the case at the time of the interviews as the police were 
preparing for the national elections. The unrest and riots of the previous elections meant that the 
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PPF had become highly risk adverse. Assuming the role of primary security providers resulted in a 
far less flexible approach to CD than had been the case only months earlier. Most respondents felt 
this was only a temporary problem.  
The RSIPF responses to these questions did reveal a mixture of experiences in terms of the PPF’s 
preparedness to adopt a flexible approach to CD. No doubt earlier experiences of the intervention 
were not flexible or inclusive but most RSIPF respondents felt this had improved considerably with 
the greater emphasis on CD in more recent times. Several RSIPF reported PPF implementing rigid 
structures and approaches to CD and policing that did not make sense or suit the context, but most 
of this appeared to be in the past or applied to advisers other than their own. The majority of RSIPF, 
however, reported satisfactory to very high levels of flexibility in recent CD approaches. Those that 
appeared most satisfied with their advisers and the CD progress being made spoke at length about 
how advisers always consulted regarding CD decisions, were looking for ways to be flexible and 
adapt to the environment, and demonstrated a genuine appreciation for the knowledge of RSIPF and 
were always prepared to follow the lead of local personnel. There appeared to be a rather large gap 
in the relationships and effectiveness in CD between the advisers who consult or inform the 
counterpart regarding CD decisions and those that collaborate with their counterpart or respond to 
expectations – taking a primarily demand-side approach. A few RSIPF members noted a fluctuation 
in the quality of CD and the preparedness of advisers to be flexible coinciding with events of high 
importance or risk. For example, the approach will tend to be less capacity developing in times of 
high profile or urgent investigations or when security is compromised.   
The second aspect of this concept relates to analysing risk in taking a flexible approach to CD. As 
the high risk security environment of the pending elections illustrated, risk can derail CD. Risk 
analysis is an extraordinarily complex and fraught undertaking in the case of police CD and the 
consequences for making the wrong judgement can be extreme – resulting in the escalation of 
conflict as well as potential police and civilian fatalities. According to the most senior and 
experienced (in the field of operations) adviser I interviewed, advisers do ‘without a doubt’ step in 
too early in high risk situations and they often underestimate the RSIPF’s capabilities. They do not 
allow the RSIPF to resolve situations that they most likely could have handled on their own. But he 
acknowledges the enormous risk in PPF stepping back and disregarding their training and their own 
analysis of the situation and allowing the RSIPF to take the lead. He says that many PPF simply do 
not take this risk. Often, he says, this is the result of PPF and RSIPF looking at the same situation 
totally differently.366  
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This same adviser contends that perhaps the greatest risk is the risk of not listening to your 
counterpart as they, in his view, will understand the situation better because they understand the 
context and the cultural dimensions of violence, rioting and conflict. On the other hand, he 
acknowledges that the RSIPF are not always equipped to make these decisions as they are not used 
to having the equipment, resources and personnel to respond in the most effective way, and this 
results in a lack of experience in deploying such force and a tendency to avoid force even if it is 
necessary.367 Despite the consensus that PPF do jump in too early, every interviewed adviser with 
an operational role gave detailed accounts of extremely high risk situations where they in fact did 
follow the lead of the RSIPF counterpart against their own judgement and in each situation this risk 
had paid off. These situations were repeatedly confirmed by detailed RSIPF accounts – often of the 
same scenarios. 
Several of the PPF interviewed confirmed the above senior adviser’s account of PPF intervention, 
and all but two confirmed the enormous complexity of analysing the risk given the clear advantage 
the RSIPF had in understanding the context but at the same time the clear responsibility the PPF 
had in guaranteeing security. The fact that the PPF have weapons and the RSIPF are unarmed is 
another potent element of these considerations. In short, the PPF do have an operational advantage 
in terms of formal skills, procedures, weapons and resources but the RSIPF have a far better picture 
of the context and the conflict dynamics and are therefore much better placed to predict behaviour 
as well as negotiate conflict. Furthermore, both RSIPF and PPF members interviewed 
acknowledged a tendency for PPF tactics to inflame a situation and a tendency for RSIPF tactics to 
deescalate a situation. Interestingly, whilst the PPF are the mentors and advisers in this operation 
many acknowledged the need for RSIPF to monitor and mentor them to ensure they were reading 
the context accurately and to prevent them from making cultural mistakes.368  
Risk analysis in this context is not just a case of security; it also includes managing the risk of 
undermining CD. These risks are entwined and often competing in complex ways. Essentially every 
time the PPF intervene in a security situation unnecessarily they inadvertently compromise CD. 
This tension encapsulates the inherent contradictions of CD in this environment. On the one hand, 
the PPF are there to provide security and train RSIPF in formal policing methodologies and 
technologies. On the other hand, it is in fact the RSIPF’s informal approach to high risk situations 
that is both at odds with PPF methodology and acknowledged as the RSIPF’s most notable strength. 
There have been cases where the PPF have introduced policing methodologies that have completely 
reoriented the RSIPF’s approach to policing. Most operational respondents provided examples of 
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this being successful – all citing a recent high stakes football game where violent conflict was 
anticipated but likely adverted through employing such methodologies. At the same time, all such 
respondents acknowledged that formal standard operating procedures for handling instances of 
escalating tension are often not appropriate in the Solomon Islands context and can instead lead to 
an escalation of risk. It is at such times that RSIPF approaches, whilst often counter to the training 
PPF are providing, tended to produce far more favourable outcomes as illustrated by the following 
overview provided by a senior adviser (acting as a sworn RSIPF officer at the time): 
I’ve got all the powers, and as a PPF adviser I had all the powers of a police officer in the Solomon 
Islands, so we are for all intents and purposes whether we wear adviser badges or whatever, we are 
police officers here. But ultimately this is their country, and ultimately they have to deal with the 
problems here. As far as risk goes, it’s like being back home – you do an assessment at whatever incident 
you’re going to. But basically my philosophy is they have to take the lead, they have to deal with it. I’m 
there to help and support them. … earlier when I was an adviser … I’d go out doing things with troops on 
the ground. And we would attend risky incidents, but I’d say to them, ‘Alright, how are you going to deal 
with this? What do you guys normally do? What do you want me to do?’ 
… What the local RSIPF guys are, are very good negotiators. Their negotiation skills continually amaze 
me. I’ve seen them talk a guy down who’s full of beer and kwaso369 and wants to kill somebody. And 
they’ll just talk and talk and talk and move around and slow the guy down, wear him out. That might take 
an hour.... And I notice the way they speak – they’re always very respectful of people. If a younger officer 
is dealing with an older man, he’ll call him ‘uncle’. And I’ve seen on a number of occasions we’ve had to 
arrest people but in the end the guy’s thrown his machete down and hopped into the back of the van and 
that’s been it. They’re very good negotiators. And it’s their country, I’ll let them have the lead and I’m 
there if they need me.370 
As illustrated in the above quote, despite the delicate balance between capacity developer and 
security provider, many senior PPF were confident managing these tensions and this invariably 
came as a result of them explicitly trusting their counterparts. One adviser explained that if you trust 
your counterpart’s abilities and judgment then you can essentially just respond to what he/she says 
they need of you. He adds that both parties are aware of their limitations.371 Another adviser 
working in a key operational area said there was a serious risk in undermining the RSIPF by 
working separate to them (or taking over responding to a risk situation). He said it is important not 
to appear to be ‘outdoing’ them as it erodes their authority and confidence. However, some 
respondents did not agree and clearly had a different approach: 
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regardless of who I’m working with I don’t sit back, I stand beside them and if I feel the situation is 
escalating to the point where my counterpart is not able to handle the situation – step in! It’s not only for 
security reasons – there might be something going on with an investigation and if you feel they are not 
able to handle the situation I feel obliged to say maybe this is how we do…372 
5.3 Capacity Development Takes Time  
Verging on a truism, respondents confirmed that CD takes time and eludes quick fixes. There is also 
a concerted effort by many (advisers and counterparts) to resist the temptation to undermine 
sustainability in the interests of demonstrating the realisation of short-term goals. Nonetheless, all 
RSIPF reported experiencing unrealistic time pressures and generally felt the PPF lacked an 
understanding of how long it takes to develop capacity and how long things take in Solomon 
Islands generally. Again, this was becoming less of a problem as the PPF consolidated its CD 
phase. Almost all RSIPF members interviewed reported this as a source of ‘frustration’ and several 
questioned the motivations of those PPF who were seen as being pushy.373 Despite improvements in 
this area most RSIPF felt that the whole approach to CD was too fast and the rate of change was 
unsustainable. One RSIPF respondent noted that time pressures resulted in advisers telling them 
what to do: 
I will tell my adviser I don’t want you to tell me what to do… you just guide me. I will tell you what I need 
you to do.374 
Whether or not PPF respondents felt they were under unrealistic time pressures to deliver CD 
outcomes often depended on whether or not they considered the question in relation to individual 
CD and policing tasks or if they considered the time allowed for CD overall. Approximately one 
third of the respondents did not experience day-to-day time pressures to meet unrealistic goals but 
all acknowledged that their deployments were generally too short to achieve long-term sustainable 
change and it would depend on the continuity of advisers over time. There was uncertainty 
regarding how long the PPF would be engaged in CD – making it difficult to use the time 
effectively. Most felt the PPF would not be there long enough to achieve the kind of changes that 
was probably envisaged. Those PPF who did report unrealistic time pressures confirmed that these 
expectations seriously undermined CD, sustainability and relationships with counterparts. Many 
pointed out that poor decisions regarding deadlines were generally made for political reasons and by 
those who were not directly undertaking CD roles themselves, and were therefore oblivious to the 
realities of CD in Solomon Islands: 
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every month my counterpart has to create a [unit] management report to the executive. It’s due today. 
However, to create that report he needs to get a report from the ministry. And we just found out, just 
before you turned up, the reports are now ready. OK, so. An unrealistic timeframe is that by 4:30 they 
want a report from my counterpart. But he has to extract that data from the ministry report, review it, 
analyse it, do a forecast of the expenditure, and put it in the format required, and then write a report to 
go with it, and then print it. OK, he’s got, what, one and a half hours to do that. Completely unrealistic! 
Every month he fails at that because the timeframe’s unrealistic. And, you know, today’s just a fortunate 
one where they actually have the report ready today. We have to take a USB down to the ministry… We 
have to drive there… go down there. Pick it up. Come back. Clean the viruses off your USB. Get the 
report… so, by the end of today we may be able to have it in an extracted form and start analysing 
it…[the counterpart] will need a week to do that… So perfect example. But for me, I’ll go and collect the 
report after this meeting and tomorrow morning I’ll do it and it’ll be done in an hour.375 
PPF members in an operational context, including General Duties, tended to report experiencing 
deadlines for policing tasks (as opposed to CD outcomes) that would result in them undertaking the 
task themselves. This was sometimes due to unrealistic timeframes and sometimes interpreted as a 
lack of motivation on the part of RSIPF to perform. One PPF member explained that he and his 
counterpart had agreed that he would not step in to attempt to meet unrealistic timelines. According 
to the adviser they would prefer to miss deadlines than perpetuate unsustainable expectations.376 
Another PPF member interestingly mused that such unrealistic time frames might be in part a good 
thing. As he saw it, the less time advisers were embedded in the organisation the more likely that 
the RSIPF would just take what they needed from the PPF and resist unnecessary change informed 
by ‘Western’ ideas of policing.377 In any case, PPF advisers had little say over how long CD 
commitments would be funded for and instead developed operational plans to correspond with 
policy decisions after the fact.  
5.4 Be Realistic About What Can Be Achieved 
The vast majority of both the RSIPF and the PPF respondents spoke about the importance of being 
realistic and the problems with attempting to completely transform the environment. Most agreed 
that attempting to pursue some ‘ideal’ police force was unlikely to be successful and where advisers 
had attempted to implement such fundamental changes it had been counterproductive. For the most 
part, advisers and counterparts agreed that this kind of institutional transformation was not possible 
or necessary. The early attempts to achieve such changes were largely attributed to a lack of 
meaningful engagement and to the manner in which the PPF came to occupy important roles which 
allowed them to create a parallel system and a parallel reality.  
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More recently RSIPF respondents report being consulted thoroughly before decisions affecting their 
unit are made. They contend that this inclusive approach has been instrumental in avoiding the 
disruptions of past approaches and in ensuring that sustainable changes, which can be realistically 
maintained by RSIPF personnel and can be expected to be supported generally in the organisation, 
are implemented. Whilst there have been some important changes to the approach to CD, some 
RSIPF still report observing PPF attempts to implement unrealistic approaches to policing and/or 
organisational standards, and they attribute this to: a lack of understanding of the context, being 
overly ambitious (not always for the benefit of the RSIPF), not really being prepared to listen to 
RSIPF, and RSIPF lacking the confidence or inclination (or the job security) to voice their 
concerns. One practical example of this is the PPF’s implementation of minimum standards for 
entry into training programs. Several RSIPF explained that the system of minimum standards 
initially implemented resulted in the systematic exclusion of almost all of the RSIPF officers who 
actually required the training. The idea was to set a benchmark for entry to allow the training to be 
conducted in a certain way which required a perquisite level of knowledge/education. The RSIPF 
were eventually successful in having this entry requirement changed as well as the training 
curriculum adjusted to cater to those RSIPF (generally older, less educated members) who required 
the training to improve their work practices.378 Numerous examples were given by RSIPF 
interviewed whereby the PPF had attempted to implement systems which inadvertently resulted in 
the exclusion or sidelining of the RSIPF personnel responsible for carrying out the task or 
implementing the program change. 
5.5 Manage Expectations, and the Importance of Communication and 
Relationships 
As is evident from the above account of RSIPF members steering CD towards realistic and 
attainable ends through relevant processes, most PPF and RSIPF interviewed spoke of the 
importance of engaging with local personnel at all levels about what is needed and what is possible. 
On the whole the ‘Roll Royce syndrome’ was indeed a problem, with both RSIPF and PPF 
reportedly expecting unrealistic and inappropriate changes for the sake of replicating a system and 
resources that are seen to be superior rather than because they are needed. Most of the police 
interviewed identified this issue – but not all saw it as a problem. There was a clear divide amongst 
RSIPF officers interviewed – some saw the inundation of PPF equipment and resources as 
fundamentally changing policing in a manner that was demonstrably unsustainable, whereas others 
viewed these resources as essential and felt that the RSIPF was finally getting the support it needed 
to do their work properly.  
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Over half of the RSIPF respondents felt that the PPF needed to manage their own expectations 
about what CD could really achieve and two respondents noted that the PPF were attempting to 
implement ‘Rolls Royce’ type changes to increase their own confidence in policing in the 
environment. These respondents noted that many PPF were uncomfortable policing in the Solomon 
Islands context and that some could not quite grasp that the cultural and contextual differences have 
massive implications for policing. As one RSIPF member indicated with this deliberately gentle 
analogy: 
I would say to a few of my friends [PPF advisers] that when you come up with a model [a policing 
model] make sure… [makes a gesture to indicate that deep thought is required]… if a coconut can’t grow 
in Canberra, certainly the coconut will grow in [gestures to an outer island]… to me Solomon Islands is 
very scattered and we must make sure that the example or picture we are trying to put is adaptable to the 
remote areas…. 
This quote is particularly interesting because the RSIPF officer is indicating that it is not enough to 
take ideas from Canberra, identify barriers to implementation in Solomon Islands and then make the 
necessary adjustments. Sometimes it is more useful to work with the assumption that if it does not 
work in Canberra then it might work here. 
Other RSIPF interviewed were clearly satisfied with the changes, contending that the RSIPF could 
and should be policing according to international standards. One senior RSIPF member in an 
operational role appeared to enjoy the transformation in policing that PPF assets brought about and 
obviously felt that such resources allowed a deserved dignity, prestige and professionalism for his 
RSIPF members:  
If the PPF left the impact would be very big – there are three police posts on the Weather Coast. Those 
are very isolated police posts. To get there it would take ages to send a team. What is happening now 
[indicates they are getting there with PPF helicopter], this is a service they are providing to the people of 
the Weather Coast – transport to and from these posts and we have PPF advisers located at these posts 
as well… that is why police presence is felt in these areas – before people do not see the police for a year 
or more. Now… it is just a consultation with my PPF adviser, the Team Leader, and he organises the 
travel arrangements – that is why I am so grateful to these PPF advisers – just one flick of my finger, 
‘alright I want this’ and it is done.  
Several RSIPF noted that there needed to be a balance between ‘best practices’ and policing in a 
manner that was suited to the cultural and geographical context in particular. One RSIPF member 
insightfully laid out the complexity of achieving this mix and noted that the RoL as conceived by 
the PPF and many RSIPF was simply incompatible with many social and cultural norms. 
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Consequently this member felt there was a need to manage expectations about the complexity of 
negotiating a compromised system that was itself derived from managing expectations.379  
Most of the PPF felt that senior RSIPF understood the purpose and limitations of CD and most felt 
their close counterparts did as well. Those who reported having attended a CD workshop provided 
by AusAID said this gave them improved clarity and helped manage expectations of both advisers 
and counterparts. The majority of PPF felt the expectations of CD were actively managed but that 
they were nonetheless unrealistic because achieving a minimum standard of capacity and resources 
was unrealistic. Every PPF person interviewed acknowledged that the resources the PPF had 
brought to bear were setting up unrealistic expectations but they were also considered necessary. As 
one adviser explains, different RSIPF have different expectations: 
I think in the middle management, probably some staff sergeants, some inspectors, and certainly …high 
up in the executive, they understand what it’s about and what the PPF is trying to do. I think at the lower 
ranks though, they look at us as a form of supplementing their already meagre logistics and getting 
equipment out of us. Because quite frankly, you go out in the country and lot of them don’t even have 
shoes. I mean, they’re used to being bare foot. But they actually like to have boots. It makes them feel 
better, makes them look better. So in the lower ranks, they look at us more as a source of resources. Bit 
further up, at the PPC’s [provincial police commander] level, he realises why the PPF’s here and he 
often says quite openly, ‘I dread the day that the PPF leave. There’s going to be a generation at least 
before we’re ready to stand on our own two feet’. So he’s quite realistic about it.380 
Several PPF advising in units that were considered elite or more desirable places to work reported 
an excellent understanding of the role of CD and a willingness to take appropriate advantage of it. 
PPF in specialised non-operational roles (for example, advisers in Directions and Standards) had a 
higher tendency to report that RSIPF do not understand the point of CD or the function that their 
particular unit/area served. In these units, managing expectations appeared to be particularly 
difficult as the broader RSIPF did not appear to have well-informed expectations of their roles. 
Almost all PPF reported that RSIPF who did not work directly with an adviser did not know what 
CD was or what they were trying to achieve and instead viewed the PPF as either a resource (both 
in terms of a human resource and in terms of deployable assets) or an interloper. In terms of 
managing the expectations of the broader community, PPF assets and resources have been a 
welcomed intervention (for the most part) but they have generated a level of expectation at the 
community level that is undoubtedly unsustainable.  
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5.6 Ownership and Leadership is Vital  
There is some contention as to whether or not supply-driven assistance has worked in this context. 
Certainly the PPF and RSIPF interviewed were both able to point to numerous examples of at least 
partially supply-driven assistance that has been well received and, in some instances, arguably 
effective. Only time will tell if such assistance will be sustainable in the long-term. On the other 
hand, both RSIPF and PPF spoke convincingly of the critical importance of CD and reforms being 
locally driven and owned. This includes ownership at all levels of the organisation and also outside 
of the organisation where relevant. A great deal of the critical issues RSIPF and PPF reflected upon 
related to the ‘capability to commit and engage’. There were also examples of ‘local champions’ 
heavily influencing the take-up and effectiveness of CD as well as institutional and cultural 
changes. That said several RSIPF who were interviewed made a series of suggestions identifying 
sophisticated strategies for tackling some of the most complex and entrenched problems the CD 
operation faced. The PPF interviewed were often unaware of these proposed approaches and RSIPF 
acknowledged that they had not been asked their views on these issues before.  
Generally speaking the question of local ownership is extremely difficult to answer. It is 
undoubtedly critical for effective CD and there were numerous extensive examples given by both 
RSIPF and PPF where local ownership had been nurtured effectively. However, all of the 
interviews were full of contradictions as to whether or not local ownership was being prioritised by 
the PPF in how CD was actually carried out. All RSIPF reported that the RSIPF’s ‘Business Plan’, 
introduced in the year of this field work, was the basis of everything they did and that CD was 
implicitly linked to this plan. Most RSIPF were satisfied with this approach and all agreed that there 
was a high level of involvement of RSIPF in, if not ownership over, developing the plan. All RSIPF 
interviewed confirmed that they were regularly asked to provide advice on CD and were always 
asked about the suitability of particular processes and changes to the Solomon Islands context. Most 
respondents demonstrated high levels of pride over being consulted and gave detailed examples of 
instances when their advice had been successfully implemented. Some RSIPF reported that PPF 
members insisted that the RSIPF members take the lead on planning and there was genuine 
recognition of the value of their knowledge.  
Nonetheless there were examples provided of RSIPF advice being ignored, with serious 
consequences, and most RSIPF acknowledged that local people were likely to avoid confrontation 
thereby leading to poor PPF decisions that were not being challenged. One senior RSIPF respondent 
said that he had explicitly warned senior PPF that ‘we could be nodding our heads but what we are 
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actually indicating is ‘I don’t like that’’.381 According to several RSIPF accounts, previous advisers 
have tried to impose ways that do not work in Solomon Islands and are not respectful of (or aware 
of) existing capabilities, procedures, policies, laws and culture. It appears that advisers in the past 
have not been particularly good at listening to the RSIPF when it comes to technical policing issues 
but rather have tended to only seek advice on issues that were clearly in the realm of social or 
cultural norms. One RSIPF member reported that the PPF only ‘recognised our knowledge and how 
we deal with our people and they have seen some good results’ in this regard.382 In all relevant 
areas RSIPF members reported that the views of the community and other informal stakeholders 
were sought and often incorporated into practice but that this process was always informal and was 
not particularly comprehensive.  
Two RSIPF officers reported serious power imbalances which affected the likelihood of RSIPF 
members talking ‘straight’ to PPF about their concerns or reservations. It was clear this issue was 
part policy, part personality, with several RSIPF acknowledging that it really depended on the 
adviser as to whether the space for local ownership was effectively created. One contended that 
some PPF care what local people think and some are not too interested. On the other hand, many 
senior RSIPF reported that their advisers were respectful and asked for their advice on what would 
work in Solomon Islands. It appears there is quite a dramatic difference in outcomes and ownership 
depending on whether PPF ask for advice from RSIPF based on initiatives that the PPF are 
attempting to implement or if the RSIPF drive the initiatives or changes themselves with PPF 
support. Several critical initiatives were instigated by RSIPF officers who were given the space and 
support to think strategically. One senior RSIPF member reported having attended a Pacific 
Regional Policing Initiative forum and upon his return the commissioner offered to support the 
ideas that had come out of this forum:   
When I came back [the commissioner] said how can I make a difference and I said the way you can make 
a difference is by us getting a workshop run locally by one of our advisers – 4 day workshop, 2 days 
specifically on strategic planning. At the end of the workshop we presented the results to the minister, the 
minister presented it to cabinet, the cabinet said this is the first ever document [of this nature] that came 
from a public sector organisation [that was initiated by local personnel] and so it was adopted … [they 
were asked] do you need a budget for this? The commissioner said yes, so we were given [quantum 
removed] as a budget which was then called the police capability plan fund - the PCP fund … In the past 
it was no forward thinking, no strategic planning – it was just coming to work – that’s it.383 
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All PPF interviewed spoke unequivocally of the importance of local knowledge and ownership. 
Most were able to give detailed accounts of how they have taken local knowledge into account and 
how they have attempted to facilitate local ownership. Three caveats on this remain, however: (1) 
some PPF acknowledged that whilst they attempted to include local RSIPF in planning processes 
within their unit many important decisions were made regarding CD outside of the context (some at 
Guadalcanal Beach Resort, others in Canberra); (2) a great deal of the examples given confirmed 
that there was a tendency to only seek in depth local knowledge and support genuine local 
ownership in matters that obviously overlapped with social and cultural issues; and (3) most PPF 
reported some difficulties in getting RSIPF to voice their opinions or to take ownership. Whilst 
local ownership appeared to be just one of many factors the PPF considered, some PPF members 
clearly prioritised local ownership as the most important overarching principle. One member 
articulated the value of this, asserting that he prefers to draw on what works in Solomon Islands and 
encourage local people to make the decisions and inform planning as this is critical for building 
relationships, understanding the context and ensuring that the approach is sustainable and built on a 
local foundation. Many acknowledged that there was little CD planning undertaken as such and as a 
consequence it was difficult for the RSIPF to have ownership over CD in a systematic way. Rather 
than plan CD based on local ownership, PPF instead responded to immediate RSIPF needs and 
were careful to follow the lead of local personnel and provide demand-side CD wherever possible. 
The below quote is indicative of a widespread approach amongst PPF which they generally labelled 
as collaborative or working together as a team: 
We do all our planning together. Whatever activity we’re engaged in, or whatever long-range plans we’re 
making, we work out the strategy together – ‘You’ll do this. I’ll do this. In order to do that, you’ll need 
this – that’s what I’ll provide’. If it’s equipment, training, knowledge, we’ll work it out together what they 
need and what they’ve got, wherever I can I’ll meet the shortfall.384 
The nuances surrounding local ownership are extraordinarily difficult to account for but it is fair to 
say that the PPF have introduced policing practices that may not have been called for by RSIPF, or 
locally owned at the outset, but some PPF contend that the RSIPF would not necessarily know to 
ask for these things but once they are exposed to them they flourish. This account of imparting 
policing tactics and methodologies on the one hand, and then learning local approaches on the 
other, seems to encapsulate the to-ing and fro-ing around local ownership that is indicative of this 
CD operation: 
I needed to find a balance between what skill level these guys needed to be at and what skill level the 
RAMSI membership was at. And so to bring those on an even playing field so that people could work in 
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interoperable arrangement was one of my goals. If I can get people to work on a commensurate level, 
then at least the left hand knows what the right hand is doing. And that may well happen. It’s happened 
before in certain situations of public disorder that need[ed] to be managed. And if we can impress upon 
the RSIPF certain modern, contemporary policing practices that will assist them in a command and 
control environment, then they adopt best practice techniques. But we also need to be mindful of some of 
the tactics and methodologies they use such as simply walking up to people, and negotiating with crowds, 
and negotiating with local offenders, that is perhaps the most powerful tool I’ve ever seen. The other 
night for example, I attended an incident with 70 or 80 people rioting in the White River area, and it was 
over a land dispute which may have seemed trivial to you and I, but a lot of the PRT [police response 
team] were able to control that because they’re the local members and they asked me to remove all the 
RAMSI assets from the area. And it only took two of those guys from the PRT to walk down – one 
negotiated with one wantok part of the community, the other negotiated with another wantok part of the 
community. Within 15 minutes we had two suspected persons involved in the matter. They were taken 
back to the station for questioning. The whole crowd was dispersed and we drove out of there with people 
cheering and applauding us.385  
Whilst there was little dispute as to the importance of local knowledge in such instances, it was not 
as clear cut in relation to the technical and administrative aspects of the work. Interestingly not all 
PPF agreed on the importance of the Business Plan or felt that RSIPF had a great deal of ownership 
over it. A former senior PPF adviser and CD program manager said the obsession with plans and 
reports were at odds with the reality of the RSIPF’s work and lives, noting it appeared a strange 
priority when ‘these people are flat out getting boots on their feet and getting people to turn up for 
work’.386 He was critical of how these things became important focuses of CD and said this was a 
product of the PPF thinking that they needed to replicate what they did at home as if there were no 
other way of policing. Whilst most PPF contended that their approach to CD had been to respond to 
local demands, over two thirds of those interviewed explained how they had conducted informal 
gaps analyses – comparing the RSIPF unit with some ideal unit and then prioritising areas for 
improvement based on gap filling. Nearly half of the RSIPF interviewed were explicitly aware of 
being evaluated and measured in this manner (all brought this up without prompting) – with several 
bitterly resenting this assessment. The most commonly cited reasons for this approach being 
unhelpful included: (1) the ‘ideal’ type or Australian approach/systems that the RSIPF were being 
compared with were often irrelevant to RSIPF practice and context; (2) this assessment was 
inherently unable to identify RSIPF strengths because the most important capabilities the RSIPF 
possess are often not valued or remain unseen in this methodology; and (3) it implied a cultural and 
professional superiority that was counterproductive and demonstrated a lack of understanding of the 
context. As is illustrated by the above PPF quote regarding interoperability, it seems that some PPF 
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were often attempting to do both – that is, import systems from Australia (comparing the RSIPF 
with such systems), but at the same time valuing RSIPF strengths. This mix was pursued with 
varying degrees of success. 
Whilst most PPF and RSIPF agreed the PPF more recently had been trying to encourage local ideas 
and ownership, all respondents recognised the barriers to encouraging local personnel to contribute 
in a frank and meaningful way. Every interview respondent attributed this to cultural differences as 
well as problems to do with power imbalances – race, gender and formal hierarchy. Many of the 
advisers felt this was a cultural issue, as the following account illustrates: 
Yeah… they’re very quiet by nature. Often they won’t say anything if they don’t agree with you. But you 
can sort of tell if they don’t agree with you, so you try to encourage them by saying ‘well why do you 
think this is right?’ or ‘do you think there is a better way of doing something?’ You can learn from them 
too there is no doubt about that! Because the way things operate here within the community is totally 
different to the way we operate in Australia… information that might be forthcoming to the police can 
only be obtained certain ways – different to Australia. So you really rely on your counterpart to instruct 
that this is the best way to get this information out of this person or to conduct this investigation. So you 
need to try to encourage them to tell you what to do because often they won’t say anything they will just 
go along with what you say and often it won’t be the best way to do it. So you’ve got to encourage them to 
say … ‘am I doing this the right way?’ Or ‘how would you do it?’ … [interviewer asks do you know what 
the reason is – why it is difficult to get people to voice their opinions?] By nature they are very quiet. 
Almost subservient, you know? If I voice my opinion strongly about something I wouldn’t get a 
disagreement from them even if they didn’t agree with what I was saying. They wouldn’t speak up and say 
‘well you’re wrong, that’s not right’. They just take it – that’s just their nature.387  
As highlighted above, senior RSIPF are concerned with this tendency and several problems and 
potential solutions were highlighted. Most felt the PPF needed to be more aware of the inclination 
for local people to agree (which they often attributed to avoiding conflict) and to recognise some 
innovation in seeking local input was required. Another executive level RSIPF member felt that 
more work needed to be done to encourage contributions from junior RSIPF in the interests of 
organisational renewal. He felt there were problems to do with organisational hierarchy in this 
regard and that senior RSIPF members may stifle CD if they see it as a threat to their authority.388 
The issue of hierarchy also appears to be a problem in the PPF/RSIPF relationship with several PPF 
noting that the perceived authority of the PPF made it difficult to get honest feedback from RSIPF: 
They see us as bosses not advisers, I’m constantly telling them, because they call me sir – they call me 
boss and if I tell them not to call me sir or not to call me boss they take that badly – so you know, you 
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have to allow them to call you sir or boss – I tried to get them to understand ‘I’m your adviser, I’m trying 
to help you – I am not your boss. If you don’t agree with what I say that’s ok, you just have to tell me that 
and we’ll talk about it … I try to instil in them ‘if you don’t agree that’s ok, I am not your boss’.389  
Notwithstanding these problems almost all of the PPF interviewed said that establishing a strong 
relationship with their counterpart was one of the most important fundamental elements of CD, and 
all but one RSIPF interviewed agreed that relationships with current advisers were much better and 
that this facilitates improved local ownership. Apart from the above outlined local instigation of 
strategic planning and the resultant police capability plan, the interviews revealed two other 
significant reforms/CD strategies which appeared to derive from local knowledge and personnel and 
enjoyed significant local ownership (at least at the outset). These projects were the 
reconciliation/reunification project and the community officer project (outlined in the background 
section of Chapter 4). Both appear to represent extraordinary examples of local ownership and the 
PPF’s willingness to support locally driven ideas in a manner that illustrates a real potential to be 
flexible and adapt to local conditions. The reunification project had its origins in a leadership 
development program. According to RSIPF accounts, senior RSIPF members were undertaking a 
leadership course and through the training process these members came up with the idea for the 
reunification project. The proposal was put forward and PPF management reportedly responded 
accordingly: ‘so we’ve just thought good idea! [It] comes from them and we’re working towards a 
date in November’.390 This understated account of PPF support does demonstrate the eager but 
relaxed approach to implementing local ideas that I experienced throughout my interviewing, but it 
does not quite do justice to the manner in which the PPF got behind, and stayed behind, this project 
– supporting a local initiative and allowing it to run its course.  
The community officer project is another significant initiative which appeared to enjoy significant 
local ownership and support. At the time of the interviews, the pilot had been on trial in rural areas 
of Solomon Islands. It is a different and innovative approach to community policing in a post-
conflict environment. The project’s primary purpose is to move past the formal/informal RoL 
dichotomy and begin to work with community strengths (including traditional approaches to 
justice), to support and strengthen access to justice, and to ensure some level of police presence and 
support to all areas, including remote and rural locations. It had at the time been decided that the 
community officer would be an elected community member whose job it was to be the link between 
the police and community. It was to be an unpaid role with the possibility it might be compensated 
in some way in the future. The project was largely driven by the geography of Solomon Islands and 
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related logistical constraints. The remote parts of the country are isolated by either distance or 
terrain, and are often quite literally not policed at all. Whilst the community officer would not 
police these areas as such, the idea was that they provide a policing presence. The ownership over 
the community officer project is not a straight forward external imposition or a wholly locally 
owned proposition. Rather it is a complex mixture of PPF intervention, RSIPF suggestions and 
oversight/support, external and locally driven ideas, and a colonial legacy.  
There appeared to be a lack of consensus about where the idea originated – but senior RSIPF 
reported this as being locally driven, and certainly the RSIPF executive and deputy commissioner 
did have significant carriage over the project at the time of the interviews.391 Regardless of the 
differing views over who originally proposed this project, all involved took at least some credit for 
the approach. According to some interview respondents, and supported by early planning/concept 
documents and correspondence regarding the initial proposals, it would appear that the idea stems 
from former approaches to community policing and what has been referred to as the ‘village 
constable’.392 The role was to act as a link between the community and the government, and 
enforced council by-laws. More recently area constables have worked in similar roles (up until 
1998). A ‘revisiting [of] the old system of having a government official in the communities who 
acts as a link up with the government in terms of effective policing in the communities’ was 
endorsed by the then chairman of the law reform commission (later the Solomon Islands Governor 
General), Frank Kabui.393 The community officer project was to draw on these concepts and 
introduce a similar system.  
5.7 Holistic Approaches Based on Sound Analysis 
The interview responses indicated that it is indeed critical to focus on the whole and not just 
component aspects of the organisation. As such there is a need to recognise and analyse ‘the 
interplay between individuals, organisations and community to avoid designing interventions in 
isolation’.394 This also clearly relates to the ‘capability to commit and engage’ as a host organisation 
must ‘be conscious and aware of its place in the world, to configure itself, to develop its own 
motivation and commitment and then to act’.395 The ‘capability to relate and attract’ and the 
‘capability to adapt and self-renew’ are both pervasive elements of the CD operation evident in the 
responses of both PPF and RSIPF interviewed. Despite the centrality of these concepts, the 
approach to CD has for the most part treated the units as separate components which come together 
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to make a whole - only including a holistic approach to the overlapping of systems in an ad hoc 
fashion in response to the arising need to do so. Nonetheless such approaches to CD which do 
attempt to account for the interconnectedness and interdependence of these units with broader 
systems appear to account for the complexity of the environment in a manner that appears to 
generate more sustainable processes.  
There was a clear recognition by PPF, and RAMSI more widely, of the need to address capacity at 
the wider level in the formal public sector, evidenced in PPF’s attention to organisation-wide 
planning and the placement of advisers and resources throughout a wide range of units (as well as 
RAMSI’s whole of government CD program). However, despite this recognition the day-to-day 
process of CD was routinely carried out in near isolation within the units. All RSIPF respondents 
recognised that they were largely reliant on the performance of other units as well as broader 
Solomon Islands Government agencies. Despite this there was a general feeling that the importance 
of these links and the wider system was being missed in CD. All RSIPF reported that PPF members 
previously (in the earlier phases of the operation) spoke to other PPF members and coordinated 
amongst themselves – thereby bypassing and weakening RSIPF networks and capabilities to act as a 
whole. This element, like most others was reportedly improving. One particularly astute RSIPF 
member also pointed out the problem with PPF members consulting her directly rather than their 
RSIPF counterpart liasing with her:  
Because I observe … advisers hold onto roles that RSIPF should be doing … I sometimes come across, 
for example, I expect RSIPF [unit name removed] to come and talk to me about [function removed] needs 
and recruitment – but the PPF adviser [unit removed] comes and talks to me [instead]… No I don’t 
expect that – I’m not sure what the reason is behind that – they undermine some people. 396 
On the other hand, several PPF advisers noted that they make a point of standing back and ensuring 
that the RSIPF members do the work and establish/maintain the relationships required to coordinate 
with other units or agencies. One adviser acknowledged that he relied on his counterparts to 
mobilise other local personnel: 
I rely on [RSIPF member name removed] in dealing with the General Duties police – language barriers 
and things like that make it difficult and effectively we’re not in charge of them and we’re not in charge of 
our counterparts. So we advise our counterparts and they have some influence and authority over the 
General Duties police on how things are carried out and we rely on our counterparts to control them and 
get them to do tasks that they need them to do and we just work with the counterparts… [goes on to talk 
about relationships with Solomon Islands Government] once again we rely on our counterparts to do 
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that, rather than us interacting directly with them we use our counterpart and they liaise with those 
agencies and it works well.397 
This observation is supported by another PPF account in responding to a question concerning 
coordination with other units: 
It works quite well – the RSIPF tend to understand each other quite well – they are similar. So as much as 
I don’t have a great understanding of why Solomon Islanders and RSIPF do what they do, [RSIPF names 
removed] my counterparts do. So if we need to do something for a particular job and it requires the 
resources from another department they are quite capable of going and – they are able to do that quite 
easily because they know the RSIPF – I wouldn’t be able to. 
The degree to which a holistic analysis and approach to CD is required is only partially understood 
in terms of collaboration between units and agencies. A holistic understanding goes much broader 
than this. One senior RSIPF officer gave an example of such a holistic analysis in his detailed 
account of the range of systems and actors relevant to the economic conditions and resource 
constraints that impact upon the RSIPF’s operations/CD. He explained how the police rely on 
courts that do not function well (or in some places not at all) and how this undermines their 
policing. He explained that the state of the courts is linked to the financial pressures in Solomon 
Islands generally as well as the limited resources that the Solomon Islands Government has to 
dedicate to RoL. He explained the disincentive for developing strategic plans as they are dependent 
on so many other agencies who are suffering from low capacity and limited resources. He notes that 
budgets are cut and the RSIPF do not receive the finances that the government originally 
committed. All of this undermines the RSIPF’s ability to function. The economic situation of the 
country, as well as of the RSIPF specifically – as an organisation and as individuals – is 
inextricably linked to the RSIPF’s relationships with community and impacts upon how they must 
approach policing: 
… it is a communal society so I think advisers need to understand that people depend on their 
communities and not only for wantok – but for tribal linkages to land – linkages to ownership of assets 
and all that. So I think that’s one of the most important aspects to understand – is the community 
linkages. Not only within the RSIPF, but how RSIPF link back to the community [interviewer: and 
interdependence]… yes, the interdependence aspects of communities. And I think if done properly there 
will be benefits. If a young person commits a crime, if we understand the community properly we need not 
chase the young person around. We just go to the community and say this person has done this, and this 
is not good for the community and not safe for him to be out in the community and we want him to be with 
the police. That’s one benefit I see and if we do it properly and advisers understand it properly it will 
have some great benefits. 
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Secondly in a developing country the police does [sic] not have all the resources to operate independent 
from the community. In Western countries police are resourced properly and financed properly and they 
can operate whether the community like it or not; they can do what they are mandated to do. 
[Interviewer: and issues of corruption in Western countries – are greed? but in this environment 
sometimes they are for survival?] Yes! They are for survival – that’s right! I think it is important for 
advisers or capacity developers to understand that angle because we will never be in every community, so 
it’s important for us to build that community base relationship so that they help us to look after the minor 
issues where the police can afford to deal with the major issues. That will also be a benefit. I think the 
main thing is understanding the relationship between communities. That is important for capacity 
developers to understand. This is a small country and everyone knows everyone and getting that support 
from the community is important. Rather than having the under resourced police hit hard on the 
community, it’s a partnership, rather than just a police all the powers it has. We have all the powers to 
carry out law and order but I think one in terms of resources, in terms of community relationship – if we 
want to be independent we will not have that community support. It is better to have that community 
support rather than force our way into the issues in the community. 
There were examples of such a holistic approach being taken. Again the reunification project and 
the community officer project demonstrated extraordinary processes that did indeed take a holistic 
approach based on a comprehensive and iterative analysis. Both of these projects included a wide 
range of stakeholders in their analysis, planning and implementation. The reunification project, led 
by a local special adviser with considerable networks, developed a rich understanding of the context 
and political dimensions through comprehensive community engagement, thorough and widespread 
internal communication strategies, and the incorporation of several government agencies including 
relevant public servant divisions as well as the truth and reconciliation commission. Furthermore 
the entire approach was based on cultural practices and the informal laws surrounding 
reconciliation. This informal understanding of justice was then merged with a flexible approach to 
professional ethical standards and formal ceremony.  
Also based on a holistic understanding and an inclusive approach to analysis, the community officer 
project was designed to incorporate formal RoL agencies, rural communities, informal justice/RoL 
actors, other relevant aid agencies, NGOs (particularly Save the Children), local level community 
crime prevention committees, women’s groups, and church leaders. The approach recognised the 
strengths and weaknesses of formal RoL institutions and the strengths and weaknesses of informal 
institutions with a view to incorporate cultural and social norms in the interests of maintaining order 
and improving community safety. It appeared to start with the desired state of improved security 
and access to justice and then to identify all those actors and systems which had a stake in this 
desired end state as well as the capabilities to contribute.  
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5.8 Advising Rather Than ‘Doing’, and Technical Assistance 
Relating to the ‘capability to carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks’398 this 
concept has been contentious in this operational environment. The interview responses indicated 
mixed views as to whether or not advisers should avoid ‘doing’ and rather focus on 
supporting/advising only. Whilst the majority of both PPF and RSIPF felt it was important for 
RSIPF to ‘do’ and advisers to ‘support’ to ensure that changes are embedded in the local context, at 
times the realities of the operation made this rule aspirational at best. Initially all PPF were in fact 
inline police officers and some strategically placed in inline roles still existed at the time of this 
field work.399 There is significant evidence to suggest that the degree to which the PPF have been 
working inline and ‘doing’ the work has indeed led to practitioners introducing practices, systems 
and resources that are inappropriate in the context and that are not sustainable. Nonetheless, all 
those interviewed agreed that this has been due to the nature of the intervention, particularly the 
early phase, and many contended that this has been largely unavoidable. The exceptions to this 
‘advising rather than doing’ rule, noted in the literature and policy guidelines, were highly relevant 
in this context. It has been important for advisers to ‘do’ so that they make a necessary practical 
contribution as well as offer an important gesture for developing productive adviser/counterpart 
relationships. Whilst technical skills transfers have been an important element of enhancing this 
technical capability, all respondents confirmed that there was a lot more to developing this 
capability – a central factor being adviser/counterpart relationships. 
Given the PPF’s mandate at the point of intervention, it was indeed the role of the intervening force 
to take over the policing functions of the country. However, this resulted in the sidelining of RSIPF 
members and the introduction of systems that are not well understood by local personnel. One 
senior RSIPF member explained the resultant difficulties in getting the RSIPF to reclaim the 
responsibility for day-to-day functions as well as issues to do with broader ownership: 
[the respondent starts by explaining that the PPF was initially well-received, and is clearly supportive of 
the intervention]… as the mission went on, in the first year and second years the focus of the mission 
changed from … intervention to consolidation and probably this is where things became a little bit 
difficult… to get the RSIPF working again… for me this is where we have had challenges and 
difficulties… the most important thing is the relationships that are built when there is an intervention, 
when there is two or more forces working together… coming out of a hostile environment or tension or 
law and order issue… it is a difficult environment to see progress or see what’s achieved or a clear way 
forward… there are some difficulties in getting RSIPF on board while the PPF or the RAMSI contingent 
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still maintain. Remember in the first place there is very little RSIPF and all the policing work is done by 
PPF and getting RSIPF on board and trying to have ownership and getting people to understand where 
we are going and what we need to do to return not only law and order but to build up the RSIPF – this is 
a big task, coming with a lot of difficulties – including gaining trust which we still haven’t got.400 
This respondent also explained how the importation of systems and practices has eroded RSIPF 
confidence in carrying out their functions and this has contributed to the need for the PPF to 
continue ‘doing’ rather than ‘advising’.  
Despite these problems the RSIPF were increasingly taking the lead in many of the critical roles 
throughout the organisation. As such many advisers reported that their counterparts were almost 
entirely responsible for carrying out the day-to-day tasks and most felt the RSIPF did go about their 
work with minimal monitoring. There were, however, exceptions to this with a few advisers 
acknowledging that they did ‘do’ between 50 to 70 per cent of the tasks that the unit was 
responsible for undertaking. Another inline adviser was unapologetic in explaining his need to 
‘micro-manage’ every last detail within the purview of his operational unit – due to the critical 
security role played by this unit.401 Whilst some PPF were clearly committed to ‘advising and 
supporting’ only, others felt that doing some of the work was necessary. Some advisers reported 
‘doing’ so as to demonstrate their abilities – sometimes this was considered important to establish 
credibility. Often PPF would ‘do’ using demonstration as an approach to informal on the job 
training. Mostly ‘doing’ was seen as important for relationship building in the interests of making a 
tangible contribution and demonstrating a willingness to work. A PPF team leader explained why it 
is not possible to allow some key enabling units to fail in their work and as such the advisers 
oscillated between ‘doing’ and ‘advising’:  
I’ve got four or five advisers who can find themselves moving in and out of the adviser/inline position. 
They represent the Plimsoll line on the boat, you know. When it’s sailing well and high, they’re above 
water. When it’s deep, they’re at the water level and they have to work that through… [the respondent 
explains some structural issues with two units and goes on to say]… so I don’t have any problems with us 
being inline in those areas… we’ve done the inline upfront and we’re moving back to an advisory 
program, but at the core, if those enabling service areas don’t get done then the whole organisation 
doesn’t get done and if they’re quasi-inline then they’re quasi-inline and they will be for some time…402  
One RSIPF officer questioned the logic of these oscillating inline/adviser roles. Noting the risk to 
sustainability: 
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I’ll tell you this that I tend to think that RSIPF should be doing all the work. RSIPF should be in the 
forefront getting supported by their advisers through coaching and mentoring – even if they have to ask 
for the simplest of advice. And that’s the way I’d like to see it – not PPF doing the work because 
tomorrow if the PPF leave everything will come crashing down.403 
The RSIPF responses were mixed on this issue and often contradictory. On the one hand, most 
RSIPF appeared keen to claim responsibility and control over their roles and generally confirmed 
they did ‘do’ all the work with PPF providing support and mentoring only. On the other hand, the 
same respondents would then acknowledge using PPF personnel as an extra resource. The use of 
PPF members was sometimes attributed to being short staffed but it was also often easier to use PPF 
to carry out certain tasks – particularly reporting and administrative tasks or anything that might 
require PPF assets such as transport.404 The tendency to use PPF to write reports or planning 
documents was confirmed by both PPF and RSIPF who received or read such reports, with key 
personnel on several occasions noting the obvious difference between PPF and RSIPF written 
reports. Some units were so extraordinarily understaffed – such as the Policy and Family Violence 
unit405 – that the likelihood of PPF ‘doing’ as well as ‘advising’ was inevitable. Conversely units 
that were considered to be elite or desirable places to work tended to have less staff shortages, 
greater ownership over the work, and less of a tendency to use PPF to ‘do’ their work.  
Most RSIPF acknowledged drawing on their adviser’s influence when necessary but this was 
generally to get the adviser to speak to other advisers or the PPF hierarchy on their behalf. Some 
RSIPF respondents acknowledged using their PPF advisers to exert influence when they were 
unable to obtain decisions or resources through their own networks/processes. One RSIPF at 
commander level seemed happy with his adviser’s willingness to act on his behalf but frustrated 
that he should need him to do so: 
…if I want some funds out of finance it will take me some time before they are able to give me funds 
required – but with my PPF adviser that can be done in a very short period of time, unlike me – I’m not 
sure because I’m black or something…Very frustrating! As police commander I think I should be 
accorded this kind of thing, if I ask for something, then give it to me, but it is not like that [he explains 
several instances where the releasing of funds has been critical for operational work and notes he has 
had to use his adviser’s influence]… I find it very hard to get the funds so I use my PPF adviser to get the 
funds for me. I know that’s not what he’s here for but I need him to do it.406 
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5.9 The Delivery of Capacity Development, Training and Technical Transfers 
Interview responses confirmed there is less emphasis now on generic training and more on learning 
for the context and from the context, including an increasing recognition of the importance of the 
co-production of knowledge rather than technical knowledge transfers. Capacity development 
generally happens on the job and, to varying degrees, facilitates this shift in knowledge production. 
In cases where formal training is appropriate, the need is increasingly established by the context and 
is locally driven through strong local ownership within the RSIPF training unit. Consequently the 
training itself is more inclined to be directly relevant and incorporated into practice. This concept 
relates to the ‘capability to carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks’. 
The most important and commonly reported type of CD reported by the RSIPF remained the 
injection of resources and the assets PPF presence brought to bear. Almost all RSIPF reported 
receiving mentoring and on-the-job training and most confirmed that learning ‘through doing’ was 
the most appropriate approach to training and CD in this context. The approach to training in the 
past had been very technical and required high levels of literacy, and tended to focus on skills 
outside of the immediate needs of the RSIPF. This had been recently rectified at the time of the 
field work. Training had considerably more focus on the practical skills required to improve the 
RSIPF’s work, and was grounded in its day-to-day operational reality and commensurate with the 
educational level of relevant members. In previous years training had required a higher educational 
attainment than was practical or appropriate for the context. All RSIPF respondents confirmed that 
the most important factor in successful CD was a good relationship with the adviser. This was seen 
as the foundation for mentoring and on-the-job training and it allowed the adviser to have a greater 
understanding of the context and the needs of their counterparts. Most RSIPF respondents reported 
poor relationships with previous advisers. There had been a recent emphasis on formal training in 
leadership development but, as the reunification project indicates, there had been an effort to ensure 
this training was highly practical and context driven resulting in immediate application.  
5.10 Build on What Exists 
There is little doubt that CD has been successful in this operation when existing capacities have 
been recognised, explicitly acknowledged, and built upon in coproduction. There is also evidence 
that the PPF have benefited from learning how to recognise capacity in the RSIPF, and in the 
Solomon Islands context more generally, and that this lack of comprehension at the outset has 
undermined the effectiveness of CD and relationships. Whilst there is now a heavy emphasis on CD 
and change embedded in the local context, there have been considerable problems with the 
importation of foreign systems and an initial inability to take a strengths-based approach. In earlier 
phases the PPF have almost certainly conducted needs analyses based on identifying gaps and 
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weaknesses. In cases where the PPF have approached CD in a manner that clearly harnesses local 
knowledge and is building upon what exists, there is evidence of the ‘capability to adapt and self-
renew’ developing within both the RSIPF and PPF systems. In doing so, both organisations relied 
heavily on informal information to allow them to respond to changes in the environment.  
As is highlighted above there was previously a tendency for the PPF to import practices and 
systems in early phases of the intervention as they were responsible for providing security. The 
majority of the RSIPF and PPF interviews confirmed this and both agreed that such approaches 
(whilst arguably justifiable given the operating mandate) were unsustainable and did tend to 
undermine CD on the whole. As is the case with most other concepts this appeared to be improving 
significantly at the time of the interviews and both RSIPF and PPF reported the relative success of 
initiatives that were grounded in the context and built on existing systems and processes. However, 
several RSIPF were able to give a multitude of examples where PPF were not aware of professional 
and legal processes let alone cultural ones, and that this level of ignorance regarding the local 
operating context was not only frustrating but entirely counterproductive when PPF attempted to 
force changes based on such a lack of understanding. The following exchange between the 
interviewer and a senior RSIPF officer provides some illustration of these problems: 
Interviewer: Do you think the PPF could see the strengths of the RSIPF when they came and tried to 
build on that, or do you think that there was a period of time where there was too much change trying to 
be achieved? 
Respondent: [Laughs knowingly] certainly, I think that is one of the issues… in terms of capacity 
building we need to understand the history of the organisation, in this case the RSIPF. I believe [pause] 
maybe there is no time to sit back and think about what has happened in the past and what happened now 
and where to do we go from [here]. There is probably no time to think about that given the intervention I 
think people want to come in, deal with the issues and then build later. But there is certainly 
[pause/hesitation] misinterpretation of the RSIPF in the beginning, its history, probably achievements, 
what it did before, what are the systems in the organisation, what are the government processes and 
systems that RSIPF is linked to… how does [sic] the day-to-day activities happen through up and down 
the linkages. So as I said there are systems that have been brought in not only from Australia, not only 
from New Zealand – people who come and take decisions want to put in their own systems without 
realising a system was there before.407 
The interview respondent then agreed with the interviewer’s suggestion that new systems might be 
introduced so that the advisers can make sense of the environment. He agrees the inclination to 
make the operating environment knowable to the adviser through transforming the system is 
understandable and ‘certainly that happened’ but it ‘causes a lot of problems’. He notes that the 
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RSIPF have responded by ‘backing off’ and this is where ‘you get that tension’. He says that the 
PPF (implying ‘to their credit’) have recognised the problem that: 
Some individual police officers [PPF] who have come in with great knowledge [of Western policing] 
wanted to implement a system which they are familiar with and they can work with. But it’s not the same 
with the RSIPF – with due respect to these systems and process, they are good, but I think that the 
understanding of the RSIPF at that time cannot match with the understanding of the PPF.408  
The majority of PPF respondents recognised that, at the time of deployment, they had a lack of 
knowledge regarding the Solomon Islands context, the RSIPF generally, and social and cultural 
norms. All but one respondent either did not receive relevant pre-deployment training, or felt their 
pre-deployment training was inadequate in this respect and far too generic to properly prepare them 
for their CD role. Several of the PPF respondents appeared frustrated at the lack of information they 
received regarding the processes of CD, the purposes of CD, RSIPF policies, Solomon Islands law 
and particularly issues to do with language and culture: 
Pre-deployment training was helpful in regards to firearms and four-wheel drive training. Everything 
else was really, really a waste of time. We could have had Pijin lessons, which would have helped me 
immensely to know a bit of Pijin. Because my first week here I did two outreaches and I couldn’t speak to 
the locals. Just things like that. I’m just doing a Pijin course now, which is six months into it. And I think 
doing two weeks of language training would have prepared me more than anything.409 
Another PPF respondent was clearly annoyed at how generic the training was: 
Was it helpful for this job? No! Did it prepare me for this job? No. I enjoyed it but it’s not relevant at all 
to what we’re doing here. And you know, for instance it was in Canberra winter [referring to the 
simulation/scenario aspect of the training in the ‘Village’] ok? So that’s climate – wrong! The content, it 
was delivered at UN related missions. So is this a UN mission? No! And thirdly it was delivered at police 
[as opposed to capacity developers/advisers]. Ok? So completely irrelevant!410 
Several PPF members acknowledged the shock of arriving in Solomon Islands and explained how it 
took some time to settle in. Most advisers acknowledged that it took some time for them to really 
understand how to even begin to tackle the work of CD, and several others explained the sensation 
of being completely out of their comfort zone implying that it was almost disorientating. This sense 
of floundering, it was suggested by one adviser, could have been avoided if they were given access 
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to PPF who had returned to Australia, had received some sort of debriefing from them, and had 
been allowed to ask informal questions in preparation for what to expect.411 
Both RSIPF and PPF were asked about the handover system between outgoing and incoming 
advisers – all but a few felt there was no system and that this was highly problematic. As one 
RSIPF officer explained it was especially a problem when advisers were only there for six 
months412 and he or she was trying to come up with a new system in the office: 
…for example, we are trying to put out our daily spreadsheet here and this is how we are going to 
[manage workflow and systematise CD] every day you come in and type – but then we don’t have enough 
computers for everyone to access so we do manual thing again…413 
Most advisers acknowledged that they had to start from scratch or ‘reinvent the wheel’ due to a lack 
of information about what CD had been trying to achieve and what had been implemented prior to 
their deployment. Several RSIPF explained that they would be making great progress with one 
adviser and the next would come in and change everything. Most acknowledged this happened 
because CD was not properly grounded in the local context. Three RSIPF respondents detailed how 
they were actively managing this problem by actually taking responsibility for providing handover 
information to the incoming adviser to ensure they did build on existing capacities as well as build 
on the CD processes and priorities of the previous advisers.414 One RSIPF officer noted that it was 
his aim to get as much as he could out of this current adviser to ensure they made forward progress 
and embedded this in the interests of demonstrating a clear plan and trajectory to the next adviser so 
as to improve the chances of some continuity in CD.415 The vast majority of RSIPF and PPF 
acknowledged that deployments were often too short and that advisers needed to be in place for 12 
months as a bare minimum to increase the likelihood of their being able to understand the context 
and build on what exists as well as consolidate and bed down changes.  
Notwithstanding these reported problems, most RSIPF strongly confirm that the PPF have been 
actively learning from them and that over time the PPF had become increasingly interested in 
recognising and building on existing capacities, strengths and practices, and have been prepared to 
look beyond formal capacities in attempting to build on what exists. The community officer project 
is again an example of this. It is fair to say that those involved from the PPF were wary of 
introducing new structures and sources of power, and they were also keen to build on existing 
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norms.416 As a senior PPF officer in program management explained, the PPF’s support for this 
approach was at least partly due to the historical existence of a similar approach as well as local 
support for, and familiarity with, the concept:  
I had concerns at first because you had the legitimate authority by legislation of the police and 
Constitution, you had the legitimate authority through traditional customary law in terms of the chiefs 
and alike and I was originally concerned about having something in the middle… but before 
independence the headman was an appointment that was voted by the villagers…so the history of this and 
its significance in the context of this culture, or multiple cultures… is actually in existence, so we’re not 
creating something [entirely] new.417 
5.11 Importance of Incentives, Motivation, and Perverse or Unintended 
Consequences 
The importance of incentives and motivations for change and CD recognises the complexity of 
factors which influence the behaviour of individuals and the flow-on impacts throughout the 
organisation and between systems. There is little doubt that this is a major factor in this CD 
operation – with many of the above quotes illustrating the competing pressures on RSIPF members 
to prioritise family and wantok loyalties and the sometimes perverse incentives created by the 
interdependence of this relationship. PPF have certainly found it difficult to understand what 
motivates people, and even more difficult to understand how other actors will respond to changes or 
how the wider system will respond. The interview data confirms this complexity demonstrating that 
whilst there may be a reasonably clear incentive to act in one way within the professional and 
official realm, it is critically important to recognise there may be strong disincentives emanating 
from external systems which overlap. This too relates to the ‘capability to commit and engage’ as 
strong disincentives or hidden barriers and countervailing forces can create a state of ‘stuckness’. 
To varying degrees both PPF and RSIPF described this sense of ‘stuckness’ relating to such 
disincentives. Such observations resonated strongly with the ‘capability to relate and attract 
resources and support’ and the ‘capability to balance diversity and coherence’. 
Many of the RSIPF reported significant incentives for participating in CD, not least of which was 
the benefit of PPF resources. These resources were considered by some as a luxury that made the 
work more enjoyable as well as more rewarding. Others clearly experienced it more as a novelty or 
a perk. Nonetheless, the presence of PPF resources contributed to the incentives for RSIPF 
involvement in CD. However, this form of incentive created some considerably perverse effects on 
the sustainability of CD. It was felt by some RSIPF as well as some PPF interviewed that there was 
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a tendency for local officers to take advantage of the resources while they were there but without 
commitment to long-term change. 
Most RSIPF interviewed claimed that they were committed to CD and felt that incentives did exist. 
These incentives generally related to a pride in one’s work or a commitment to the nation. Many 
RSIPF acknowledged that not all RSIPF viewed these benefits as sufficient incentives for change. 
This appeared to be a source of frustration for those RSIPF interviewed who were clearly 
committed to achieving high standards. PPF interviews confirmed this view of existing incentives 
and many had observed RSIPF members’ commitment to CD being driven by pride in their work 
and through a broader commitment to the country. All PPF acknowledged the extraordinary 
disincentives at play including poor work conditions, general poverty, family pressures, low pay 
and the cost of getting to work (both in time and transport costs). Other PPF reported the 
disincentives for adopting new practices. In particular the lack of incentive to follow reporting 
protocols was illustrated by the following PPF comment: 
It was an interesting concept as an adviser to have to work with their middle managers to put in these 
Business Plans and report on how effective they were when they are disenfranchised [because they have 
no equipment, resources or incentives in stark contrast to the PPF] and then you’ve got to work with your 
counterpart to say ‘all your inspectors where are their Business Plans? Why haven’t they reported on 
how effective logistics and resources are?’ And they’ll go ‘well we can’t get resources or logistics so why 
the hell are we reporting on them?’ Although that [Business Plans] had to be done from a political aspect 
one of the biggest things that needed to be concentrated on was how do they [actually] do their job?418 
The PPF member explained one RSIPF officer said to him ‘in my role I will always look ineffective 
on a business plan’ – he notes then that: ‘they are set up for failure – why should they want to report 
on it?’419 
5.12 Plan for Staff Turnover  
It was recognised that CD can and does contribute to unintended consequences such as high staff 
turnover. There was some confirmation of this principle in that personnel who had received CD did 
become more valuable to other units (although not generally to other organisations), and there was a 
recognised need to move away from focussing on individuals exclusively and instead concentrate 
on units and the wider organisation to avoid creating dependency on a small few. The majority of 
PPF interviewed explicitly provided CD to the broader unit as a deliberate strategy for improving 
sustainability and mitigating the risk of losing key personnel to transfers and the like, as well as 
supporting systemic change.  
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That said RSIPF turnover was not a big problem for most units considered in this case study. The 
policy unit was an exception to this, as the experience of learning planning, policy and report 
writing was of high value in other units and therefore this unit did tend to lose personnel to transfers 
and promotions.420 Not surprisingly the increased demand for such skills in the organisation is 
largely generated by the PPF’s presence. The senior RSIPF officer in this policy unit lamented this 
problem noting: ‘we breed people for other areas’.421 Another ongoing challenge for CD was the 
degree to which many units were short-staffed, often to a debilitating extent, and this related to 
wider problems to do with funding as well as HR systems and issues to do with force ‘renewal’.  
5.13 Accounting for the Cultural Environment 
This CD operation clearly illustrates the pitfalls of attempting to introduce systems and practices 
which are incompatible with cultural practice. Those elements of CD that have not made sense 
within the cultural context have either been unsuccessful or local personnel warn they will not be 
sustainable. On the other hand, innovative approaches to CD that have been explicitly grounded in 
the cultural context, having included the consideration of local values, obligations, motivations, 
knowledge systems and the broader social and cultural environment, have been enthusiastically 
welcomed and appear to have solid footing. This includes understanding and working with the 
culture(s) of the organisation, the culture(s) of the wider formal system and the culture(s) of related 
systems including informal and social systems. This concept appears to be highly relevant – 
demonstrating the critical importance of the ‘capability to balance diversity and coherence’. This 
capability is particularly critical in terms of negotiating social and cultural pressures and 
expectations with professional and formal expectations that often include imported notions of 
‘ethics’. 
It is important to emphasise that cultural dimensions of CD were seen by the vast majority of PPF 
and RSIPF respondents to be the most fundamental aspect of CD. It was evident from the data 
generated that cultural issues permeated throughout every aspect of CD with widespread 
consequences for its effectiveness. Almost every barrier, unintended implication or complexity 
seemed to boil down to either economic constraints or complications stemming from cultural issues 
– and often it was a combination of the two. Conversely the majority of success stories or reports of 
effective CD and collaborative knowledge generation had at their heart a story about culture(s). The 
importance of culture was recognised as being central to everything from attendance rates and 
modes of training to the very essence of police work and everything in between. A few PPF clearly 
articulated that they could see that culture was not just practices and values but that it was a 
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different way of knowing. Often RSIPF could explain the logic of a cultural issue so the PPF could 
understand it, but two PPF officers acknowledged that they could only have a surface understanding 
and that there was really ‘no way in’ to access the logic of local knowledge production and 
reproduction. Nonetheless the PPF were clearly learning, with several RSIPF respondents speaking 
of the oral traditions of learning in Solomon Islands and commending CD for being delivered in a 
manner which catered to this strength. Many also felt the extension of this was a ‘learning by doing’ 
modality of skills development, and several respondents recognised that some advisers were 
particularly good at CD because they employed such techniques together with a collaborative 
approach to knowledge generation.  
Many RSIPF and PPF openly recounted times at which the approach to CD had not been culturally 
appropriate, or lacked awareness of cultural factors playing out behind the scenes. Most were 
keenly aware of the consequences of misjudging the cultural context as well as the considerable 
propensity for outsiders to do so. All RSIPF and PPF interviewed confirmed that advisers were 
wholly reliant on their counterparts and other RSIPF members to continually monitor CD and offer 
ongoing advice on cultural factors. This made relationships critical and demonstrated how CD was 
completely dependent on establishing trust and understanding the broader social and cultural 
environment. Despite these lessons, most units had little or no formal or systematic contact with 
local people outside of the RSIPF and did not systematically include cultural perspectives from 
other stakeholders in the approach to CD. RSIPF reported a tendency for the PPF to introduce 
generic policing concepts based on value systems foreign to Solomon Islands. Issues to do with the 
conflict between wantok obligations and professional ethics, for example, remained unresolved. 
There were numerous examples of inappropriate police procedures, such as the execution of 
warrants resulting in cultural claims for compensation, and a failure for PPF to go through proper 
cultural protocols in their effort to police ‘by the book’. PPF tended to see this as attempting to 
introduce policing procedures that are regarded in Australia to be fair, just and neutral but in the 
context of a particular village these same procedures were received as anything but. Most PPF 
found the wantok system to be of inherent value as well as an obstacle, and almost all found it at 
least perplexing: 
The wantok system, there’s no social security in this country. It’s one of the greatest strengths of this 
country, but it’s also one of its worst weaknesses. Serving police officers will not arrest their close 
wantok no matter what that person has done. I find it quite baffling at times that we have wanted 
criminals freely associating with police officers. These are wanted murderers that have escaped from jail. 
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It does your head in when you see those sorts of things, and my philosophy is ‘We’ve just got to get round 
it somehow’.422 
Whilst most PPF did purport to understand the significance of culture and wantok obligations, one 
PPF member lamented the tendency to treat culture as a problem rather than an enabling strength: 
The thing about the wantok system, it was always talked about at [removed] as something bad, or 
something corrupt, or something evil. But it’s not that, the way I see it. Working in a small town I did the 
same thing. Somebody mucks up. You say, ‘Hey, come on. Piss off home’. They do that here, because you 
know the guy. You know where he lives. You know who his dad is. You know that’s out of character or 
whatever. You’re going to deal with it later. You just tell him to go home. Here they do the same. Some 
people, when you first come here, you think ‘That’s the wantok. He’s looking after his mates. He’s being 
corrupt’. It’s not corrupt… it’s [hesitation – interviewer suggests ‘community policing’] Exactly! It’s a 
totally normal way of dealing with it. Now there are obviously corrupt elements and things that people 
are getting away with and using the wantok system, the same as they do in any other police force. They 
know the local copper so they can speed or you know drink drive or whatever. And that’s just bad 
policing. It’s not inherently cultural. It’s just the way it is in how some people police.423 
When RSIPF respondents were asked if they felt that they, or other RSIPF, might have to ignore 
new systems or rules introduced through CD because of wantok, political, or tension-related 
pressures, all acknowledged this was a very big problem. Every respondent confirmed a great deal 
of RSIPF members do or would indeed ignore new procedures, systems and rules. Some 
respondents felt this was due to an incomplete but necessary cultural change within the RSIPF; 
others felt it was because introduced practices were culturally inappropriate. Most felt it was a 
combination of the two. The following account, which one RSIPF officer offered on how he would 
accommodate wantok pressures, cultural systems and professional ethics, demonstrates the 
contingent nature of negotiating this space: 
[the officer begins by explaining that if one of his family members came to him to report a crime inside 
the family he would first explain the options (i.e. the formal or informal approach) he goes on to explain] 
If she says well ok I want to sit down with the chief and elders and sit it out like that I will help – but if 
she says I want to open up a case I will – I believe that if you do that within your own family the 
community at large will see you carried out your job faithfully they will trust you – it’s all about trust for 
a police officer once the community lose trust in you – you are finished – they will talk about you, your 
family and everything… If I knew that if I go and try and help and that [they would] say I don’t want you 
to help because of that [family involvement/conflict of interest] – I will tell other police officers to deal 
with it… If there is thing that happens to my sister – custom says that it is taboo for me to know business 
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of my sister – sometimes I will not know how a row came about – sometimes it’s about [private] things – 
so if she came to me or if I heard about that I would go to the [other] police.424 
5.14 Capacity is Both a Means and an End 
The interview data undoubtedly confirmed the importance of capacity as both a means and an end, 
although it also demonstrated the difficulty in understanding capacity as something different from 
performance, and in knowing what processes are likely to enable such capacity to develop. It was 
nonetheless clear that capacity is in fact an important end in itself and the means of reaching that 
end are important if not central. In short, the interviews confirmed CD processes are critical and the 
manner in which capacity is built has a far greater impact on sustainability than was previously 
understood. Whilst the above analysis goes some way towards explaining this concept there were 
several interview responses that attempted to articulate issues to do with process. Several PPF were 
confident that whilst they could not quite pin down what capacity or CD was, successful processes 
were inherently relational: 
Where I see the people, even if they haven’t got much of an idea of what capacity development is, once 
they’re in a position for a while and they start to develop those relationships they do it naturally anyway 
because you get to know somebody and problems come up and you sit down and talk about it. And that’s 
what capacity development is – you sit down and talk about it and figure out how we’re going to solve 
this. That’s my very simplistic philosophy on it.425 
Such an intuitive understanding of the importance of process and relationships, however, is not 
easily standardised or even articulated. As another adviser explained, he did not think there could be 
a generic way to deliver CD as it is contingent on too many factors and far too dependent on culture 
and context: 
Like I don’t know how you can train somebody to develop somebody else because you’ve got to know 
them first. You’ve got to know what they’re about. I don’t think you can have a general, generic way of 
developing someone, because you have to assess where they’re from, what they’re doing, and what you 
want to achieve might not be achievable. If you’re talking about a generic way of ‘this is how you develop 
somebody’, I don’t know whether that’s [possible].426 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates the key concepts of a systems-based understanding to 
capacity and CD, as articulated in contemporary policy and practice guidelines (summarised in the 
table of concepts (Table 3)), are indeed highly relevant to the police CD operation in Solomon 
Islands. What is less clear is how these understandings can be usefully translated into a PMM&E 
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framework for police CD. The following questions and reflections on the data are concerned with 
exploring this issue.  
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2. Are conventional approaches to PMM&E adequate for capturing, managing and monitoring 
the complexity of police CD environments and processes, and do they reflect the manner in 
which capacity emerges? 
Given the initial emergency response and the executive policing mandate of the intervention, the 
PMM&E of this CD operation had evolved in a manner that meant it was largely unable to 
articulate at the outset what needed to be done, how it should be done, and the timeline for 
achieving such objectives. Partly as a product of this, the PPF did not appear to be slaving under an 
overly prescriptive framework of PMM&E. Whilst they were certainly responsible for accounting 
for inputs and outcomes, the links between these stages appeared to be somewhat under-articulated 
in comparison to a standard conventional approach to PMM&E. These conditions have given rise to 
some instances of extraordinary flexibility and adaptability to respond to changing circumstances, 
providing the opportunity for some valuable insights. 
A system for performance management within the RSIPF was being developed at the time of the 
field work – however, it was not explicitly linked to CD M&E. This was partly because it appeared 
impossible to make claims about CD outcomes by evaluating the performance of the RSIPF while 
the PPF were still embedded in the organisation. This is because there is no way of separating 
RSIPF capacity from the PPF inputs. Furthermore, treating RSIPF performance as a proxy for 
measuring the effectiveness of CD would only increase the tendency of advisers to ‘do’ the work to 
ensure performance improvements, which would in fact undermine sustainable CD on the whole. 
Although there were efforts to track wider impacts, such as community perceptions of safety 
(through the People’s Survey) and the like, there was no real tracking of capacity changes at the unit 
level, nor was there any systematic CD planning and M&E processes, or even procedures and 
guidelines to inform CD.  
Whilst there was a newly developed ‘capability framework’ being introduced to attempt to 
overcome this problem at the unit level – to set standards and monitor competencies – every adviser 
interviewed insisted that there was no real way of monitoring capacity in this way, as it was 
considered to be intangible and therefore not measurable. All of the PPF interviewed decidedly 
rejected conventional performance measures and PMM&E frameworks as an approach to 
measuring CD due to the ‘messiness’ of identifying and monitoring the interconnected factors. Most 
PPF interviewed dismissed the possibility of defining capacity in a manner that could account for its 
complexities and identify measurable impacts. The majority of PPF interviewed also objected to 
conventional approaches to measuring policing due to the scarcity of reliable, accurate and 
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comparable data, as well as the absence of a baseline and an inability to make sense of conventional 
policing data due to the complexity of the social, political, economic and cultural context. All PPF 
agreed that they should be building on the context and existing practices, systems and capacities, 
but the history of the intervention confirmed that this information was not knowable in advance and 
thus precluded the possibility of predefined objectives for the CD intervention against which 
performance and effectiveness could be measured. The question therefore remained outstanding: If 
conventional approaches to PMM&E are categorically rejected by police practitioners what kind of 
framework and data would be helpful in managing and monitoring police CD in a manner which 
reflects how capacity emerges? 
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3. What processes and data need to be captured to better account for the realities of a police 
CD operation?  
The interview data revealed an overwhelming resonance with systems approaches to PMM&E, 
which advocate the inclusion of broader cultural and social systems, values and knowledge(s). 
Furthermore, it is clear that the success of CD depends on the incorporation and absorption of these 
elements for its sustainability. Whilst local knowledge was not often systematically included and 
recognised as central evidence informing the operation’s approach to designing and planning CD, as 
well as monitoring and evaluating progress, it was routinely informally relied upon. In fact the vast 
majority of PPF interviewed explained how successful CD was built on relationships and had been 
informed by dialogues they had with local people. Conversely, conventional approaches, which 
favour scientific, strategic and quantifiable evidence/knowledge, did not carry much favour as this 
type of data was not seen to be critical or reliable for informing CD. Nonetheless, the mandate of 
the operation undoubtedly reinforced a focus on the formal organisation, making engagement with 
broader stakeholders secondary and incidental.  
Within that formal organisational focus, however, PPF interviewed regularly gave accounts of 
informal but deliberate inclusion of at least the local knowledge of their counterparts and units. One 
demonstrably successful tool utilised by a senior adviser was to routinely approach every planning 
session with very open questions, such as ‘what is your vision of success?’ He said it was important 
to begin with a wide lens and hone in on the details from there. Otherwise you are asking for advice 
within a predetermined scope that could be misguided for the start.427 Most advisers confirmed that 
the best CD planning was always achieved in informal settings with informal conversations, and 
several deliberately utilised a kind of ad hoc ‘story telling’ methodology – whereby they routinely 
put aside time to just tell stories and this would invariably generate useful CD information.  
One PPF officer made the point that the PPF needed, themselves, to be part of some kind of 
dialogue which honestly accounts for what CD is trying to achieve and the assumptions people hold 
regarding how this can be achieved. It became apparent through his comments that this adviser was 
advocating for a kind of self-reflexive dialogue process to be used for both planning and 
monitoring. He felt this might in some way ease the pressure on the PPF to appear to have all the 
answers and it may reduce any unnecessary posturing. This adviser also pointed out that such an 
honest dialogue might bring about the kind of humility required for CD. He noted that the RSIPF 
are not oblivious to the policing scandals and misconduct in Australia, and that this can make the 
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PPF look a little hypocritical (or at least naïve) when they are trying to introduce a demonstrably 
corruptible system as if it were the superior, and only, way to achieve an ethical police force.428   
Most PPF rejected the usefulness of conventional program management approaches, with several 
referring to the enormity and the interconnectedness of the CD environment which makes it very 
difficult to breakdown into parts. A senior PPF policy and planning expert noted that the 
fundamental conceptual basis of conventional approaches offer very little for understanding 
organisational change and emergence: ‘we’re not delivering nuts and bolts things. We’re trying to 
influence and build capability across the organisation – to do some fairly abstract things and it 
doesn’t really lend itself to the project methodology in many cases’.429 
RSIPF accounts of the value of local knowledge and broader stakeholder inclusion unequivocally 
confirmed the PPF views reported above and generally went further. A myriad of examples were 
continuously referred to by RSIPF as they explained the critical need to include local knowledge 
and stakeholders in the CD planning, implementation and monitoring process. One RSIPF officer 
noted that they do get valuable informal feedback from stakeholders, but sometimes it is ill-
informed. This officer noted that misguided comments are obviously disregarded, but because they 
lack a systematic approach to addressing stakeholder feedback, disregarding it can fuel resentment 
because it appears as though the feedback is not considered at all. This officer added that there is 
often ‘gossip’ about CD and this could be addressed if there were a system of two-way 
communication. The officer recommended getting feedback from everyone, whether they are 
RSIPF, Australian personnel, from PNG or Samoa, or in the villages. They need, in this officer’s 
view, a framework for generating, collating and addressing feedback as well as ensuring feedback is 
well informed.430 Another RSIPF officer explained that they did in fact have a standard template for 
allowing stakeholder feedback in their unit, but this was not how they became aware of widespread 
dissatisfaction with an aspect of their work. Rather, they became aware of complaints from other 
units through informal channels. This lead to a dialogue process with both internal and external 
stakeholders, and this approach was very successful. The officer noted that this dialogue gave them 
an opportunity to realise they were in fact in agreement, but it also allowed for necessary changes to 
be identified and addressed.431 
A senior RSIPF officer occupying an operations role explained a particularly successful new 
initiative referred to as investigation tours – whereby police would travel to communities in their 
                                                 
428 Anonymous.  
429 P3. 
430 R2. 
431 R1. 
141 
 
jurisdiction and stay in the area for up to two weeks addressing outstanding police issues. He 
described a kind of informal place-based ‘stocktake’ that he felt was showing promising signs of 
engaging stakeholders in policing and CD. The data collated through this approach was not 
recorded in any formal way but he noted significant potential for doing so.432 Another officer in 
regular contact with community stakeholders felt that their engagement was critical and that the 
PPF presence had generated high and unsustainable expectations of police. This officer confirmed a 
need to address expectations and manage them through systematic communications and 
monitoring.433 The Family Violence Unit had already begun to implement a more systematic 
approach to stakeholder inclusion. The officer reported regular meetings with a range of key 
community, government, donor and NGO stakeholders: ‘yes, this is what we actually do – we have 
meetings with them [stakeholders] and discuss what area we are looking at improving and then we 
work on that, then we have other meetings to follow up’.434  
Five important points emerged from the data in relation to this question: (1) CD is indeed best 
driven by relationships and local knowledge; (2) a huge proportion of reported CD successes were 
informed by broader informal stakeholder inclusion; (3) broader stakeholder inclusion can be and is 
facilitated as part of the core work of advisers and police, and such processes are in fact inherently 
capacity building and can be included as part of policing activities (i.e. they are not extra to CD but 
rather they are in and of themselves capacity building and policing); (4) informal engagement needs 
to be more systematic and the data it generates needs to be accounted for; (5) stakeholder 
engagement requires a multidirectional flow of information and it must be well informed to ensure 
input is useful. Such dialogical engagement and monitoring can effectively manage and inform the 
expectations of all parties.  
5.15 Conclusion 
This first stage of the data analysis confirms the relevance and value of systems thinking 
conceptualisations of capacity and CD to police CD operations. It also demonstrates that there is 
considerable room for improvement in conventional approaches to PMM&E to take account of the 
complex realities of a police CD operation, and I would not discount the practical benefits of 
attempting to implement such improvements. These improvements would likely include (but not be 
limited to): broader and deeper stakeholder inclusion in planning, implementation and M&E; 
improved coordination between units, agencies and external stakeholders; and a broader inclusion 
of the types and sources of data taken into account when monitoring and evaluating effectiveness. 
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However, based on the emerging themes revealed in this data analysis, it is difficult to see how such 
a shift within the logic of the current model could accommodate the essence of CD that was 
repeatedly reported in this fieldwork. In fact, throughout this data analysis it became increasingly 
clear that conventional approaches are limited by a fundamental conceptual inadequacy related to 
the linear frameworks they are inevitably built upon. This interview data revealed a strong 
resonance with systems based conceptualisations of capacity and CD, and suggested an 
ontological/epistemological inconsistency between how police practitioners intuitively understood 
the nature of capacity and its development and the tools conventional approaches offer to manage, 
plan, monitor, and evaluate it. For this reason it is necessary to return to the literature in the interests 
of exploring the possible conceptual value of systems based approaches, and in particular the 
related concepts of complexity theory, to determine whether such an understanding would provide a 
useful conceptual basis for informing an improved PMM&E framework for police CD. I take up 
this theme in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Complexity Theory – Stage Two Data Analysis 
 
For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat and wrong. 
H.L. Mencken 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Based on the emerging themes of the foregoing data analysis, it is clear that there is something 
fundamental about the essence of CD that simply cannot be captured by conventional PMM&E. 
Most obviously, those factors and processes that have proven to be central to CD, such as 
relationships, culture, and interdependent systems, only appear in conventional PMM&E as add-
ons. Furthermore, the type of knowledge that conventional PMM&E naturally privileges seems to 
miss the point. Respondents repeatedly described core aspects of the environment and change 
processes which resonated strongly with the systems approach and language used in the ECDPM’s 
conceptualisation of CD but appeared irreconcilable with the conventional methodologies for 
managing and monitoring such CD. This resonance with the ontology and epistemology of systems 
thinking prompted me to reconsider the literature in an effort to attempt to identify a conceptual 
model for thinking about CD that might replace the logic model and inform a framework for 
improve PMM&E in CD.  
Upon returning to the literature, I found that the language of systems thinking utilised early on by 
the ECDPM had shifted to that of complex adaptive systems (CAS), and that the work in this field 
was starting to draw heavily from the broader concepts emanating from complexity theory. 
Consequently, I began to consider the component concepts of complexity theory in the interests of 
exploring their relevance to CD and implications for PMM&E. I systematically reanalysed the data 
against these core components and found an overwhelming alignment with many of these concepts. 
As I explored this literature, the correlations with the interview data proved to be compelling and, 
consequently, complexity theory concepts came to frame my understanding of the data while the 
data came to simultaneously animate my understanding of complexity theory in a CD environment. 
I therefore present the literature and data here in a manner which best reflects this iterative process. 
I begin by providing a brief overview of complexity theory. I then break complexity theory down 
into its component concepts and systematically present the case study data against these concepts in 
an effort to explore the their usefulness in understanding the CD environment, as well as to get a 
sense of what the implications might be for practice and PMM&E. Whilst this review draws 
extensively on a range of literature – including complexity in social science generally, complexity 
and systems thinking in the organisational and management fields, development and evaluation 
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more broadly – it is centred on the work of the Overseas Development Institute and the ECDPM. 
Given the practical emphasis of this thesis, the consideration of practice orientated scholarship is 
given priority here. 
6.2 Overview: Systems Thinking and Complexity Theory 
The renewed interest in systems thinking approaches to CD and M&E is in direct response to many 
of the criticisms made of conventional approaches.435 Peter Morgan’s earlier work on CD and 
performance measurements recommends thinking in terms of ‘systems’.436 Systems thinking is 
based on the understanding that no individual, organisation, institution or other social structure can 
be understood in isolation because all are ‘bound by invisible fabrics of interrelated actions’.437 To 
attempt to understand such organisms in isolation is at best futile and at worst detrimental – 
therefore ‘you can only understand a system by contemplating the whole, not any individual part of 
the pattern’.438 Soft systems thinking is a particular branch of systems thinking which draws on an 
interpretivist perspective in its approach. It assumes that human beings attach meaning to 
everything, and we therefore cannot understand, manage, monitor, influence or change human 
activity or behaviours effectively without considering context and meaning.439 Any interpretation of 
the ‘reality’ of a situation or problem will be incomplete.440  
Such partial understandings are what inform our ‘purposeful action’– that is that people act to 
improve a perceived problem situation. Purposeful action then impacts upon the perceived world 
and brings about change, which again people will perceive and learn from, and so the cycle 
continues.441 Knowledge acquisition is therefore part of a cycle: experience creates knowledge > 
informs purposeful action > leads to change (transformation) > leads to new experience > 
generating new knowledge > and so on. It is possible to be part of a problematic cycle and this may 
be cause for intervention. Such intervention should utilise this knowledge acquisition and action 
cycle.442 A definitive problem-solution scenario will often be illusive – the best we can do is to 
develop a ‘rich picture’ of the problem situation through the systematic inclusion of interested 
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parties.443 The process is ‘intrinsically collaborative’ and the learning generated is deliberate and 
valuable.444  
This approach takes a definite step away from conventional approaches to program management in 
that it is less concerned with measuring tangible outputs and more concerned with the process and 
how this may bring about the ‘emergent property’. In this case the emergent property is the impact 
of CD itself – capacity. It is this focus on the whole, emergence and the importance of meaning 
informing purposeful action that has resulted in CD scholars considering the value of complexity 
theory concepts.445 
Complexity sciences, having originated in the natural sciences, have more recently come to inform 
what Urry has called the complexity ‘turn’ in the social sciences.446 Complexity sciences derive 
from a number of related concepts including one of the earliest and most famous manifestations 
known as ‘chaos theory’. 447 Like other aspects, it derives from observations made in the physical 
sciences, with popular understandings stemming from Edward Lorenz’s ‘butterfly effect’. This 
early work highlighted the nonlinear dynamics which can lead to unpredictable change. It is this 
thinking that challenges the reductionist model and clearly demonstrates the problems with the 
compartmentalisation of complex systems.448 The complexity sciences or theory is not a coherent 
and definitive formula of ontology, epistemology and corresponding methodology and method, but 
rather it has been described as a ‘collection of ideas and principles’ that draw on a range of 
influences from both the natural and the social sciences.449 In reviewing the literature, it is clear that 
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instead analysing patterns in a system’s behaviour. 
449 B. Ramalingam and H. Jones, “Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications for development and 
humanitarian efforts,” Working Paper 285, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008); and D. Henderick, 
146 
 
users of the theory are often drawing on very different understandings.450 Included in this difference 
is the centrality of the concepts themselves. In some cases a concept will be considered critical and 
in other descriptions and applications the same concept will be largely ignored. As noted by 
Hendrick, scholars also differ in their picking and choosing of concepts, with some advocating that 
the list of concepts can be drawn on as convenient.451 For this reason it is impossible to provide a 
definition which captures all these aspects and perspectives. Ramalingam and Jones of the Overseas 
Development Institute do, however, offer a helpful description:  
Complexity sciences look at the phenomena that arise in systems of interconnected and interdependent 
elements and multiple dimensions... Both positive and negative feedback processes take place … acting to 
dampen or amplify change; emergent properties result from the interactions of the elements, but these are 
not properties of the individual elements themselves.452 
The use of complexity theory in social sciences is not without its critics. It is commonly argued that 
complexity is only applicable to the physical or natural sciences.453 Others who acknowledge its 
resonance with social science have suggested that its descriptive similarities mean it is a useful 
metaphor; others suggest it is a useless coincidence.454 Less dismissive are those who suggest it 
may be valuable but so far its theoretical and methodological development in the social sciences is 
still too crude to assess its value.455 I recognise these criticisms from the outset, although I do not 
have the space here to address them, I acknowledge that I am inclined to agree with the latter of the 
criticisms. It is clear that conventional approaches to social science, as it relates to social change, 
CD and its M&E, is of limited use when it comes to the analysis and evaluation of complex social 
systems, and it is highly probable in my view that the solution lies in a complexity understanding of 
the world. How we operationalise these concepts remains a challenge, as is the extent to which 
these claims can be adequately substantiated. Nonetheless the following data analysis does explore 
the explanatory power of complexity theory concepts in the case of CD, demonstrating that its use 
in social science is at least helpful for redefining our conceptual understandings of change processes 
in a manner that strongly aligns with experienced realities.  
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6.3 The Complexity Frame of Reference:456 Approach to the Data Analysis  
My approach to the second stage of the data analysis began by identifying the component concepts 
of complexity theory outlined in the literature. In particular I drew on the work of Ramalingam and 
Jones of the Overseas Development Institute as a framework as it specifically applies the ‘science’ 
of complexity to development practices.457  In doing so I considered the following component 
concepts of complexity theory:  interconnectedness and interdependence (interrelatedness); 
coupling; emergence; localised interactions producing the global; complex adaptive agents; self-
organisation; co-evolution; feedback processes; sensitivity to initial conditions; non-linearity. I 
coded the interview data accordingly and sought to understand how these concepts might operate in 
the context of police CD. Through this process I was able to recognise which of these concepts 
intersected in practice, which were relevant to CD and PMM&E and which offered useful insights 
for practice. Throughout this analysis I was particularly interested in how complexity theory was 
able to make sense of the data and how this sense-making might be utilised to inform and improve 
PMM&E. As a consequence of this analysis I was able to group the relevant concepts into clusters 
as follows: 
1. Interconnectedness and interdependence (interrelatedness), and coupling  
2. Complex adaptive agents (CAAs) 
3. Emergence, localised interactions producing the global, and self-organisation  
4. Co-evolution 
5. Sensitivity to the initial conditions, feedback processes, and non-linearity 
6.4 Findings: Iterative Literature Review and Data Analysis 
This chapter proceeds by providing a brief overview of the component concepts in clusters as 
outlined above. Each component is then applied to the case study data and examples are drawn from 
the data in order to demonstrate the relevance of these concepts and to illustrate how such concepts 
operate in the context of police CD. The data is presented in this manner in the interests of best 
reflecting the iterative process of exploring the literature and reflecting on the data which has led to 
my final conclusions. 
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6.4.1 Interconnectedness and interdependence (interrelatedness), and coupling  
According to the complexity literature, all systems display varying degrees of interconnectedness. A 
system is complex when it is made up of multiple elements and processes which are constituted and 
influenced by other elements and processes within the system, as well as being shaped and 
influenced by the system (or the environment) itself. Miller and Page state that ‘complexity arises 
when dependencies among the elements become important’.458 In a social system, this refers to: the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of social and political actors; their relationships with each 
other, the physical and political/social environment, and the processes of social construction and 
exchange; historical conditions; and the shared and competing meanings of the actors in the 
system.459 The relationship between one element and another cannot be understood through 
isolating and analysing the two elements. Rather the relationship between the two elements is 
informed, shaped and influenced by their relationships with other aspects of the system. The 
elements and processes of the system are therefore mutually constituting. This is not to say all 
elements would cease to exist without reference to all other elements – only that each element 
which is connected to the same system is in some way dependent on the others for its 
composition/manifestation. Arthur explains, ‘as the elements react, the aggregate changes; as the 
aggregate changes, elements react anew’.460 Interconnectedness refers not only to the connections 
between elements of a system, but also interconnectedness occurs between systems, as well as 
levels of systems and subsystems. This interconnectedness ‘leads to interdependence’ and ‘gives 
rise to complex behaviour’.461 Interconnectivity results in the emergence of complexity and non-
linear relationships.462   
Such interconnectedness/relatedness/dependence was repeatedly described by both PPF and RSIPF 
in relation to a vast array of issues to do with CD and policing. In fact I found interconnectedness to 
be unequivocally the most important and prevailing factor in the CD environment. The manner in 
which the political and economic conditions, the social and cultural order and processes, and the 
environmental/geographical conditions intersected to define, bound and mutually constitute the law 
and order (and therefore policing/CD) sphere was absolute. This concept proved to be a central 
factor in the majority of examples provided regarding both the enabling and disabling forces at play 
in most aspects of CD. Whilst it is impossible to fully account for this concept, the following 
illustrative example provides some insight into what this means in practice: 
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A senior RSIPF officer explained the impetus for the accommodation project and the general 
overreliance on PPF assets for transportation and logistical support. With the use of considerable PPF 
resources, financing and expertise the RSIPF was in the middle of an accommodation project which was 
designed to provide housing for RSIPF officers in the interests of accommodating officers who were 
living away from their ordinary place of residence. This was encouraged as it was felt the RSIPF must 
not, wherever possible, police their own communities as wantok influences were seen to compromise their 
impartiality. According to this RSIPF account, prior to the tensions the RSIPF were seen as being largely 
professional and local people generally trusted and supported them. When officers moved around the 
islands and attended to remote communities the people made provisions for them… ‘When they hear 
police are coming they have food and accommodation ready’. This community support ensured the RSIPF 
were far more mobile than is currently the case, and this localised activity at the community level 
provided an emergent country-wide system that essentially resulted in a widespread policing presence 
with police travelling freely and with assistance – relying on localised manifestations of goodwill and 
support. The expense of travel, accommodation and provisions is a new cost being incurred partly due to 
the tensions and partly due to a new form of ethical standards and the ramping up of impartiality. The 
involvement of RSIPF officers in the tensions and the subsequent failure to successfully prosecute these 
members has eroded this trust and dismantled the enabling environment for a widespread policing 
presence. The community largely do not understand the legalities of evidence and the prosecution process 
– rather they see a police force that protects its corrupt elements and is therefore not worthy of their 
support.463  
The degree of interconnectedness can vary and therefore so too does the depth of interrelatedness. 
This will have an effect on how influential an individual change within the system might be. The 
extent to which systems, elements and actors are interdependent is referred to as coupling.464 
Loosely coupled systems tend to be less responsive or susceptible to changes induced by other 
elements, actors systems or subsystems. In this way there is a greater likelihood of maintaining a 
localised equilibrium despite changes in the system. Whilst this makes it more difficult to effect 
change throughout the wider system, loosely coupled systems are generally more resilient and 
independent.465  
The interviews demonstrated the relevance of this concept in that CD particularly struggled to gain 
traction in instances of loosely coupled systems and subsystems. That said, the approach to CD was 
occasionally innovative in this respect. The degree to which formal and informal law and justice 
systems are coupled in Solomon Islands varies enormously, as does the degree to which there are 
separate systems and different points of convergence. In the more remote areas of Solomon Islands, 
the formal RoL system is often only very loosely coupled with local practices of social order. This 
is not to say that all such areas are lawless, but rather the laws are informal, based on traditional or 
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customary understandings, social norms, mixed with church teachings with various sources of 
authority. Different law and order actors enjoy different levels and manifestations of legitimacy, 
and such legitimacy is often highly contingent on the processes of justice employed. The extent to 
which such remote communities would recognise the laws and legal processes of the state differ 
markedly. Sometimes there is a direct correlation between the logistical accessibility of these 
locations and the extent to which they actively recognised the laws of the state. In other cases such 
laws may well be actively recognised regardless of the state’s likely inability to enforce them.  
The community officer project is an aspect of CD explicitly tightening the degree to which the 
formal and informal systems are coupled. The purpose of the community officer is to be the link 
between formal and informal systems and practices, in the interests of ensuring the formal system 
responds where necessary and is kept abreast of informal processes and outcomes on the ground. 
One of the primary purposes of this project is to ensure there is an increased influence of the formal 
system on the informal system, at the same time as recognising the capabilities within, and 
importance of, the informal system. Importantly, the program was deliberately attempting to 
achieve an optimal degree of coupling in that those developing it were explicitly conscious not to 
undermine the benefit of loose coupling in terms of local level independence and resilience. Senior 
RSIPF spoke of being very careful to have proper dialogue with the community regarding the 
specific details of the role of the community officer. Those responsible for developing the 
community officer project noted that they wanted to work with local people to develop standard 
operating procedures and criteria for the basis of community officer involvement and intervention – 
working out how the formal and informal systems would meet, where they converge, and when they 
needed to remain separate. This was seen to be critical so as not to undermine the integrity, 
legitimacy and capabilities of the informal structures/systems.466  
6.4.2 Complex adaptive agents (CAAs) 
‘Certain kinds of systems are made up of individual agents acting for their own purposes, and with their 
own view of the situation. A special class of complex systems is made up of adaptive agents [complex 
adaptive systems],467 which react to the system and to each other, and which may make decisions and 
develop strategies to influence other agents or the overall system’.468  
All adaptive agents in some way sense the environment and broader system, and they respond.469 In 
the case of complex social systems these agents include people (actors) – intelligent agents that are 
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capable of receiving and analysing information about the system and acting accordingly. Agents in 
the system are also a product of the system - and their inherent knowledge in which they draw upon 
to analyse and respond to the system, is the emergent property of their historical experience and 
learning of that system. Although thought processes and ways of knowing will differ between 
agents, they will have their own ‘internal information processing and decision-making capacities’, 
enabling them to engage in ongoing situational analysis, assessing the state of the system, 
considering how they will affect the system in their actions, and comparing this with their desired 
end-state.470 Or, as Miller and Page put it, social agents are capable ‘of change via thoughtful, but 
not necessarily brilliant deliberations about the worlds they inhabit. Social agents must continually 
make choices, either by direct cognition or a reliance on stored (but not immutable) heuristics, 
about their actions’.471 
As Arthur points out, ‘this adds a layer of complication … not experienced in the natural 
sciences’.472 Social agents predict and react to the behaviours of other agents,473 they also anticipate 
future states ‘based on internalised models of change’ (which may be incomplete and/or 
incorrect).474 This self-awareness together with an awareness of surroundings and possibilities has 
been described as reflexive agency.475 The notion that intelligent adaptive actors possess the ability 
to ‘perceive the system around them and act on these perceptions’, and that this ‘view of the world 
dynamically influences, and is influenced by, events and changes within the system’, has strong 
resonance with the soft systems conceptions of knowledge and purposeful action cycles.476 The 
process of receiving information and analysing it will necessarily be impacted by the agent’s 
framework. A framework includes beliefs as well as knowledge construction processes. These are a 
consequence of the agent’s socialising influences including: societal culture, history, institutional 
culture, national culture, religion, gendered constructs, and so on. The way an agent responds to the 
system and its other agents will invariably be biased by the agent’s lens.477  
Many of the advisers appeared to be acutely aware of this and conscious of how they were being 
received. One adviser made the point that the daily experiences of RSIPF members impacted upon 
how they viewed a situation: 
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I can’t speak for them, but I think they see us obviously as a foreign agency and something totally 
different. And they get some of our concepts but not all of them. And sometimes we take that for granted. 
We talk from our experience and what we know to be the way things are. But sometimes we forget where 
they’re coming from and what they’ve been through and where they live, and all that sort of stuff – which 
does make a big difference to how they work.478 
Many of the PPF interviewed acknowledge that they often did not understand the decision-making 
logic of their counterparts. Trusting local knowledge, which often contradicted the adviser’s reading 
of the situation as well as their training, was at times a big leap of faith. Nonetheless, most advisers 
recognised that the PPF would suffer from considerable blind spots without the local knowledge 
and cultural knowledge of their counterparts. As this adviser acknowledged, he himself did not 
understand many of the cultural subtleties, but he did not need to because his counterpart did:  
The sergeant I was working with, he knows what areas people are from. He knows, ‘that’s their people – 
he’s best to go’. And even though it might be a constable (he’s a staff sergeant), [he’ll say] ‘… send the 
constable in because he knows the people, he can speak their dialect, or he knows who to speak to, and 
things like that – so he’s best to deal with it’. Seeing that obviously makes me very aware how important 
it is and how useful it is. It’s a useful policing tool. To get the job done – to resolve issues and to move 
things forward – rather than just saying ‘we’re the police – this is the line in the sand’. To negotiate and 
things like that, it’s always a good thing. 
For the most part, this understanding of the importance of CAAs is not made explicit and nor is it 
incorporated into formal CD processes. Where there are exceptions to this the differences are 
striking. The reconciliation and reunification program is one such example. The project design and 
implementation explicitly recognised the different perspectives of its many stakeholders and was 
careful to include these perspectives. CAAs from every interrelated system and subsystem were 
included at each stage of the project, and the project adapted and responded to the information 
being received. The community officer project approach too was to be wholly responsive to a 
dialogue process with CAAs at all levels of the different systems. The approach was purposefully 
designed to generate a new emergent capacity and order based on the inclusion of CAAs. This 
approach to planning and stakeholder inclusion is also being pursued in other areas of community 
policing, where CD is including a wide range of local community stakeholders as well as other 
agencies (domestic and Australian) and local and international NGOs.479  
Such approaches are not without their challenges – as the literature clearly recognises that not all 
agents have the same capacities. Whilst these differences can be subtle and manifest in any number 
of ways, complexity theory generally uses the concept of weak and strong agents to explain these 
                                                 
478 P2. 
479 P8. 
153 
 
differences.480 Weak agents are generally understood to be reactive and to lack an explicit 
understanding of the forces at play. Strong agents, on the other hand, typically possess a greater 
capacity to identify elements and forces within the system which allows them to better negotiate 
outcomes and influence others, as well as influence the system itself.481 I would argue that weak 
and strong agents can be seen as having varying degrees of agency, as their autonomy is bounded in 
different ways and their activity and behaviour is informed by a type of ‘bounded rationality’.482 In 
short, ‘the common knowledge assumption’ is flawed – agents have differing levels of agency 
depending on their understanding of the system(s) at play.483  
This understanding appears to be extremely relevant to the case study. In that whilst RSIPF 
members were in many ways informed and sometimes limited by their cultural frame(s) of 
reference (as are we all), most of the members interviewed explicitly explained how they actively 
managed and negotiated the cultural environment in a manner which demonstrated enormous 
agency and sophistication. In particular, members from the sexual violence and family violence unit 
spoke at length about how they navigate through culturally sensitive terrain on a daily basis. Both 
had considerable strategies for negotiating this space, as well as wantok obligations, which 
appeared to be highly contingent and fluid. Certainly it would be impossible for interveners to 
acquire such an understanding for influencing sustainable cultural change without local people such 
as these being central to the process.  
6.4.3 Emergence, localised interactions producing the global, and self-organisation  
Emergence ‘describes how the behaviour of systems emerges, often unpredictably, from the 
interaction of the parts’.484 The commonly used phrase ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’ 
goes some way to illuminating the concept of emergence. However, Urry argues that ‘it is not that 
the sum is greater than the size of its parts – but that there are systems effects that are different from 
their parts’.485 Simply put, emergence describes the process of producing that emergent property 
through the interaction of component parts (elements). Whilst such characteristics emerge from the 
‘micro-dynamics of the phenomenon in question’, they are not reducible to such.486 Further 
elaborated on by DeWolf and Holvoet: ‘emergence refer[s] to two important characteristics: a 
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global behaviour that arises from the interactions of the local parts; and that global behaviour 
cannot be traced back to the individual parts’.487 
It is this emergent property which differentiates a complex system from a complicated system. It is 
also a crucial factor in the unpredictability of a system. The interaction of elements within the 
system produce any number of emergent properties, such properties influence elements and produce 
emergent properties in an ongoing process of dynamic interaction. It is these unknowns, influencing 
the emergence of other unknowns, which make prediction with certainty extremely unlikely, if not 
impossible. That said, depending on the complexity of the system and the context, I would argue 
that a well-informed intervention (that being one gathering data from multiple local sources) can 
still make useful approximations, but it must expect to be inaccurate to varying degrees. 
The concept of emergence challenges the fundamental assumptions of state-building, as it means 
that social and political ordering is not the result of careful planning and management from the top, 
but rather the generation of an emergent order through the multi-directional interaction of elements 
and processes. As Marion argues, ‘a [complex] system emerges from the interactions of individual 
units … [that] are driven by local rules … and are not globally coordinated’.488 By this rationale 
global order, whilst no doubt heavily influenced by top down pressures, is essentially the emergent 
property of local interactions. As Urry explains, drawing on the work of Resnick, ‘market 
economies, immune systems – in all these systems, patterns are determined … by local interactions 
among decentralised components’.489 That being the case, we need to find new tools to explore 
things from the ‘ground up’.490  
There appeared to be an implicit understanding by all RSIPF interviewed and several PPF that 
capacity was indeed emergent and that there was a need to create the enabling conditions, to 
develop and harness relationships, and to guide things in the right direction wherever it was possible 
to have an influence. Emergence also appeared to be intuitively understood at a deeper level by 
many of the RSIPF interviewed. One such example of creating the enabling conditions for 
emergence was explicitly being pursued by senior PPF and RSIPF through the community officer 
project. The following summary provides an overview of the dialogue between a member of the 
RSIPF executive and myself regarding the gaps in the collective capacity of the formal and informal 
systems, and the need to trust the process of emergence: 
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Interviewer: In Malu’u there have been instances where the community have in fact gone to the police 
and reported a matter they felt was beyond their control… according to the local police they pursue such 
matters, but they lay charges, perpetrators are given automatic bail or left out on open bail and await a 
hearing… the local court never sits, the offender is therefore never dealt with by the legal system and the 
community think the police haven’t done anything… what do you do in such circumstances… how can 
this approach [the community officer project] really overcome this? 
The RSIPF member responded by acknowledging that such capacity shortfalls would continue to 
undermine the work of police and compromise the safety of the community. But he reinforced the 
need to talk, the need for inclusion and to ensure that the community at least understands how these 
situations come about. 
Respondent: It’s a challenge… but I think the more we interact with the community, the more we speak 
with them… we’ll come up with something … that both community and the RSIPF are happy to go with … 
without actually breaking the law… we need to find a mid-point that all of us are willing to contribute to 
…it’s about what we will bring to the table and what they can bring to the table… how much they can 
participate and how much we can participate…. 
He went on to explain how it is different from the sum of its parts – that if parties come together 
without the collective resources to deal with a situation that is not the end of it… the process of 
communication itself changes the nature of the problem and moves the dynamics. This is not an 
assessment that can be made separately from the interaction.491  
An important concept which helps to make sense of these notions of emergence and the behaviour 
of adaptive agents and their impact on the system is the concept of self-organisation. Self-
organisation ‘describes how the adaptive strategies of individual agents in particular settings gives 
rise to a whole range of emergent phenomena’.492 The process of self-organisation results in the 
emergence of patterns of behaviour, collectively comprising the system and subsystems, through the 
interconnectedness and interactions between adaptive agents. Most work on self-organisation and 
emergence combines these concepts or sees them as working together. This point of view treats 
self-organisation as causing emergence.493 This is very important from the point of view of an 
intervener as it suggests that top-down reforms and impositions of change will not succeed as 
planned. Rather, CD will be just one of many factors feeding into the system. Adaptive agents will 
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perceive and absorb the CD according to their own understanding of the system and their 
interpretation of the CD, and they will act or respond in their self-organisation.494 
Studies on how self-organisation works in complex social systems have revealed that direct orders 
from the top, calls for mobilisation by respected or influential leaders, dramatic system changing 
events and the like do not produce straight forward cause-and-effect behavioural changes in 
adaptive agents as the structures are not derived from external control.495 Rather, these strongly 
influencing factors feed into a complex social system resulting in adaptive agents interpreting this 
information and absorbing it into self-organising processes.  
Again this concept was pervasive throughout the case study data. PPF officers regularly made the 
point that they were there to provide expert advice but that local officers were free to adopt 
introduced practices as they saw fit. Often this meant that things that were introduced through CD 
were creatively sidestepped or incorporated in ways that PPF could not have anticipated. 
Nonetheless, advisers often viewed this self-organisation as a positive development and felt that any 
adaptation or reinventing (or even rejection in some cases) of introduced systems and practices 
would only improve the relevance and sustainability of CD. Interestingly, several advisers were 
keen to resist the pressure to intervene in these self-organising processes to achieve predetermined 
outcomes as they felt attempting to exercise such a level of control was counterproductive.  
Many of the CD interventions were deliberately attempting to achieve broader social and cultural 
change and were therefore explicitly dealing with interconnected and interdependent systems and 
subsystems. More implicitly, they were also clearly working with emergence based on localised 
interactions and self-organisation. For example, one RSIPF respondent explained how the work of 
the Family Violence Unit was regularly in conflict with social and cultural norms and practices. The 
unit reportedly spent a great deal of time in the community conducting information sessions – 
explaining what domestic violence is and that it is now against the law. The respondent explained 
how people bring this new information into their existing understandings of what is right and 
normal and that over time this normal will change and culture and practices will adjust. He also 
made the point that despite the obvious clash with culture, community leaders (including chiefs and 
the churches) were always very supportive. He notes ideally the RSIPF would enforce domestic 
violence laws but for a number of complex reasons they cannot. The two biggest reasons are a lack 
of resources and a lack of knowledge. The respondent explained how they instead work towards it 
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within their current capacity constraints. They acknowledge that all communities are different and 
they try to encourage them to come up with sustainable community-based solutions. In the long-
term he would envisage a country which is adhering to domestic violence laws but is doing so from 
the ground-up. Social, cultural and community adjustments and arrangements should be made at the 
micro-level, within the context – but informed by the laws.  
6.4.4 Co-evolution 
When adaptable autonomous agents or organisms interact intimately in an environment, such as in 
predator-prey and parasite-host relationships, they influence each other’s evolution – this effect is called 
co-evolution.496 
The complexity theory literature regularly refers to the mutually constituting nature of elements 
within a system. This notion is also known as mutualism and is partly understood as co-evolution. 
In simple terms this means that the manifestation of agents and their behaviour within the system 
will be influenced by, and at least partially dependent on, the evolution of other agents and elements 
within the system.497 In this way ‘adaptive agents are seen to have porous boundaries’.498 That is, 
they are not separate from the system, but rather they are of the system and they evolve in relation 
to other elements of the system. In social systems, co-evolution is never equal. Whilst all agents 
evolve in relation to other agents or properties, there is no standard effect as the manifestation of the 
agent (and its properties) is unique and multifaceted and therefore so too will be the response/co-
evolution. Co-evolution in social systems relates to power and adaptation. Those in a position of 
less power co-evolve with their more powerful counterparts. This may be for survival or it may be 
to gain something. In a donor/recipient relationship, co-evolution can manifest in many different 
ways, some of which can be positive. However, too often co-evolution in this relationship creates 
dependency. Another problematic example of co-evolution in this type of relationship is when those 
who wish to benefit from aid adapt to mimic the behaviours of interveners.  
Numerous examples of this co-evolution, dependence and mimicking of PPF behaviours were 
apparent throughout the responses provided by both RSIPF and PPF. Systems and practices were 
clearly being implemented through CD that fundamentally changed the manner in which the RSIPF 
conducted their daily business in ways that made them wholly dependent on PPF assets, resources 
and expertise. Several units were known to have ‘professionalised’ in a manner which had left them 
reliant on advisers actually doing the work and in these cases it was difficult to see how the RSIPF 
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could take back control of systems that had changed in ways they were unable to understand. 
Several PPF advisers were actively avoiding this ‘trap’. One adviser noted that his counterpart 
asked for advice when he did not need to (implying that the intervention had caused him to question 
himself and eroded his confidence). For this reason the adviser notes that he avoids upheavals that 
would undermine his counterpart: 
I’ve said to him ‘I’m not introducing anything new’. I can go back to our computers and drag off standing 
orders or policy or whatever you like, straight out of the AFP book of how to do things… but I don’t do 
it… like I said before you’ve got to build on what they’ve got!499 
One senior RSIPF officer explained how practices introduced by the PPF had impacted upon 
community expectations and how he saw community expectations developing and changing in line 
with the resources and capabilities the PPF had introduced to the country. In this way dependency 
was clearly co-evolving with CD in unsustainable ways: 
…what I mean is [name removed] here’s a car for you and a boat but when you look at it, yes, I love 
those things but in terms of consistency or sustainability it is still a challenge today… and I think when 
RAMSI came in the mission built RSIPF to a standard that meant they were moving too fast… the way I 
see it at the moment when we request for a [particular] spare part for a vehicle … it takes months… I 
know the expectations for the community that when there is a crime committed they want a result 
[straight away – because that’s what they are now becoming used to] but that’s something where I see 
hem a challenge… another solution for the problem of accessing remote areas is the building of new 
housing for police in the provinces – this is a good outcome but it will bring more dependence as RSIPF 
will not be able to maintain them… RAMSI have brought a lot of good things but a lot of them are 
unsustainable.500 
The officer went on to explain that there is a growing community expectation that the RSIPF will be 
able to attend to complaints and reports, because the PPF have the boats and the cars to get there 
and the community views this as ‘how a professional police force works’. However, when the PPF 
leave these assets will go, and the RSIPF will return to problems with transport and being highly 
dependent on the weather to get to outer islands.  
6.4.5 Sensitivity to the initial conditions, feedback processes, and non-linearity 
The importance of the initial conditions ‘refers to situations where small changes in the initial 
system configuration may lead to large, non-linear effects’.501 The initial conditions are 
simply the state of the system at any given time in its evolution. It will generally coincide 
with a purposeful assessment of the system. It is invariably an arbitrary point in time which 
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may be considered the starting point in the interests of utility. The notion of sensitivity to the 
initial conditions is crucial as it emphasises the critical importance of paying attention to the 
idiosyncratic composition of every complex system at any moment. It is an explicit 
acknowledgment of the potentially significant impact seemingly trivial and often invisible 
aspects of system can have on the behaviour of the system.502 As such, any input will be 
absorbed into the system, and outcomes will manifest according to the unique state of the 
system or the initial condition. Importantly the initial condition is the product of all that has 
gone before. Its specific manifestation is therefore highly contingent on its historical context. 
In line with Lorenz’s observations regarding the massive impact of the most minor 
irregularities, the subtlest of differences between one system and another at the point of 
intervention (the initial condition) can have widespread effects throughout the system and 
result in very different outcomes. Accordingly, initial misdiagnosis which informs predictions 
will magnify in their inaccuracies over space and time.503   
Both PPF and RSIPF respondents made strong cases for improving the assessment of, and 
sensitivity to, the initial conditions. One senior RSIPF officer in particular explained how 
misdiagnosis of the environment, culture and existing organisational capacities, rules and 
procedures within the RSIPF had led to CD mistakes which had indeed magnified over time. One 
example of this was provided in the stage one analysis, whereby the PPF’s initial intervention had 
ignored existing practices and the creation of a parallel police force had in many ways become 
entrenched with widespread ramifications that were not easily undone.504 Many advisers noted that 
there was no such thing as ‘best practice’ and that any CD intervention must start with the context. I 
paraphrase here an overview of this problem provided by a PPF adviser: 
‘Best practice’ is a problematic concept in this space. Advisers come from different jurisdictional 
backgrounds and enter the capacity development environment in Solomon Islands determined to impose 
their version of ‘best practice’. This erodes the existent capacity and undermines what was there before 
as well as what has been built up by previous advisers. Police from various states in Australian as well as 
New Zealand want to do things their way and he notes that his response to this tendency is always ‘let’s 
let the Solomon Islanders do it their way and we’ll adapt to them. That might be a better way to go… 
because they’re the ones who have been here the longest’. He says this is critical for three major reasons: 
(1) things have developed in Solomon Islands the way they have for a reason and outsiders cannot really 
know what that reason is and Solomon Islanders cannot always explain why things are the way they are 
because they just are – through historical and cultural circumstance. If you attempt to make sweeping 
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changes without fully understanding the context there will be spin off implications we cannot see or 
understand. So we should start with the assumption that we should build upon what is already there and 
makes sense; (2) sustainability is crucial here – if you attempt to make changes that don’t fit in the 
context they will not be sustainable anyway; (3) efficiency – it just makes sense to work with what works 
rather than unravel it and try to start again.505 
This critical understanding of the importance of the context or sensitivity to the initial conditions 
was confirmed at the highest level of PPF program management and command. With one senior 
PPF member noting that this is well understood at the top and ‘the boss is very vocal about the fact 
that we should not be imposing what we do … it’s about the Solomon Islands context and their 
country’.506 
As the above account recognises, CD can often result in ‘spin off implications’ that are difficult for 
outsiders to understand. This account relates to the concept of feedback. The impact of agent 
activity within the system is generally very difficult to isolate because agent activity (as with other 
activity in the system) results in feedback. Feedback can be positive or negative. It is basically the 
influence that moves through the system as a consequence of activity. Such activity may produce 
positive feedback which essentially sets in motion a change process that continues in the trajectory 
of the initial activity, it may amplify the change process through the emergence of ‘reinforcing 
pressures’.507 In the case of negative feedback the activity may result in a response in the system 
which is counteracting. Negative feedback may only balance the system back or close to its initial 
state. It can, however, push the system in another direction. Feedback can be masked or 
disregarded. If feedback signals are not detected or do not obviously correlate with the activity this 
can be referred to as masked feedback. For example, evaluations and program management often 
miss the negative feedback which takes place outside the official spheres of intervention.  
Feedback in the system is multidirectional as it comes from a myriad of sources simultaneously. 
Feedback is therefore a process of continuous dynamic interaction. As implied above, wholly 
positive feedback is not necessarily optimal. If legitimate problems exist in following a particular 
path, but negative feedback is weak or non-existent, there is the possibility of ‘runaway’ positive 
feedback whereby the system gains momentum in one direction, ‘leading to accelerated changes 
and potentially a radically different configuration of the system’.508 Similarly, if positive feedback 
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processes create a magnifying effect it can lock the system into a self-perpetuating pattern. This is 
an analogous pattern to what has been referred to as path dependence.509  
Evidence of feedback in the system was difficult to isolate in the data analysis. Feedback by its 
nature is implicit in many of the foregoing examples, as well those explored in the first stage of data 
analysis. However, this concept is very much of the system and as such is inherently related to other 
aspects. Nonetheless, there were continuous examples of feedback playing out in unintended ways. 
One such example had been the consequence of the ‘high visibility’ policy of the RSIPF that had 
created feedback throughout the organisation in terms of pressure being placed on operational units 
to be seen to be policing. It seems there was a pattern emerging in the special operations group 
whereby their success as a unit meant the executive wanted to use them a lot more than their 
mandate would normally require. This had created some negative feedback for several reasons. One 
is that the RSIPF officers that had worked hard to get into this unit had done so because they 
aspired to be in an elite team. The incentive for joining this unit was the prestige attached to it and 
the opportunity to escape the more mundane aspects of General Duties and to work primarily in 
high risk situations such as ‘riots, a barricaded person situation or a high-risk warrant arrest’.510 
There was reportedly a desire at the executive level to use this unit more often because of their 
professionalism. This is largely due to their effectiveness, but it also demonstrated police 
competency to the public, which was attractive to the executive. There were several problematic 
feedback loops occurring as a result. The incentives to be in the unit, as well as the rewards for 
getting there, were being eroded and their specialisation diluted. Without the intense focus on 
specialist operations, the unit was getting ‘bogged down’ in General Duties type roles and were 
unable to harness and hone their capabilities.  
What we’re finding at the moment, is because of the professionalism, the commitment and probably more 
likely reliability of my unit, we’re being used to complement matters that would otherwise be afforded to 
General Duties and Traffic. So, one of the things we’re finding is the success of our unit and the 
performance outcomes that we’re able to actually achieve has been welcomed by the executive and it 
creates a lot more work. So the irony of that is you’re looking at placing more pressure, more work, on a 
unit that is a specifically tasked unit.511 
Many of the examples provided regarding positive and negative feedback were often predictable or 
identifiable given sufficiently informed analysis. Not all aspects of the system will lend themselves 
to being knowable in this way. The concept of non-linearity encapsulates the complex interaction of 
the above factors. The non-linear nature of complex systems means that impacts within a system 
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based on any particular input are disproportional and unpredictable. Therefore, complexity 
approaches to social science argue that social and human systems cannot be understood in terms of 
linear relationships. Given the multiple and mutual interdependence of any number of elements, 
dimensions and processes within a complex system, causal relationships cannot be identified in a 
linear cause-and-effect pattern. The concept of non-linearity in complex systems shares its emphasis 
with systems thinking in that it refers to the need to study the system as a whole. Unlike linearity, 
which ‘describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are 
proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects’, nonlinear patterns of a whole cannot 
be neatly ‘broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately’.512 Importantly, inputs into 
a complex system are not proportional to system outputs or outcomes.513 
In unpacking these complexity concepts and considering their resonance with the case study data, it 
is arguable that complexity theory is far better placed to make sense of this CD environment and 
change processes than conventional approaches to PMM&E. It is important then to get a better 
sense of how complexity theory might inform improvements to CD, what the implications are for 
practice, and in particular how it can be utilised/operationalised to provide a conceptual foundation 
and a framework for PMM&E that is more able to account for, manage, monitor and respond to the 
complex realities of a police CD operation. 
6.5 Applying Systems Thinking and Complexity  
The main themes and applications which have so far come from leading development institutes, 
thinkers and innovative development providers have all had a tendency to draw on the 
constructionist/critical approaches to complexity. The Overseas Development Institute, Panos and 
World Vision, for example, have all emphasised the importance of local knowledge, participation, 
and the centrality of understanding the social context and social construction in applying 
complexity theory. The Overseas Development Institute’s Harry Jones recently presented a paper to 
a World Vision conference highlighting the critical importance of linking knowledges and decision-
making. Some of these points include a need to be ‘mindful of where, when and how the knowledge 
we need emerges’.514 He recommends an adaptive management approach in the interests of 
responding to new knowledge when it comes to light, and to gather this information through 
inclusive dialogue in the program management process. In getting the scale right, he suggests 
facilitating multi-level discussions and learning – stimulating emergence and using methods which 
are capable of integrating multiple knowledges.  
                                                 
512 Ramalingam and Jones, “Exploring the science of complexity.” 
513 Holbrook, “Adventures in Complexity.” 
514 H. Jones, “Tackling Complex Problems: Linking Knowledge and Decision-Making,” (paper presented at the 
Governance Ecosystems Livelihoods (GEL) World Vision CAS Conference, Tanzania, 2010). 
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There is a general consensus in this emerging field of complexity in development program 
management that there is a need to take a highly flexible and adaptive/iterative approach to 
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating social change programs. There is also a 
tendency to emphasise process orientation, continuous learning and valuing multiple ways of 
knowing, importantly including local and indigenous ways of knowing.515 Participatory 
deliberation, dialogue, narrative and conversation all come up regularly in this thinking as methods 
for improving PMM&E within a complexity frame of reference.516 The ECDPM also advocates a 
reflexive approach to CD.517 Given what is planned will not necessarily occur, PMM&E in CD 
should avoid rigid frameworks which are incapable of responding to what emerges.518 The ECDPM 
asserts that CAS understandings ‘challenge assumptions about the need for planning, detailed 
design and control’.519 Consequently, M&E becomes all the more important. In summary, the 
ECDPM suggests that complexity does have implications for CD practice. It helps to emphasise the 
importance of local ownership and the need to treat CD as a ‘process of experimentation and 
learning’.520 It recommends a more ‘evolutionary approach to design … leaving space for 
adaptation’.521 Crucially it reinforces the need to include local stakeholders in design processes and 
to ensure a greater concern with context – particularly political, social and cultural norms and 
practices.  
As is also noted by the ECDPM, capacity itself is an emergent property and therefore impossible to 
fully plan for. The accountability which is central to any M&E is also arguably an emergent 
property. Given the myriad of actors sharing responsibility for service delivery or problems in the 
public space, and the potentially huge range of interested parties (beneficiaries, communities, and 
other interested agencies), according to Ramalingam and Jones, ‘accountability can be seen as an 
emergent property, and as more than a collection of rules and procedures’.522 In fact, in most cases 
the collection of rules and procedures present in any system would be conflicting and elements 
within the system will negotiate and adjust. It is the manner in which accountability demands and 
                                                 
515 Emphasis on process orientation is supported by Arthur (1999). 
516 See for example: C. Mowels, “Successful or not? Evidence, emergence, and development management,” 
Development in Practice, 20 no. 7, (2010) 757-770; C. Miskelly, A. Hoban and R. Vincent, How can complexity theory 
contribute to more effective development and aid evaluation? (London: Panos, 2009); M. Booy, Complex Adaptive 
Systems: New Strategies for Transformational Development – Embracing complexity to enhance resilience. Conference 
Proceeding Report. (Mississauga: World Vision [Governance, Ecosystems, Livelihoods], 2010). 
517 It is worth noting the ECDPM’s research is funded by AusAID, the African Capacity Building Foundation, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, DFID, the Directorate General for Development Cooperation 
Netherlands, the Swedish International Development Agency, UNDP, and others.  
518 A. Fowler, “Complexity thinking and social development: Connecting the dots,” The Broker. Issue 7 (2008) 
519 T. Land, V. Hauck and H. Baser, “Capacity Development: Between Planned Interventions and Emergent Processes; 
Implications for Development Cooperation,” Policy Management Brief No. 22 (Maastricht: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, 2009). 
520 Ibid. 
521 Ibid. 
522 Ramalingam and Jones, “Exploring the science of complexity.” 
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responses manifest through these complex relationships which results in the emergent property – 
accountability. Similar observations have been made of dialogical approaches to evaluation, as 
Greene observes, ‘in many important respects, genuine dialogue is meaningful evaluation’ – that is 
to say that the accountability which emerges from this process is what makes evaluation 
meaningful.523 
Such approaches to program management and M&E do expose some significant capacity deficits 
amongst CD practitioners and a need to improve the facilitation skills of practitioners is regularly 
reported. It is acknowledged that utilising a complexity framework appears cumbersome, time 
consuming, messy, expensive and without guarantees. To varying degrees this is all true. However, 
it is important that when comparing complexity informed approaches to conventional approaches in 
this respect, we are mindful that the guarantees provided by conventional approaches are in fact 
fanciful and that the cost of failure continues to mount. In cases where interventions are attempting 
to achieve change in complex social systems, linear models have proven to be worse than useless, 
undermining efforts for change, damaging relations and costing enormous amounts of money in 
their misallocation of funding through misdiagnosis.  
Paul Cilliers has made perhaps the most obvious and most important observation about complex 
systems and how we may be able to claim to ‘manage’ them. Urry summarises Cilliers’ point and 
notes, if something is complex, then our ‘knowledge of it will always be limited. We cannot make 
complete and absolute or final claims about complex systems… a responsible approach to 
complexity involves modest and contingent but non-relativist claims.524 
Importantly, Cilliers uses the term ‘modest’ to ‘describe reflective positions that are careful about 
the reach of the claims being made and of the constraints that make these claims possible’.525 It 
would seem that such humility in interventions and PMM&E would be of enormous value in 
learning how to improve our approaches to CD.  
6.6 Conclusion: Complexity Implications for Program Management and M&E  
In a complex social system, the multiple elements and processes which ultimately constitute each 
other, the environment and the system itself mean external diagnoses will always be too shallow to 
accurately account for the factors at play. Consequently, local knowledge of the interrelatedness of 
the system is invaluable in situational analyses. The interconnectedness and interdependence of 
aspects of a complex system mean no individual component can be understood (or changed) in 
                                                 
523 J. C. Greene, “Dialogue in Evaluation: a relational perspective”, Evaluation, (London: Safe Publications, 2001) 7 
no.2, 184.. 
524 Urry, “The Complexity Turn, ” 12 
525 Cilliers, “Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism,” 256. 
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isolation. In practical terms, this means that interventions which rely on the compartmentalisation of 
the organisation, and on the treatment of isolated units, will fail. So too will interventions that treat 
the organisation as separate from society.  
There are many things to learn from the interconnected nature of complex systems for PMM&E of 
interventions. The importance of being aware of linkages means that situational analyses must be 
based on local knowledge regarding the interconnected factors at play in any reform effort. CD 
must treat the organisation as an interconnected organism both internally and externally (rather than 
a machine that breaks into parts). Intervention activities need to account for and manage the impact 
on other aspects of the organisation as well as the social impacts. 
The extent of interdependence (or coupling) highlights the degree to which donor government 
policy actually influences practices on the ground – depending on how tightly the government, its 
relevant agency, its in-country office and implementing practitioners are coupled. In many cases the 
government is more likely to be tightly coupled with its agency, with looser coupling closer to the 
ground. In this case there is an increased opportunity to implement locally derived solutions, 
allowing greater autonomy at least in practice and greater local level resilience. There is, however, 
also the increased possibility of masked feedback to occur as the relationship between elements 
throughout the levels of the system is less obvious. In loosely coupled systems it is difficult to 
implement system wide changes – but on the other hand, the gap between top level bureaucracy and 
local outposts of an organisation offers the room to implement locally appropriate policy and 
practice.  
Consequently, situational analyses and M&E need to identify whether the system is loosely or 
tightly coupled as this will dramatically effect what is achievable in terms of system wide changes. 
Once coupling relationships are understood, strategies should be devised accordingly. For example, 
it may be necessary to address loose links: can relationships be improved? Or should the strategy 
exploit the gap and work with semi-autonomous groups within the organisation to achieve localised 
solutions? The analysis should be mindful that loosely coupled systems can have distorted impacts 
as weak links undermine communication and exchange between levels of the system. Others too 
may try to exploit the gap by taking advantage of misunderstandings due to weak links. PMM&E 
needs to be aware of the increased risk of masked feedback in loosely coupled systems and to allow 
for this in data collection processes.  
Often what interventions are attempting to achieve is the product of emergence. Capacity itself is 
something that emerges and is not reducible to its very many individual and interconnected parts. 
This emergence is the product of localised activity including the self-organisation of agents within 
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the system. This means that the manifestation of organisational capacity emerges from the ground-
up. In the case of interventions in the RoL system, it is typical that donors, with varying degrees of 
host government input, design and implement top-down change processes by virtue of their focus 
on state institutions. This does not mean that such interventions do not change the local. On the 
contrary, they are absorbed by the local as they feed into complex dynamic systems of 
interconnected and interdependent elements and feedback processes. They do not, however, change 
the local according to plan. Local systems take on the pressures from interventions and they adapt 
in unpredictable ways. 
State-building as a concept therefore, needs rethinking. It is likely that the ordering and hierarchies 
assumed by intervening actors is the wrong way around. Capacity may need to be developed from 
the ground-up or at least from both directions, meaning top-down forces must adapt and respond to 
localised changes which produce global emergence. Only so much can be achieved by technical 
interventions as skill and technologies are only part of capacity. Importantly, the concept of 
emergence means that the outcome of interventions will be unpredictable. This does not mean 
program management cannot make plans or predictions. It just means that we should expect 
programming to be wrong or only partly right about the anticipated outcomes. This is why M&E is 
so important. An M&E system must capture unintended consequences and feed back into the 
planning cycle immediately. PMM&E needs to be iterative – as each emergent property impacts 
upon the system in unexpected ways the intervention must adapt. More attention should be paid to 
localised interventions. Local level changes will produce high level changes. As Morgan suggests, 
there may be a need to focus on systematic processes in line with some critical rules that could then 
provide a program management environment conducive to enabling desirable change: 
Overall, the principles of emergence mean that over-controlling approaches will not work well within 
complex system – that in order to maximise system adaptiveness, there must be space for innovation and 
novelty to occur. While this may be obvious, this is often the reverse of what happens in the real world, 
because of a tendency to over-define and over-control rather than simply focus on the critical rules that 
need to be specified and followed.526 
Or as Arthur puts it, governments should not attempt to predict and coerce – but push gently: ‘Not a 
heavy hand, not an invisible hand, but a nudging hand’.527 
The actions of adaptive agents in CD programs will be motivated by factors which are largely 
unknown to program managers and practitioners. The information which motivates program 
managers and practitioners will be unknown to the other adaptive agents in the system. All actors, 
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both local and interveners, will be operating based on partial understandings (bounded rationality). 
Program managers and practitioners along with their counterparts need to ask questions like: Who 
are the intelligent adaptive agents in this system? What motivates their behaviour? What 
information/inputs is this based on? Are there general rules that govern their responses? How do 
they view the situation? How will they respond to a particular intervention? How will this play out 
with the interaction of other agents? This analysis will be vastly improved by drawing on the 
knowledge of such agents (stakeholders).  
The best way to gain an understanding of how the agents of a system will respond to intervention, 
and what might be the best approach to change, is to facilitate the broad inclusion of intelligent 
agents which make up that complex system. This inclusive analysis will need to include different 
ways of knowing and account for, or at least be aware of, the different knowledge verification 
processes different agents engage in (i.e. how does information become something that compels 
action?). The analysis will need to be power sensitive and politically aware. Not only do power and 
politics influence what agents will be willing to reveal, it also impacts upon motivation and 
behaviour generally. Agents will all be operating based on differing information. It is therefore 
critical that the process of planning, change and M&E includes a multidirectional, broadly inclusive 
communication strategy to try to build a common understanding and gain a rich picture of messy 
problem situations. The recognition of agency, and how actors work to better their situation, not 
only improves analysis but it reminds interveners of the crucial need to draw on and harness 
existing capacities, processes and perceptions in the interests of bringing about sustainable change.  
Program management and practitioners need to be aware of the potentially powerful implications of 
co-evolution in interventions. Not only are agents co-evolving with each other and the system itself 
– ensuring that things are in a constant state of flux – but also local systems and their agents are co-
evolving with the intervention. There are many examples of problematic adaptation that occurs 
within host country institutions and communities. Some of these examples include increased donor 
dependency. This can happen when the intervener sets up systems that the host personnel adapt to 
and become dependent on, but then find they are not sustainable after donor withdrawal. A simple 
example of this is the overuse of paper and computers, which donor introduced systems encourage 
and local economies cannot support. Another common problem is the withdrawal of counterparts. 
This often happens when practitioners take over a job within a host organisation and change it so 
that local personnel no longer have ownership over their workplace. Often local staff cope by 
withdrawing from the work.  
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The introduction of donor knowledge and the systems of interveners systematically devalues local 
knowledge. It is a prevalent response in host countries for counterparts to absorb this hierarchy of 
knowledge and to come to devalue local knowledge. This is highly problematic when it results in a 
disconnection of the host organisation’s personnel from broader society. Local actors are also 
known to mimic state actors and adopt bureaucratic approaches, not because they work, but because 
they attract funding.528 Whilst donor practitioners are generally pleased when local organisations 
begin to mimic their language and structures (as this makes them easier to deal with within their 
own existing structure) it can be, and often is, a negative development. It is critical that PMM&E 
does not reward such damaging co-evolutionary responses to the interveners’ presence as it sets up 
perverse and unsustainable systems. 529   
When attempting to influence change in a system, it is crucial that change agents are at least aware 
of the positive and negative feedback processes at play. For planning and adaptation purposes, it is 
critical to have current information about the impact of feedback in the interests of enhancing 
positive feedback and counterbalancing negative feedback. Of course this assessment in itself is 
quite simplistic. If negative feedback does occur, working against the planned change processes, it 
is extremely important to be informed and mindful as to why this is happening. It may be that an 
intervention is having unintended consequences and/or the system is correcting itself for good 
reason. The identification of masked and ignored feedback is also imperative for situation 
diagnosis, responsive adaptation and monitoring. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider feedback between systems and subsystems. Local 
knowledge will be invaluable in the identification of feedback. Any program management and 
M&E system should take stock of unintended consequences and ensure that they are identified 
through the inclusion of a broad group of stakeholders. Including perspectives from outside of the 
immediate system will also help to identify path dependent or run away positive feedback and may 
provide insights into how vicious cycles can be broken. Ramalingam and Jones point out, the use of 
logframes themselves might be seen as a case of damaging path dependency.530  
The idea that the way in which a system will behave relies heavily on the initial conditions seems 
obvious. It is therefore surprising how often this is ignored or obscured in the process of 
                                                 
528 L. Wiuff Moe, Addressing state fragility in Africa: A need to challenge the established ‘wisdom’? (Helsinki:  Crisis 
Management Initiative, Finish Institute of International Affairs, 2010) 26-31. 
529 I am not interested in making moral claims about the superiority of local knowledge. Treating local knowledge as 
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development environment. In fact, external practitioners, policy and program management personnel are all intelligent 
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530 Ramalingam and Jones, “Exploring the science of complexity.” 
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interventions. The understanding that no two systems are the same is followed by the reasonable 
assumption then that no two interventions in a system will be the same. The initial conditions will 
always be different – so too will be the outcome of any activity or change. This has several 
implications for conventional approaches PMM&E and the fundamental assumptions which 
underpin them. Context specific situational analysis is critical in setting up successful interventions. 
Such analyses are dependent on local knowledge and on as many different sources of knowledge as 
possible. Given the importance of initial conditions, there can be no such thing as ‘best practice’ in 
terms of prescribed universally appropriate interventions. As conventional approaches to PMM&E 
rely on standardised results (predictable impacts generated by controlled inputs), they are therefore 
methodologically flawed tools for the evaluation of CD interventions. Inaccuracies in the diagnosis 
of the initial conditions can start a chain of inaccuracies which will magnify over time. 
Interventions must therefore work with uncertainty and the unpredictable nature of complex 
systems. All things are never equal. Any methodology which assumes otherwise as its starting point 
is grossly inadequate.531 
The observations regarding the inadequacy of linear projections and analysis of complex nonlinear 
systems are critical in understanding the woeful track record of logical or rational program 
management tools. Tools such as the logframe have been explicitly criticised by those forced to use 
them for exactly this reason. Activity completion, leading to said output, resulting in predetermined 
outcome and ultimately resulting in a particular impact on the system is nothing like the 
experienced realties of practitioners and their counterparts.532 The disproportionate way in which 
the system responds to particular inputs means that PMM&E tools that rely on such linear 
projections need at least to be recognised for what they are – flawed change theories or partially 
informed guesses. The importance of non-linearity in complex systems reinforces the need to use 
PMM&E tools which focus on the whole and explicitly recognise the likelihood that inputs may not 
be followed by proportional outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, organisations receiving CD cannot 
be compartmentalised, technically ‘treated’ and clicked back together as a functioning whole – any 
analysis of a unit separate from its whole will produce distorted understandings and results. 
As this chapter demonstrates, complexity theory offers a far more sophisticated way of 
understanding the CD environment and the manner in which CD emerges than conventional 
approaches to PMM&E. This is largely demonstrated by the manner in which complexity theory 
concepts are better able to reveal, identify, explain and make sense of the data and relationships 
                                                 
531 See Jervis for an overview of why the premise ‘holding all things constant’ is irrelevant in the study of complex 
systems. R. Jervis, ‘Complexity and the Analysis of Political and Social Life’, Political Science Quarterly, 112(4) 
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which have proven critical to the process of CD in this case study. The foregoing analysis has 
provided an overview of the implications for practice which result from a complexity based 
understanding of CD. It is now important to consider what this understanding means for how CD 
can be managed and monitored in a manner that harnesses the complex realities of CD processes 
rather than ignoring them. The concluding chapter to this thesis therefore attempts to draw together 
the aspects of capacity and CD, align them with the relevant complexity concepts and explain how 
these understandings can be translated into an improved framework for PMM&E in police CD 
operations.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion – Proposing a Framework  
 
As the preceding analysis has indicated, there exists a significant overlap between the capacity and 
CD concepts that proved most relevant to the police CD operation, and the complexity concepts and 
their implications for practice and PMM&E.  This chapter now provides an overview of the key 
research findings and endeavours to make some practical contribution to the advancement of 
PMM&E design by proposing a framework for the PMM&E of police CD operations, particularly 
those operations that are of a similar nature to the RSIPF CD intervention explored in the case 
study. Like much of the research process, the manner in which this proposed framework emerged 
from the analysis has not been a linear pathway but instead an iterative process of building a staged 
approach that accounts for many of the implications of the research findings. Nonetheless, in an 
effort to clearly demonstrate the links between the research findings and the proposed framework, I 
shall begin this chapter by providing a matrix that helps to more clearly align the foregoing 
concepts and analysis with practical implications for a PMM&E framework, before attempting to 
provide an overview of the stages involved in implementing such a framework. I do not pretend to 
be offering a definitive solution to the PMM&E problem; nor is there any reason to suggest that this 
is the only way to go about managing and monitoring police CD. Rather I offer this proposed 
framework as a starting point to demonstrate the real possibility of harnessing a different conceptual 
understanding in PMM&E. I acknowledge that conversations about how to get around dominant 
and detrimental conventional practices are well under way, leading some to suggest the need to 
move from the ‘logframe’ to the ‘twigframe’.533 This is valuable, pragmatic thinking, ‘after all, 
twigs are more flexible, diverse and multidirectional than logs’.534 I therefore suggest that, where 
appropriate, there is a possibility for practitioners on the ground to use complexity based 
understandings in undertaking the forthcoming proposed stages of PMM&E and transferring the 
generated data into conventional frameworks for the sake of compliance.  
7.1 The Stages of the PMM&E Framework 
The proposed PMM&E framework is presented in stages. These stages constitute the steps involved 
in implementing the overarching PMM&E framework. The stages are described in this chapter as 
discrete activities or processes to be undertaken within the overarching PMM&E framework. These 
activities or processes are described as stages for two reasons: (1) in the interests of providing a 
clear breakdown and description of the various activities and processes which make up this 
approach to PMM&E; and (2) to reflect how the approach emerged from the foregoing analysis. 
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Throughout my data analysis (as summarised in Chapter 6 under sections 6.5 Applying Systems 
Thinking and Complexity, and 6.6 Conclusion: Complexity Implications for Program Management 
and M&E), the practical implications of the theoretical concepts and preceding analysis emerged, in 
that the need to undertake particular processes in PMM&E became apparent.  For example, the 
centrality of the complexity concept of interconnectedness/interrelatedness pointed to the need to 
include stakeholders (or CAA) from connected systems in the process of situation analysis and 
planning. This in turn led me to conclude that such inclusive situation analysis and planning stages 
were necessary activities/processes to be undertaken as part of the PMM&E approach. The data 
analysis identified a series of related stages which came together to constitute the proposed 
PMM&E framework. Consequently, the proposed framework herein is made up of interconnected 
stages. These stages are referred to in the matrix to demonstrate how each stage is designed to 
partially account for and accommodate the different aspects of the relevant concepts and their 
implications for practice. Whilst the individual stages do not, on their own, overcome the inherent 
problems of conventional approaches, taken together they work to achieve an iterative, non-linear 
approach to PMM&E which begins to account for the complex realities of police CD and works to 
harness the enabling conditions for a systems understanding of capacity to emerge.  
7.2 Matrix 
As prefaced above, I provide this matrix in the interests of summarising the salient concepts, which 
proved to be most relevant through the case study analysis, and demonstrating how these concepts 
inform and align with the stages of the proposed PMM&E framework which follows. This matrix 
demonstrates how the capacity and CD concepts (column 1) relate to, and overlap with, the 
complexity concepts (column 2), and how these concepts together result in implications for practice 
which inform key understandings for improved PMM&E (column 3). Finally this matrix links these 
concepts and implications for practice to the respective stages of the proposed PMM&E framework 
(column 4). In order to avoid a full reproduction of the concepts explored in previous chapters, I use 
here the numbers and descriptive titles assigned to them (refer to Chapters 4 and 6).535 The numbers 
and descriptive titles provided in column 4 refer to the stages of the PMM&E framework which is 
described later in this chapter.  
 
 
  
                                                 
535 Refer to Chapter 4, Table 3: Table of concepts, and Chapter 6, section 6.3 The Complexity Frame of Reference: 
Approach to the Data Analysis. 
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(1) Capacity/CD 
Concepts 
(2) Complexity 
Concepts  
(3) Program Management 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
(4) Stages 
1 Plan to leave 
from the start – 
avoiding 
dependency 
4 Co-evolution Avoiding dependency requires a 
sophisticated understanding of how it 
co-evolves with interventions and a 
locally informed strategy for ensuring 
CD is grounded in the context – 
increasing the likelihood of 
generating sustainable change. 
Ideally, every aspect of CD would at 
every level be subject to some form 
of locally informed sustainability test 
much like the informal assessments 
RSIPF members were often carrying 
out in controlling the CD they 
received. Also required at the 
strategic level as advocated by senior 
RSIPF. Ongoing monitoring required. 
3  
 
4 
 
5 
 
Situation analysis 
 
Planning 
 
Monitoring loops 
2 Be flexible/ 
adaptable, and 
analyse risk 
3 Emergence, 
localised 
interactions 
producing the 
global 
 
CD is emergent and therefore largely 
unpredictable. In the interests of 
influencing the environment and 
outcomes, and capturing actual 
change, there is a need to be flexible 
and iterative in the approach to CD 
with a strong emphasis on monitoring 
and adaptation informed by a wide 
variety of stakeholders based on 
different ways of knowing. Whilst 
top down CD will influence the local 
interactions, it will not control or 
accurately predict them. It is 
important to work at the local level to 
induce/support the emergence of 
capacity and to make adjustments to 
expected outcomes and CD 
implementation according to ongoing 
monitoring data received.  
1 
1b 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
Stakeholder 
identification and 
analysis 
 
Visions of success 
 
Planning  
 
 
Monitoring loops 
 
Unintended 
consequences 
3 CD takes time 5 Sensitivity to 
the initial 
conditions, 
non-linearity  
This concept derives from a 
persistent underestimation of the time 
involved in achieving CD outcomes 
and sustainable change. This is 
1 
 
 
3 
Stakeholder 
identification  
 
Situation analysis 
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largely due to a lack of understanding 
of the context and an inability to 
predict how change will play out. 
Conventional CD planning is 
generally based on a ‘logical’ 
understanding of how long tasks will 
take to complete rather than on an 
understanding of the complex manner 
in which systems change. Local 
knowledge is critical and should 
substantially inform time 
lines/monitor necessary adjustments 
to such time lines. All stakeholders 
should be informed regarding 
practical time lines. 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
Planning 
 
Monitoring loops 
 
Community 
communications 
4 Be realistic 
about what can 
be achieved 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Sensitivity to 
the initial 
conditions, and 
non-linearity 
 
CAAs 
 
The case study data suggests that 
being realistic requires a 
sophisticated understanding of the 
context, as well as the actors and 
their cultures within that context. 
Without such an understanding, 
interveners have a tendency to 
impose inappropriate systems with 
unrealistic expectations that 
ultimately undermine commitment to 
CD. Again this concept suggests the 
importance of including CAAs in all 
stages of planning, implementation, 
M&E. 
1 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
Stakeholder 
identification  
 
Situation analysis 
 
Planning 
 
Monitoring loops 
 
Community 
communications 
5 Manage 
expectations, 
and the 
importance of 
communication 
and 
relationships 
1 
 
 
2 
 
4 
Interconnected-
ness 
 
CAAs 
 
Co-evolution 
Expectations co-evolve throughout 
interconnected (sub)systems with the 
presence of intervening personnel 
being based on the short-term and 
temporary outcomes they produce. 
There is a need to engage a broad 
range of stakeholders in order to 
understand and manage these 
expectations. Stakeholder inclusion is 
critical in planning stages to ensure 
relevant stakeholders are fully 
informed. It is also important to 
1 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
7 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
 
Planning 
 
Monitoring loops 
 
Community 
communication 
 
Unintended 
consequences 
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monitor expectations as they evolve 
within wider (sub)system(s), and to 
keep the broader community well 
informed in the interests of 
generating realistic expectations and 
flow on accountability which 
emerges. 
6 Ownership and 
leadership is 
vital 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
Interconnected-
ness 
 
CAAs 
 
Emergence, 
localised 
interactions 
producing the 
global, and 
self-
organisation 
 
It is well established that local 
ownership is critical for the 
sustainability of CD outcomes and 
this ownership must be at every level 
of the analysis, planning and change 
process, and consequent evaluations. 
This inclusion cannot simply be 
within a predetermined scope as 
defined by intervening personnel, 
because the knowledge and 
expectations interveners bring with 
them will work to frame local 
ownership within a narrow confine – 
ultimately undermining the terms of 
inclusion. This is why broad notions 
such as ‘visioning’ are required to 
open up the space for local 
ownership. In the interests of 
harnessing and enabling local 
ownership it requires the inclusion of 
broader stakeholders and the 
recognition that capacity and change 
will be emergent and the product of 
localised interactions and self-
organisation. Therefore, such CAAs 
must be included to work with the 
change processes and to help capture 
changes in the (sub)system(s). 
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2 
 
3 
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5 
 
7 
 
 
8 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
 
Visions of success 
 
Situation analysis 
 
Planning 
 
Monitoring loops 
 
Community 
communications 
 
Evaluation 
reporting 
7 Holistic 
approaches 
based on sound 
analysis 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
Interconnected-
ness 
  
CAAs 
 
Emergence  
Approaches to CD must be based on 
an understanding of the whole and 
treat the organisation as a living 
system which is interconnected/ 
interdependent with other systems. It 
requires an understanding of CD as 
1 
 
 
3 
 
4 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
 
Situation analysis 
 
Planning 
176 
 
 
5 
 
Feedback 
processes, and 
non-linearity  
the emergent product of the many 
elements and therefore requires a 
holistic approach to analysis. Given 
that capacity and change is emergent 
it should be acknowledge in planning 
and M&E strategies and 
documentation that it will be 
unpredictable and change will be 
non-linear. Changes in the system 
will also produce feedback (positive 
and negative) which needs to be 
captured in the analysis. This requires 
monitoring mechanisms for 
unintended consequences as well as 
monitoring intentional change.  
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Monitoring loops 
 
Unintended 
consequences 
 
Evaluation 
reporting  
 
After action 
review 
8 Advising rather 
than ‘doing’, 
and technical 
assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
CAAs 
 
Emergence, 
and localised 
interactions 
producing the 
global  
 
Co-evolution 
 
Technical assistance is important but 
it cannot come at the expense of other 
elements of capacity. Technical 
assistance must therefore be provided 
in line with the established need on 
the ground and embedded into 
existing local systems and practices. 
It is best that such technical 
assistance be provided based on 
demand, in response to the context, 
with the understanding that this 
technical assistance will be absorbed 
into localised interactions producing 
an emergent capacity that is different. 
Advising is preferable to ‘doing’ as 
‘doing’ results is the co-evolution of 
dependence as well as the co-
evolution of unsustainable practices, 
which will then be built upon with 
other unsustainable practices/ 
systems. Engagement with CAAs and 
being critically aware of their needs 
will inform how much ‘doing’ is 
required to establish and maintain 
key relationships. 
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Stakeholder 
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Situation analysis 
 
Planning 
 
  
 
9 The delivery of 
CD, training 
and technical 
transfers 
10 Build on what 1 Interconnected- In the interests of building 1 Stakeholder 
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exists  
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
5 
ness 
 
CAAs 
 
Localised 
interactions, 
and self-
organisation 
 
Sensitivity to 
the initial 
conditions 
sustainable capacity and developing 
operating systems, processes and 
practices which make sense in the 
context, CD must be explicitly built 
upon existing capabilities and a 
sophisticated/nuanced understanding 
of the context. This requires 
including stakeholders in the analysis 
and planning stages, as well as an 
understanding of how systems 
interconnect and are interdependent. 
This understanding will provide 
opportunities to feed CD into localise 
interactions and to harness self-
organisation. This also requires the 
inclusion of local stakeholders in 
monitoring based on information 
channels and feedback loops which 
already exist. 
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Visions of success 
 
Situation analysis 
 
Planning  
 
Monitoring loops 
 
 
 
11 Importance of 
incentives, 
motivation, and 
perverse or 
unintended 
consequences  
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2 
 
5 
Interconnected-
ness 
 
CAAs 
 
Feedback 
The inclusion of stakeholders will 
allow planning and monitoring to 
take into account the vast array of 
incentives and motivations which 
inform the behaviour of stakeholders 
and the complex adaptive systems 
they comprise. As the case study 
revealed, motivations and incentives 
emanating from outside the formal 
system can be more powerful or at 
least partially countervailing upon 
incentives set up inside the formal 
realm. Situation analysis, planning 
and monitoring needs to be sensitive 
to this. Other examples such as 
negative feedback within the system 
are often a product of perverse or 
compromised incentives and there 
needs to be formal and informal 
channels for monitoring such 
consequences in order to inform CD 
adaptation.  
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consequences 
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12 Plan for staff 
turnover  
1 
 
 
2 
Interconnected-
ness 
  
CAAs 
The positive changes in capacity 
inside one unit will result in staff 
being attractive to other units. CD 
must take this possible turnover into 
account in planning. More 
importantly, personnel turnover 
amongst advisers causes enormous 
disruption due to the rupturing of 
relationships and the lack of 
knowledge possessed by incoming 
personnel. This needs to be addressed 
with less turnover and better 
handover practices. Furthermore, CD 
planning, implementation, etc., 
should be embedded in the host 
organisation rather than change every 
time advisers move. 
9 After action 
review 
 
And: 
PMM&E must be 
embedded in the 
local organisation, 
with local 
personnel as the 
knowledge keepers  
13 Accounting for 
the cultural 
environment 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
Interconnected-
ness 
 
CAAs 
 
Localised 
interactions, 
and self 
organisation 
Cultural systems inform the 
behaviour, knowledge acquisition 
and action cycle of CAAs. It is 
critical, therefore, that stakeholders 
are included in every aspect of CD 
PMM&E in the interests of fully 
accounting for the cultures 
influencing the environment. It must 
be explicitly acknowledged that 
culturally aware and informed 
analysis must take place at every 
level of the intervention and at every 
level of the systems. This is because 
the manner in which cultural factors 
will manifest in different places at 
different times will always vary, and 
therefore culture will be a factor in 
differing ways at the point of 
localised interaction/self-
organisation. PMM&E must 
therefore take place at all levels in 
order to influence and take account of 
how the cultural interplay at the local 
level produces an emergent global 
1 Stakeholder 
engagement 
 
Stakeholder 
inclusion at every 
stage and at every 
level based on the 
understanding that 
localised 
interaction 
produces the 
global 
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culture within the organisation 
(balancing diversity and coherence).  
14 Capacity is both 
a means and an 
end 
3 Emergence  This concept means that capacity can 
only be partially measured as 
performance. If performance is 
treated as the proxy of capacity then 
the unsustainable inputs of 
intervening personnel will be 
included in this measurement, and 
once they withdraw this capacity will 
collapse. This means that the 
measurement of performance needs 
to somehow disentangle local 
personnel performance from that of 
advisers and their resources. This 
requires minimal interference by 
advisers in those aspects being 
measured and/or the explicit 
recognition of their impact. 
Furthermore, capacity development 
processes should themselves be 
inherently capacity developing. By 
including local personnel in driving 
capacity development process such as 
those outlined in this staged PMM&E 
approach, the core component 
capabilities of capacity are enhanced 
and built upon. Such a 
comprehensive approach to CD as 
outlined here is not an extra burden 
but rather the process is inherently 
capacity building in itself. 
 Inclusion of local 
personnel in all of 
the stages of 
PMM&E 
Table 4: Matrix informing proposed PMM&E framework 
7.3 Introduction to Proposed Framework 
It must be acknowledged from the outset that the proposed PMM&E framework presented here is in 
a skeleton form. I now outline the stages involved in this proposed methodology with the full 
knowledge that considerable work is still required to establish the appropriate tools and methods for 
undertaking this type of approach. In particular, methods are required to identify and work with 
stakeholders in a manner that is power sensitive and ensures the optimum level of stakeholder 
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inclusion while avoiding the risk of creating a continuous discussion that is ultimately disabling in 
its complexities and contradictions. Such an exploration into appropriate tools and methods has in 
fact been advanced some way beyond what I am able to present here. However, for the purposes of 
this thesis it is sufficient to say that the tools for this type of participation do exist and are well 
established in the other fields, including, for example, tools developed for Participatory Rural 
Appraisal and guidelines such as the Participation Handbook for Humanitarian Fieldworkers: 
involving crisis-affected people in a humanitarian response developed by the Action Learning 
Network for Accountability and Performance.536 Furthermore, the interview data confirmed that 
some police CD practitioners and their counterparts undoubtedly have many of the required skills 
and established practices, as well as the intuitive inclination, to pursue this type of engagement – 
albeit largely in an informal capacity. With these capacities in mind, as well as other lessons 
deriving from practice revealed in the foregoing analysis, I now attempt to provide an overview of 
the proposed PMM&E framework. 
Taking into account the findings I have presented, and the matrix aligning these findings with 
practical implications for improved PMM&E, I propose a framework comprised of the following 
stages. As is evident from the below diagram – with the arrows illustrating how data and 
information flows into multiple stages and in multiple directions – these stages are designed to be 
iterative and flexible, ultimately feeding into each other to inform adaptation to CD. The stages are 
to be carried out sequentially and continuously as the cyclical diagram suggests, but they are also to 
feed back and forth (depicted by the arrows). This is because both PMM&E and CD itself should 
adapt to reflect and respond to the information and changes which emerge. For example the 
‘community communications’ stage (detailed below) logically flows into the broader examination 
of ‘unintended consequences’; however, it also feeds back to ongoing ‘stakeholder analysis’. 
Likewise, ‘monitoring loops’ directly feed data into the ‘evaluation and reporting’ stage but, 
critically, this stage also feeds data into ongoing program adaptation through continuous ‘situation 
analysis’ and adaptations to ‘planning’. Rather than viewing this framework as an onerous never-
ending planning cycle, it should be seen as an approach to managing and monitoring CD which is 
inherently capacity developing and is a reflection of the kind of iterative process of adaptation 
which experienced and successful CD practitioners in any case undertake intuitively. 
                                                 
536 Action Learning Network for Accountability and Performance, Participation Handbook for Humanitarian 
Fieldworkers: Involving Crisis-Affected People in a Humanitarian Response (London: ALNAP, 2009). Other sources 
include Participatory Rapid Appraisal and the Participatory Learning and Action approaches to stakeholder driven 
interventions (and related participatory community development techniques developed by proponents and practitioners 
such as Robert Chambers).  
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7.4 PMM&E Stages 
1. Stakeholder Engagement  
2. Visions of Success 
3. Situation Analysis 
4. Planning  
5. Monitoring Loops 
6. Community Communications 
7. Unintended Consequences 
8. Evaluation Reporting 
9. After Action Review 
 
 
 
 Figure 12: Proposed PMM&E framework stages 
This PMM&E framework is designed to be scalable and can be used at every level of a CD 
intervention. The stakeholders included and the level of detail at each stage will be determined by 
the scope or level of intervention/analysis. Levels of intervention/analysis will typically include: the 
national level, which will include political actors as well as various agencies in the RoL sphere; the 
Context 
Stakeholder Engagement 
Visions of Success 
Situation Analysis 
Planning (adaption) 
Monitoring Loops  
Community  
Unintended  
Evaluation / Reporting 
After Action Review 
Organisational Planning 
Host Govt Performance Assessment  
Donor Organisation Impact Reporting 
182 
 
organisation level; the branch and/or unit level (within the organisation); regional or other 
geographical levels (for example all police stations on a particular island); and the community level. 
There will be other approaches to determining the level of analysis and the scope of the PMM&E 
framework such as project-based lines of delineation. The idea is that this PMM&E framework can 
be used at all levels. In recognition of the interconnected/interdependent nature of (sub)systems, all 
levels of analysis would include in their scope relevant internal and external stakeholders and 
factors. Ideally, the higher levels of analysis would draw on the stakeholders and data identified at 
the sub levels. For example, analysis at the organisation level (formal system) would carry out the 
stages by including stakeholders from the respective units (subsystems) and drawing on their data, 
which in turn would be informed by the inclusion of their relevant stakeholders and so on. This 
allows for detailed stakeholder inclusion, data collation, and planning on the ground which is then 
abstracted up to the national level. The strength of this approach however is that it is flexible and, 
therefore, even if this framework is not adopted at the higher levels, it can still be used on the 
ground within the boundaries provided by higher level mandates, policies and strategic planning.  
7.4.1 Stakeholder engagement 
7.4.1a Stakeholder identification  
The purpose of the stakeholder identification stage is to identify relevant stakeholders to participate 
in the process of planning and M&E. This process will be specific to the operating space (level of 
intervention/analysis) and take into account issues such as locality, power relations, representation 
and enabling and disabling factors in existing social, cultural and institutional organisation in the 
host country. Depending on the scope of CD as well as the stability of the operating environment, 
the stakeholder identification stage will identify a range of relevant actors (or CAAs) including: 
partner organisations such as the agency/department undertaking the CD; its relevant oversight 
bodies; other donors and donor agencies working in the environment; as well as essential supporting 
institutions such as other sectors crucial to RoL (courts and corrections, for example). This analysis 
will importantly include cultural and social groups and factors, such as churches/religious 
organisations, women’s networks, youth groups, business relationships, NGOs, and community-
based organisations. It will also be critical to include informal and traditional systems of justice, 
social organisation and processes of exchange such as kinship groups, in the interests of valuing 
these systems and tapping into the enabling aspects of already established practices of information 
exchange, knowledge generation and social normalisation and legitimisation processes. It is crucial 
that this analysis also identifies groups which are seen to be an obstacle to safety and security, such 
as ex-combatants/militia, criminal gangs, and ‘problem youth’. The nature and level of participation 
will also be determined through prioritising according to objectives of the multi-stakeholder 
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process. This may require criteria for inclusion at different levels. It is important to note that the 
group of stakeholders will continually require reassessment and over time the level and nature of 
participation from stakeholders will necessarily change, as will new stakeholders emerge.  
7.4.1b Stakeholder engagement analysis: The determination of how these stakeholders can 
best interact 
The purpose of this assessment is to determine the appropriate nature of interaction between 
stakeholders. Aspects that need to be considered include power relations, capacity, language, 
cultural barriers and enablers, and locality and logistical constraints. Considering power relations 
will include identifying positive and negative power relations, addressing issues such as gender, 
age, ethnic and racial groups, religious groups, social hierarchies, institutionalised and informal 
power structures, as well as identifying risk in power relations. Perceived or real threats to safety 
and security (this includes social and economic security as well as physical security) are crucial 
considerations. It can be advantageous to include perpetrators as well as victims of crime in a police 
CD process. These approaches pose real risks as does the inclusion of politically motivated actors. 
Given the nature of police reform, actors can and do act to protect respective power bases. It will 
not always be appropriate or practical to bring all stakeholders together and often it is not necessary 
or desirable to do so. Taking into consideration these briefly outlined complexities (and many 
others) it is important to identify a method of inclusion that does not jeopardise the process or any 
actors included in it. It is also important to ensure the techniques of communication and engagement 
are suitable for those the process wishes to engage with. Obvious limitations such as low levels of 
literacy are easily identified but the analysis should not stop at that. Practitioners will need to ask 
‘what is the best way to relate to stakeholders to ensure they are at ease and comfortable with the 
mode of exchange?’  
7.4.2 Visions of success 
The purpose of what is commonly referred to as a ‘visioning’ exercise is to establish mutual 
understandings of success. It is important to note that, throughout this whole process, CD 
practitioners are also legitimate stakeholders. Accordingly, the expectations and goals they bring 
with them (including values and mandates) are treated as important and included in the visioning 
process.537 It is common to find that despite the diversity of the group, high level goals and 
expectations tend to be remarkably similar and the process of realising this can, in itself, be a 
motivation to overcome the obstacles. It is also very likely that the goals and objectives donors set 
for the project will emerge through this process as desirable visions (as the majority of stakeholders 
                                                 
537 In fact it is becoming increasingly recognised that donors explicitly declaring their own values, aspirations and 
limitations is beneficial in the trust building process and contributes to ensuring expectations remain realistic. 
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will have ambitions for peace, security, stability and providing the foundations for development). 
That said, it is crucial that practitioners do not impose their objectives and attempt to establish 
agreement around their predetermined goals. Instead, this forum should be open ended in the 
interests of facilitating the emergence of shared visions.  
In this ‘visioning’ exercise, participants should focus on the desired ‘impact’. That is, to describe 
what things would be like if RoL existed. Most participants are unlikely to give technical, 
quantitative or even directly RoL operational related responses. Instead, they might describe the 
desired impact as including a reduction in alcohol consumption, the re-opening of businesses, or an 
increased number of children going to school, for example. The collaborative approach to visioning 
can be a useful mechanism for generating and managing demands for CD. This will help the partner 
organisation to identify CD needs and issues requiring reform.538 The approach can also be helpful 
in managing competing stakeholder claims. In cases where stakeholders are making unreasonable 
demands, this process of collaboration offers an opportunity for counterclaims and empowers the 
respective stakeholders to reign in those stakeholders who are undermining the process. 
7.4.3 Situation analysis 
The purpose of this stage is to ask: (1) what is happening now?; and (2) how can we achieve change 
(in line with identified and prioritised visions)? It is during this stage that practitioners will collate 
baseline data. In a data poor environment, statistics tend to be unreliable and are notoriously 
misleading so other forms of data will need to provide a reliable substitute. The process should 
require the range of relevant stakeholders to visualise the desired condition and identify why this 
condition does not currently exist. What/who is standing in the way? What action needs to be 
taken? What do we need to overcome to achieve visions and desired impacts? What existing 
capacities can we support and use as an enabling basis for change? Other factors to be considered 
here are obstacles and boundaries. This includes identifying geographical and logistical factors. 
Where are the problems (physically) and how far can the resources stretch? Issues such as resource 
availability and current levels of capacity should be explicitly acknowledged to ensure these factors 
are taken into account in the planning stages and to minimise unrealistic expectations. It will be 
important at this stage to openly consider the future withdrawal of donor practitioners and 
resources. In undertaking this analysis, existing law and order providers present in the operating 
space should be accounted for – this will obviously include state institutions, addressing the existing 
                                                 
538 Given the relative lack of resources and/or opportunity to reform and plan, it is not uncommon for partner 
organisations to struggle to identify strategic goals and desirable CD objectives (making demand-side capacity 
development aspirational at best). This process can stimulate such thinking.  
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capacities as they relate to the outlined visions, as well as informal law and order actors and systems 
(and private security providers as applicable).  
7.4.4 Planning 
Based on the information collated during the above stages, the purpose of this stage is to plan 
change processes. The key objectives of this process are to identify steps to achieving goals and 
desired impacts (visions). Such steps will inform the identification of ‘indicators’ of success and 
progress for reporting purposes. In this stage the data collated in the situation analysis is analysed 
and mapped to locate baseline data and steps to achieving change are determined by stakeholders. 
This allows for the identification of anticipated inputs, outputs and outcomes leading to the desired 
impact. As a consequence, conventional PMM&E logic does not drive this process but the 
necessary data for satisfying its accompanying reporting frameworks can be extracted from the 
information collected and collated in previous stages. This process should also identify actors for 
carrying out tasks and anticipated timelines for task completion. The potential to undermine 
sustainability should be moderated in this inclusive approach to setting timelines, as it should 
generate realistic expectations that allow stakeholders to contribute to setting goals which they 
deem to be achievable. Moreover, the feedback loops inherent in this overall framework allow for 
evidence-based adjustments to planning, including timelines, where appropriate. 
During this stage it will be important to explicitly acknowledge how decisions were made, outlining 
the advice received from stakeholders to demonstrate how this information is being utilised and 
actioned. When approaching planning in a participatory manner, it will be appropriate to include 
stakeholders who can advise and liaise with their respective networks. In cases of institutional 
capacity development it will be crucial to include the partner organisation personnel in this process, 
as capacity development planning should explicitly link to the organisational planning of the partner 
institution. Utilising the information collated in the previous stages (visioning and situation 
analysis) the planning process converts this information into tangible action. Typically the data 
collated will inform the partner organisation’s strategic planning and this analysis will identify 
reform priorities and CD needs. The process then moves to planning change processes and 
consequent work/action/logistical plans. Finally the process identifies indicators of change 
associated with the action to be taken. This planning can be as detailed as breaking down the 
strategic plan to specific tasks and job descriptions as well as revising standard operating 
procedures and performance indictors in line with achieving CD objectives. Whilst such a holistic 
analysis can be broken down into this level of detailed planning, it is important to recognise that 
such components derive their meaning and coherence from the broader 
interconnected/interdependent understanding of the CD context and objectives.  
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7.4.5 Monitoring loops 
The purpose of this stage is to design and implement a system of continual data collation as 
evidence of progress (or otherwise) towards goals and visions (desired impacts). Various 
stakeholders can be responsible for collating data and monitoring and evaluating progress on a day-
to-day basis as well as reporting against indicators. The allocation of responsibilities will be 
determined by willingness, capacity, and logistical considerations such as locality and relevance. 
This process will necessarily identify other stakeholders to be engaged in order to gain feedback 
regarding changes occurring as a result of CD as well as barriers and challenges to it. Monitoring 
data will feed back from a range of relevant perspectives. Questions to ask include: who can help in 
determining how things are progressing; and, what is the best way to access and communicate this 
data? When these monitoring loops are in place, the data/information collated will provide evidence 
regarding the delivery of the above agreed upon work plans, implementation of strategic plans and 
the like. This monitoring/feedback system should ensure a wealth of information to inform program 
adaptation, organisational learning and performance reporting. In this way, M&E is embedded in 
the overarching program management framework. Stakeholders should be involved in designing 
this process to ensure local ownership, input and motivation. This should be done (where possible) 
in a way that shares responsibility and inherently builds upon local capacity. Getting stakeholders 
involved has the added benefit of increasing access to information and various perspectives – 
importantly including those that are well placed to observe and/or experience change. The methods 
for collating and using this data should be deliberately accessible, drawing on existing practices. 
This not only reduces the need for external experts but also ensures the information is relevant and 
useable for all stakeholders (including practitioners). This ‘unspecialising’ of M&E means that 
accountability becomes embedded in the context and the involvement of stakeholders inherently 
increases local awareness, accountability, capacity and ownership. 
7.4.6 Community communications 
The purpose of this stage is to develop a communication strategy for reaching a broader range of 
stakeholders than those directly involved in the above outlined process. The intention is to keep all 
interested people informed and provide opportunities for feedback. Different levels and types of 
participation will be appropriate for the varying stakeholders and the nature of participation will 
likely change over time. One of the most important goals of this stage is to drive and inform public 
accountability – to manage expectations and ensure that the artificial changes created by the 
presence of an intervention do not result in unreasonable expectations at the community level. This 
stage should generate awareness of the changes that are being pursued, the strategies for achieving 
change and the accountability mechanisms in place. This process will increase realistic expectations 
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in the community, fuelling ‘demand side’ CD. This not only gives a broader sense of ownership but 
will identify other stakeholders that have something to contribute. Importantly this process should 
harness existing information channels and tap into forums and gatherings that would take place in 
any case. It is critical this stage be undertaken prior to exploring the unintended consequences as it 
will increase the chance of valuable feedback.  
7.4.7 Unintended consequences 
The purpose of this stage is to reveal M&E and performance information that implementing 
stakeholders and personnel have not thought to look for. This process is extremely important in 
identifying feedback in the system(s) and the unintended consequences of CD, both negative and 
positive, avoiding the tunnel vision which has proven to be detrimental in conventional models. 
This approach should be as inductive as possible in the interests allowing new information to 
emerge. This requires asking broad and open-ended questions as well as allowing for the telling of 
stories in a manner that opens up possibilities for discussion. This stage provides an opportunity for 
broader stakeholders to have a say. It is the source of valuable information for reporting purposes, 
demonstrating success, identifying barriers and problems, and provides crucial data to inform 
ongoing program adaptation. Critically, this stage demonstrates a willingness to learn from the 
community, as well as junior staff, other agencies, and those that are not directly included in the CD 
process but are impacted by it. This process not only deepens local ownership and buy-in, it also 
significantly improves understanding of the broader consequences of CD activities – reducing blind 
spots and improving the ability to respond.  
7.4.8 Evaluation reporting 
The purpose of this stage is to collate the data generated through the above stages and to identify 
how this data can be abstracted and presented to satisfy the formal reporting processes. It will 
depend enormously on the type of performance management and accountability requirements which 
are in place, but generally speaking practitioners will need to transfer data into a conventional 
reporting format. Ideally the data collated in the above stages will provide the basis for reporting 
against the host organisation’s own internal performance management framework as well. The 
change in the partner organisation’s performance and capacity should be reflected in this process. 
Importantly, the data generated in the foregoing stages (and on an ongoing basis) can be provided to 
external evaluators if such an evaluation is required. This ensures external evaluators pay attention 
to what is actually happening as opposed to measuring success against imagined impacts derived 
from predetermined objectives set outside of the CD context.  
188 
 
7.4.9 After action review 
The most important purpose of this stage is to reflect upon lessons learnt, record the lessons and 
transform them into learning and improved practice. This stage is typically undertaken as either 
group or individual reflections – with different but related goals. Group reflections usually take 
place in a workshop environment immediately after action, while the issues are fresh in the minds 
of participants and all involved are still available. Generally speaking this is conducted after the 
completion of a program and in situ. However, it can also be useful either as a periodic tool or at the 
point of activity completion (rather than program completion). This approach is designed to 
stimulate group reflections about what has worked, what has failed, and what can be improved. 
Individual reflection (practitioner reflection) is another very useful approach to improving 
institutional memory and learning, particularly for long-term CD operations which suffer from 
knowledge bleeds due to high staff turnover and generally poor knowledge transfer mechanisms. 
This stage, in its most basic form, offers an opportunity to pass experience on from outgoing 
personnel to incoming personnel as well as to program management. This individual reflection can 
provide valuable information for evaluations and program adaptation and is particularly useful in 
providing insights into the lived experience of practitioners. This may inform improvements in pre-
deployment training and CD delivery generally. Importantly, a comprehensive record of practitioner 
experiences from emotional reactions and logistical issues to CD techniques and stakeholder 
contacts can be an invaluable source of information for incoming personnel at the time of transition, 
and can significantly improve continuity in CD delivery and provide a stronger footing for 
developing critical relationships with host personnel.  
7.5 The PMM&E Framework in Practice 
The purpose of presenting this proposed PMM&E framework is to demonstrate how the broader 
conceptual understandings of CD and complexity concepts might be adopted in practice. This 
proposed framework attempts to facilitate an approach to PMM&E which draws on different ways 
of doing, knowing about, monitoring and evaluating CD in a manner that is better able to work with 
the complex realities of a CD environment and harness the emergent nature of capacity. Whilst the 
above stages are numbered and appear sequentially in a circular diagram they are in fact designed to 
be flexible, with different stages being important at different times with different stakeholders and 
according to the different conditions - with stages feeding back and forth in an ongoing process of 
program adaptation. As acknowledged above, significant work remains to be done, including the 
identification of appropriate tools and methods for undertaking these stages. More work also needs 
to be done to develop a better understanding of what the resultant stakeholder participation, 
planning processes and documentation, monitoring loops, data, and reports might look like. I would 
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also expect considerable resistance in terms of the implied devolution of administrative and 
bureaucratic power as well as criticisms regarding the level of facilitative and professional expertise 
required for implementing such a framework. In response, I would argue that adjusting to such an 
approach would indeed require a great deal of time, resources and experimentation without 
guarantees of success but it must be acknowledged that conventional approaches already invest 
significant time and resources based on a logic model that is demonstrably deficient. This approach 
offers a real opportunity to change the PMM&E lens to better account for the real and lived 
experience of CD in a manner that is itself inherently capacity developing.  
7.6 Conclusion  
I have, in this thesis, systematically considered the literature and theoretical conceptualisations of 
capacity and capacity development in the context of international development programs. In 
considering the practice, and theoretical assumptions, of conventional approaches to program 
management, I have also demonstrated the incompatibility and ontological/epistemological tension 
between how capacity is understood to develop and how its development is managed, measured and 
monitored through conventional program management and M&E. With this contradiction in mind, I 
set out to understand if the conceptual understandings of capacity and capacity development 
outlined in Chapter 2 were relevant to police capacity development through exploring the case study 
of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Having established that such 
understandings of capacity and its development were indeed indicative of the manner in which 
capacity had been developing/emerging in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, the case study 
data confirmed that conventional approaches to PMM&E were incompatible or at least extremely 
unhelpful for understanding and managing the complex realities of police capacity development 
interventions such as this.  
Given the inadequacy of ‘logic-based’ models for the PMM&E of police capacity development, I 
then explored the explanatory value of complexity theory concepts in order to ascertain whether or 
not complexity theory offered a more useful way of understanding capacity development 
operations, and if so how this might translate to an improved PMM&E framework. As detailed in 
Chapter 5, complexity theory concepts such as interconnectedness/relatedness/dependence, 
coupling, complex adaptive agents, localised interactions producing the global, self-organisation, 
emergence, co-evolution, sensitivity to the initial conditions, feedback, and non-linearity were 
striking in their ability to make sense of the data and therefore demonstrated enormous potential for 
informing a different approach to PMM&E which is able to capture and respond to the complex 
realities of police capacity development.  
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As this concluding chapter demonstrates, the literature, theory and case study data considered 
throughout the research undertaken for this thesis significantly converge at the point of practical 
application for PMM&E. Whilst it would appear that a practical framework based on a staged 
approach to PMM&E, as proposed here, offers some potential for incorporating these 
understandings into the practice of CD, and provides a framework for utilising a complexity frame 
of reference to make sense of and manage a police CD operation, it must be understood in 
conjunction with the conceptual understandings outlined in previous chapters, such as systems 
based understandings of capacity development and related complexity theory concepts. If capacity 
development PMM&E were to be implemented based on the above framework (and stages) without 
such an understanding of the underlying theory, it would risk morphing into yet another tool for 
implementing more of the same as it would be possible to go through the above motions while 
holding to a conventional logic-based view of change. This practice would ultimately undermine the 
potential that such a PMM&E framework promises.  
Accordingly, I conclude by arguing that practitioners and program managers in police CD must 
have an understanding of the concepts of capacity and CD as outlined in Chapter 2 based on a 
systems perspective and an appreciation for the value of the core capabilities outlined therein. 
Practitioners and program managers must also have a sense of how these understandings explicitly 
and implicitly link to complexity theory concepts and how this completely reframes our 
understanding of change processes and CD in manner that demonstrably refutes the theoretical 
assumptions of conventional approaches to program management and M&E. I close by imploring 
CD interveners to use complexity theory to guide a contingent approach to CD driven by 
stakeholders and informed by an appropriate balance between ambition and humility.  
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Appendix 
Counterpart: RSIPF Interview Questions 
Questions  Coding / 
Concepts 
Name / Position / Unit of respondent:   
 
How long have you been working for RSIPF?  
  
Where are you from and what is your first language? 13 
 
In what way do you get assistance from PPF to do your job? Have they helped 
you to improve the way you do your job? If so, in what areas does PPF help you 
and how? 
9, 11 
  
Is the capacity development provided by PPF advisers fixed in a way that must 
be followed – or do you get a chance to discuss changes to suit your needs?  
Can you give examples of any changes made when you or your RSIPF 
colleagues suggested it? 
2, 6  
  
Do PPF Advisers ‘do’ the work – or do you ‘do’ it all?  
Or do PPF people just stand by to support you when needed?  
8  
  
Do you feel that some PPF advisers may be in too much of a hurry; that they 
sometimes expect changes to happen too quickly?  
Are you ever asked by advisers how long changes or improvements will take? 
3, 4 
  
Do you feel that the aims of capacity development and/or RAMSI advisers are 
realistic or are they sometimes unrealistic? Are you ever consulted? 
4 
 
What do you do when you are not really happy with the way capacity 
development is being done or you don’t fully understand the guidance or training 
you are receiving? Do you stay quiet, or do you say something?  
Who do you speak to about these matters? 
4, 6 
  
Do you think your current Adviser knows what the previous advisers were 
doing? OR are they trying to implement totally different things? 
10 
 
What sort of police service fits the Solomons? A system that is something like in 
Australia with the same equipment and ways of doing things? Or a police service 
that is less expensive, yet is still able to protect the public? How do you think 
policing should be different here than in Australia? 
5, 10, 13 
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Do you or other RSIPF contribute to planning and making decisions about 
changes – do you and/or other RSIPF plan and PPF support you? OR do RAMSI 
and PPF make most of the planning decisions and you carry them out? OR does 
RAMSI do it all?  
 6, 8, 10 
 
Since they are from countries outside the Solomons, some of the ways of RAMSI 
and PPF people are different.   
Do they try to learn how you as a Solomon Islander think and act and come to 
see that, sometimes, doing things the Solomons way is more effective – or do 
they always stick to their own ways of doing things?  
6, 10, 13 
  
Do you think all of the changes that PPF people have introduced are necessary? 
Or are there some things that cannot keep going after RAMSI leaves or because 
they do not fit Solomons culture or resources? Give examples. 
4, 6, 13 
  
When capacity development is being planned or improved do you make 
suggestions about what should be done and what is good in terms of culture? 
Do advisers encourage you to explain your ideas, and do they listen? Examples? 
6, 13  
 
Have there been times when cultural differences have come up and PPF advisers 
have been able to learn and to understand this and to work with you to find a 
solution?  
13 
 
Does your unit operate alone or are its operations closely linked with other units 
of RSIPF?  
Do you or other people in your unit work and plan together with other units? 
7  
    
Are HQ supportive or do you sometimes have problems getting action from them 
– for example: finance; human resources etc? Has HQ support changed since 
RAMSI began assisting with capacity development? 
7 
  
Do you work with other SIG agencies on any matter?  For example the courts? 7 
 
Are other SIG agencies helpful? 7 
  
What sort of training are you receiving? Do you use it in your work? 
Is it easy to learn the new things that RAMSI is introducing? Or are they 
sometimes hard to learn? 
9, 13 
 
Is the English used in speaking and in written instructions at a suitable level for 
you or your RSIPF colleagues? or should it be changed to use words commonly 
spoken here?  
Do you have any suggestions about different ways for learning?  
Do the PPF you work with speak pijin? 
13 
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Do you find it’s sometimes easier to let a PPF or RAMSI person do something 
because you’re not sure what they want? Example? 
8 
 
If you or your RSIPF colleagues have problems do PPF advisers try to work 
things out themselves? Do they talk to HQ for you? Or to SIG?  
Is it good if they do that? Would you prefer not to have to do that sort of thing? 
OR do you or the officer in charge of your unit handle these problems? 
8 
 
When you think back to how you did things in the past, there may be some 
things that you thought you and your colleagues were doing well at the time.  
Are you still doing those things in the same way now, or has everything 
changed?  
10 
 
Do you think any PPF people have learned things from you? 10 
 
Have you seen benefits from RAMSI being here and changes made? 11 
 
When RAMSI come first time – was it clear that RAMSI would help for reforms 
and capacity development and then go back home? Or did it seem like they 
would be here for good?  
 
1, 5 
 
Do you believe your unit is now capable of doing its job without more capacity 
building?   
3 
 
Do you think RAMSI and the PPF are preparing RSIPF for when they leave? If 
so, how? 
1 
 
Do you sometimes feel you might have to ignore new systems or rules because 
of wantok, political or tension-related pressures on you?  
Do you think there are others who ignore the rules because of these pressures? 
11, 13 
 
Do you like working here? Do you intend to continue working for RSIPF until 
you retire?  
12 
 
Would you consider another job outside RSIPF and, if so, would the things you 
learn through CD be useful somewhere else?  
12 
 
How does RSIPF and PPF know if you and your colleagues are doing a good 
job? Do you have performance management systems or audits? 
 7 
 
Do you think this is a good way to keep track of RSIPF performance? Or are 
there better ways to know? 
7 
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If RSIPF were doing a good job at policing and keeping people safe, who do you 
think would be happy about this? Who are the stakeholders? 
7,10,13 
 
How would you know if these stakeholders are happy or not? Are these people 
ever asked what they think about RSIPF? Is this reported in any way? 
6,7,10,13 
 
When RSIPF are doing good work and when there is strong RoL are things 
different in Solomon Islands? How? 
7 
 
What do you think community policing is? How would you describe it? 10 
 
Does your unit have any connection with community or church organisations or 
with other people outside of RSIPF? Explain. 
7, 13 
 
Do you think the changes that are happening in RSIPF are what the community 
wants? Might Solomon Islanders prefer to do some things differently? 
6, 7, 13 
 
Is it a good idea for police to work with traditional justice and reconciliation 
systems? Is it good for police to work with chiefs or church? 
 
Do you think the traditional system and custom are good for handling some law 
and order issues? Which ones? 
7, 13 
 
Refer to stakeholders identified – do you think that RSIPF should work closely 
with these groups – how can they improve these relationships? 
 
Do you think that RSIPF should work closely with women’s groups and youth 
and crime prevention groups? 
7,10,13 
 
Do you think the community respects RSIPF? What can be done to improve 
trust? 
7,11,13 
 
Summing up:   
 
What is the biggest problem RSIPF faces that must be fixed before RAMSI 
leaves? 
10 
 
Capacity development is a process through which the ability to do a job is 
improved. RSIPF capacity development applies to individuals, units, and the 
whole of police, as well as SIG. If it is done well after RAMSI leave RSIPF will 
police effectively and things will keep getting better – because the RSIPF 
management will plan for the future well.  
 
Would you say that capacity development has:  
1. been very successful;  
2. been successful;  
3. resulted in some improvement;  
 
204 
 
4. been good for now but will go backwards in the long-term (after RAMSI 
leave); or  
5. been unsuccessful? 
 
What changes would you like to see in the way capacity development is done in 
the future that best fits Solomons needs and resources? Are there other areas that 
should be receiving support in the future? 
 
 
Ask the interviewee specific questions about priorities in their area according to 
the strategic and annual plans  
 
6 
 
Additional questions asked to RSIPF in relevant units   
• What are the main safety concerns of the community? 6,10,13 
• Do women have control over their own safety and security or are they 
dependent? 
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Adviser: PPF Interview questions 
Questions for Advisers Coding/ 
Categories 
What is your role/title? Who is your counterpart/unit?  
Do you provide wider support? 7 
 
Do your counterparts have the foundation and education necessary to absorb the 
capacity development being offered? 
10 
 
Do the duties outlined in your Terms of Reference adequately describe the 
functions you are performing? 
14 
If not, how could this be improved?  
 
Have you found capacity development planning and monitoring tools to be 
useful?  
14 
 
What is your feeling about progress against key performance indicators? 
Do you think these measures effectively capture what is going on?  
Do you have suggestions regarding improvements? 
 
  
How does the monitoring and evaluation of capacity development link up to 
RSIPF’s organisational goals, planning and performance management in your 
area of work? 
10 
 
Do you have an exit strategy (transition strategy)? What time frame do you think 
is required for your counterpart to achieve independence allowing you to exit and 
leave a sustainable operation? 
1  
 
Do you feel that training and mentoring experience was an important factor in 
your appointment or was the emphasis more on your technical capabilities?  
9 
 
In what way do you think your previous work experience has been relevant to the 
work you are doing now as a capacity builder? 
9 
 
What sort of predeployment training did you receive? Was it helpful? Did it 
prepare you for what to expect? 
10 
 
Have you received any specific training on capacity development approaches? 14 
 
Did your predecessor pass on useful information – could they have told you 
more?  
 
 
Do you feel there is room to take a flexible approach to CD?  2 
 
How do you manage the risk associated with CD? (when you stand back and 
your counterpart is upfront how can you control the risk?) 
2 
 
Do you sometimes encounter time frames and objectives that are so tight that 
your counterparts can’t get them done?  
2,3 
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Do you think your counterpart and other RSIPF personnel and officers 
understand the concept of capacity development and your role? 
5 
 
Is your counterpart or other RSIPF accountable for achieving CD outcomes? OR 
do they have a parallel performance criteria and priorities? 
11,10 
 
Do your RSIPF counterparts make planning and capacity development decisions 
– or do you include them in this process? In what ways? Is this successful – or 
are there problems? 
6 
 
Have you been able to support local ideas through capacity development? 6, 10 
 
Have you found it difficult to get Solomon Islander personnel to voice their 
opinions? If so, what do you think is the reason for this?  
6,13,10 
  
How much of the work do you actually have to ‘do’? Do Solomon Islander 
personnel you work with depend on you? How? 
8 
  
Do you think your counterpart has ownership over planning and monitoring in 
their area of responsibility? Do they monitor and follow-up on decisions made, 
assigned tasks and action plans?  
6 
 
Do the RSIPF within this work unit/area carry out the day to day duties/ 
recurrent activities or does this require your regular monitoring and assistance? 
8,9 
 
Is RSIPF staff turnover a problem? You train people and then they disappear?  12 
  
Does the work in your counterpart unit affect, or is affected by, other RSIPF 
units? How do you work with them? 
7 
  
Has the performance of any other RSIPF units helped or weakened the impact of 
capacity development in the area in which you work? 
7 
 
Have other agencies and/or SIG helped or undermined capacity development 
efforts in your area of responsibility? 
7 
 
Do you work closely with or talk to other CD agencies? 7 
 
Does your work involve engagement with any organisations, groups and/or 
individuals outside government? 
7, 13 
 
Who would you say are the stakeholders of the capacity development work that 
you do? How do you engage with them? Do they influence capacity development 
decisions? 
6,10,13 
 
Do you think the community knows much about CD? 6 
 
Do you have any way of knowing how the work you do, and/or the PPF do 
generally, impacts upon the community? Do you have examples of flow on 
effects of capacity development? Are these things captured in your performance 
6,7 
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measures and M&E? 
 
How do you understand the role of traditional and informal RoL and justice 
providers in the Solomon Islands? Are they relevant at all to your work here? 
Are they included in capacity development? 
7,10,13 
 
Do your counterparts have different ways of doing things? Have you found their 
approaches helpful or frustrating? 
6, 10,13 
 
Have you made any changes in your approach to training and/or CD methods to 
make them more effective and culturally appropriate or do you feel this is not 
necessary? 
9, 13 
 
Have you been encouraged to learn to understand or to speak Pijin? Do you 
sometimes use Pijin in capacity development activities? 
13 
 
Do you sometimes find the improvements you are attempting to implement seem 
to be blocked by some belief, practice or perception that arises from cultural 
differences? Can you work around it – or does the culture need to change?  
11, 13 
 
Have you found that social responsibilities of RSIPF staff incurred through 
“wantokism” or family pressures can be accommodated without unduly 
interfering with their work – or is it problematic? 
13 
  
Are there sufficient incentives in place to motivate change and CD? 11 
 
In summary:  
 
Interviewer to read the Australian AID definition of capacity development:  
Overall would you say that capacity development in this area has been (or will 
be): Very successful; successful; provide modest improvements; is effective now 
but will be largely ineffective in the long-term (as things will revert after 
withdrawal); is a failure? 
 
 
Are there changes or other areas of focus you believe would improve capacity 
development in the future?  
 
  
Any other matters?  
 
